# restic-manager — Specification

## 1. Overview

**restic-manager** is a self-hosted, browser-based, single-pane-of-glass for managing [restic](https://restic.net) backups across a fleet of Linux and Windows endpoints. It provides visibility, scheduling, ad-hoc operations, restore workflows, and alerting from one UI.

It is built for small-to-medium fleets (initial target: ~12 endpoints) and is intentionally simple to deploy: one Docker Compose file on the control-plane host, one small agent binary on each endpoint.

**License:** PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0

## 2. Goals & Non-Goals

### Goals
- Central visibility into backup state for every endpoint
- Trigger any restic operation remotely (`backup`, `forget`, `prune`, `check`, `unlock`, `snapshots`, `stats`, `diff`, `restore`)
- Manage per-host backup schedules from the UI
- Live job progress streamed back to the UI
- Restore wizard (browse snapshots, pick paths, restore to original or alternate host)
- Repo health surfacing (size, dedup ratio, last check, lock state)
- Alerting on failure or staleness
- Cross-platform agent (Linux + Windows)
- Ransomware-resistant repo access via append-only credentials

### Non-Goals (initial release)
- Replacing restic itself or providing custom repo formats
- Managing non-restic backup tools
- Multi-tenancy / SaaS deployment
- High availability of the control plane (SQLite, single-instance)
- Mobile-native apps (responsive web only)

## 3. Architecture

### 3.1 Components

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Proxmox cluster                                                 │
│  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │  docker compose: restic-manager                            │  │
│  │   - server (Go binary, REST + WS API, embedded HTMX UI)    │  │
│  │   - SQLite volume                                          │  │
│  └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
└────────────────────────▲─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                         │ HTTPS (control plane)
                         │  - agent → server: status, telemetry
                         │  - server → agent: commands, schedules
                         │
┌────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Endpoints (Linux + Windows)                                     │
│  ┌──────────────────────┐    ┌────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │  restic-manager-     │    │  restic CLI                    │  │
│  │  agent (Go binary)   │───▶│  invoked by agent              │  │
│  │  - systemd / svc     │    └─────────────┬──────────────────┘  │
│  │  - WS to server      │                  │ HTTPS               │
│  └──────────────────────┘                  │ (data plane)        │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┘
                                              │
                                              ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Unraid                                                          │
│  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │  Docker: restic/rest-server                                │  │
│  │   - per-host append-only credentials                       │  │
│  │   - one repo per host                                      │  │
│  │   - storage: Unraid share                                  │  │
│  └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

### 3.2 Data flow

- **Backup data:** endpoint → restic CLI → restic REST server on Unraid → Unraid share. The control plane *never* touches backup bytes.
- **Control plane:** agent maintains an outbound WebSocket to the server. Server pushes commands and schedule changes; agent pushes status, logs, live job progress, host metadata.
- **UI:** browser → server (HTTPS, session cookies). Server fans out commands to agents, streams progress back to browser.

### 3.3 Why agent (not SSH)

- Push model works through NAT/firewalls without inbound rules
- Native Windows support without OpenSSH service quirks
- Local scheduling survives controller restarts
- Self-contained `restic --json` parsing, no remote shell quoting hazards

### 3.4 Why per-host repos

- Isolates corruption / lock contention
- Append-only credentials per host = compromised endpoint can't delete other hosts' backups
- Simpler `prune` orchestration (no global lock coordination)
- Trivially easy to retire a host (delete its repo + credential)

## 4. Components in detail

### 4.1 Server

- **Language:** Go 1.22+
- **Storage:** SQLite (via `modernc.org/sqlite`, no CGo)
- **HTTP:** `net/http` + `chi` router
- **WebSocket:** `github.com/coder/websocket` (the maintained fork of the
  unmaintained `nhooyr.io/websocket`; same API)
- **UI:** HTMX + Tailwind, server-rendered Go templates, no Node build step
- **Distribution:** single static binary, packaged in a Docker image; published `docker-compose.yml`
- **Config:** YAML or env vars:
  - `RM_LISTEN` — bind address, e.g. `:8080` (source of truth for the port;
    the `8080` in the reference compose is just a default mapping). Bind to
    `127.0.0.1:8080` when running behind a same-host proxy.
  - `RM_DATA_DIR`, `RM_BASE_URL`, `RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE`
  - `RM_TRUSTED_PROXY` — comma-separated CIDR list of reverse proxies
    whose `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Forwarded-Proto` we honour. Empty (the
    default) = trust no one. Set this when fronted by Caddy/Traefik.
  - `RM_COOKIE_SECURE` — `true` (default) marks session cookies `Secure`.
    Only set to `false` for local HTTP-only testing.
- **TLS:** the server speaks plain HTTP and is **always** expected to sit
  behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (Caddy / Traefik / nginx). This
  keeps cert renewal, ACME, and SNI in the proxy where operators already
  manage it. Agents must reach the server over HTTPS; the cert pin
  (`cert_pin_sha256`) pins whatever cert the proxy serves.

### 4.2 Agent

- **Language:** Go (cross-compiled for `linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64`, `windows/amd64`).
  Phase 1 ships Linux only; Windows binaries continue to build in CI to keep
  the codebase portable, but Windows service integration + signed installer
  + install.ps1 land in Phase 2.
- **Service integration:** systemd unit (Linux). Windows service via
  `golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc` — Phase 2.
- **Footprint goal:** ≤ 15 MB binary, ≤ 50 MB RSS idle
- **Privilege model:** the agent runs as root, sandboxed via systemd. A
  fleet-backup tool needs to read every file on the system regardless
  of DAC permissions; running as a dedicated unprivileged user means
  either silent skips on `/home`, `/root`, `/var/lib/<other-daemons>`,
  or operators having to add the service user to every group whose
  files they want backed up. Both are worse failure modes than the
  threat model already implies — the agent holds long-lived repo
  credentials, executes arbitrary `restic` commands, and runs
  operator-defined hooks; its blast radius is already large. This
  matches how every comparable tool ships (UrBackup client, Veeam
  Agent, Bareos FD, BackupPC client, borgmatic via systemd). The
  mitigation is aggressive systemd sandboxing of the root process:
  drop the capability set to `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH` (read any file)
  + `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`/`CAP_FOWNER`/`CAP_CHOWN` (restore ownership);
  `NoNewPrivileges=true` blocks escalation; `ProtectSystem=strict`
  + a tight `ReadWritePaths=` confines writes to `/etc/restic-manager`
  and `/var/lib/restic-manager`; `ProtectHome=read-only` keeps `/home`
  readable but immutable; standard `Protect*` / `Restrict*` toggles
  cover the rest. Hooks (P2) run as root by default with a per-hook
  override knob.
- **Persistence:** `agent.yaml` (server URL, host ID, bearer, secrets
  key) + an AEAD-encrypted secrets blob (`secrets.enc`) holding the
  restic repo URL + password. Both files are mode 0600 owned by root.
  Phase 1 ships the encrypted-file form on Linux; Phase 2 swaps that
  for OS-keyring storage (DPAPI on Windows, Secret Service / `pass`
  on Linux where a session bus is available — see §7.3). A small
  state DB (BoltDB or JSON) for queued reports lands when offline-
  resilience work does.
- **Restic invocation:** spawns `restic` with `--json`, parses streamed output, forwards to server in real time
- **Updates:** distributed via OS package manager — apt repo (Linux) and
  Chocolatey package (Windows), both pointing at gitea releases. No
  bespoke signed-binary self-update; the `restic-manager-agent update`
  command is a thin wrapper over `apt-get install --only-upgrade` /
  `choco upgrade`. UI surfaces "agent N versions behind server" so an
  operator knows when to upgrade.

### 4.3 Restic REST server (Unraid)

- Run `restic/rest-server` Docker container
- `--append-only` enabled
- `--private-repos` enabled (each user only sees their own subpath)
- htpasswd file with one user per host
- Storage path mapped to Unraid share

## 5. Domain model

```
Host
  id, name, os, arch, agent_version, restic_version, protocol_version,
  enrolled_at, last_seen_at, status (online/offline/degraded),
  repo_id (FK), tags,
  current_job_id (FK nullable),
  last_backup_at, last_backup_status (succeeded|failed|cancelled|null),
  repo_size_bytes, snapshot_count, open_alert_count,
  applied_schedule_version
  # Bottom block (last_backup_*, repo_size_bytes, snapshot_count,
  # open_alert_count, applied_schedule_version) are denormalised
  # projections, refreshed on job.finished, snapshots.report,
  # repo.stats, and alert state changes.
  # applied_schedule_version is the schedule_version the agent most
  # recently acknowledged via `schedule.ack` — lets the UI surface
  # drift when an agent is offline.

Repo
  id, name, url, kind (rest|s3|local), credential_id (FK),
  password_secret_id (FK),
  size_bytes, snapshot_count, dedup_ratio,
  last_check_at, last_check_status, lock_state (locked|unlocked),
  append_only (bool), credential_rotated_at
  # Bottom block is a cached projection from `restic stats` +
  # Credential row, refreshed by repo.stats agent messages.

Credential
  id, kind, username, secret_ref (encrypted),
  rotated_at

Schedule
  id, host_id (FK), kind (backup|forget|prune|check),
  cron_expr, paths (json), excludes (json), tags (json),
  retention_policy (json), options (json), pre_hook, post_hook,
  enabled
  # retention_policy: {keep_last, keep_hourly, keep_daily, keep_weekly,
  #                    keep_monthly, keep_yearly, keep_tag: [...]}
  # options:          {limit_upload_kbps, limit_download_kbps}
  # pre_hook/post_hook: see §14.3 (encrypted at rest)

Job
  id, host_id (FK), kind, status (queued|running|succeeded|failed|cancelled),
  scheduled_id (FK nullable),
  actor_kind (user|schedule|system), actor_id (nullable),
  started_at, finished_at,
  exit_code, stats (json), error

JobLog
  job_id (FK), seq, ts, stream (stdout|stderr|event), payload

Snapshot  (cached projection from `restic snapshots --json`)
  id (restic id), host_id (FK), repo_id (FK),
  time, hostname, paths, tags, size_bytes, file_count

Alert
  id, host_id (FK nullable), kind, severity, message,
  created_at, acknowledged_at, resolved_at

User
  id, username, password_hash, role (admin|operator|viewer),
  created_at, last_login_at

Session
  id, user_id (FK), created_at, expires_at, ip, ua

AuditLog
  id, user_id (FK nullable), actor (user|agent|system),
  action, target_kind, target_id, ts, payload (json)
```

## 6. API surface (control plane)

### 6.1 UI/REST (browser → server)

```
POST   /api/auth/login
POST   /api/auth/logout

GET    /api/fleet/summary                (aggregate: host counts by status,
                                          total bytes, open alerts; reused by /metrics)

GET    /api/hosts                        ?tag=&status=&limit=&offset=
                                          (returns Host rows incl. denormalised
                                          last_backup_*, repo_size_bytes,
                                          snapshot_count, open_alert_count,
                                          current_job_id)
GET    /api/hosts/:id
DELETE /api/hosts/:id
POST   /api/hosts/:id/enrollment-token   (regenerate)
POST   /api/hosts/:id/agent/update       (force agent self-update; see §4.2)

GET    /api/hosts/:id/snapshots          ?tag=&path=&since=&until=&limit=&offset=
GET    /api/hosts/:id/repo               (full Repo projection)
POST   /api/hosts/:id/jobs               (run-now: backup/forget/prune/check/unlock)
POST   /api/hosts/:id/restore            (restore wizard submit)

GET    /api/hosts/:id/schedules
POST   /api/hosts/:id/schedules
PUT    /api/schedules/:id
DELETE /api/schedules/:id

GET    /api/jobs                         ?host_id=&kind=&status=&since=&until=
                                          &limit=&offset=&order=desc
GET    /api/jobs/:id
GET    /api/jobs/:id/logs                (paginated: ?after_seq=&limit=)
WS     /api/jobs/:id/stream              (live progress; see §6.2 for shape)
POST   /api/jobs/:id/cancel

GET    /api/repos
GET    /api/repos/:id

GET    /api/alerts
POST   /api/alerts/:id/ack

GET    /api/audit
GET    /api/users   (admin)
POST   /api/users   (admin)
```

**Realtime strategy:** only `/api/jobs/:id/stream` uses WS. All other screens
(dashboard, hosts, snapshots) refresh via HTMX polling (~10s cadence). Revisit
if dashboard staleness becomes a problem in practice.

### 6.2 Agent ↔ Server

Single authenticated WebSocket per agent. Bidirectional JSON-RPC-ish messages.

**Agent → server:**
- `hello` (host metadata, agent_version, restic_version, OS,
   `protocol_version` — see "Protocol versioning" below)
- `heartbeat` (every 30s)
- `job.started` (job_id, kind, started_at)
- `job.progress` (job_id, percent_done, files_done, total_files,
   bytes_done, total_bytes, eta_seconds, throughput_bps)
- `job.finished` (job_id, status, exit_code, stats, error, finished_at)
- `snapshots.report` (full list after each successful backup)
- `repo.stats` (size_bytes, snapshot_count, dedup_ratio, last_check_at,
   last_check_status, lock_state)
- `log.stream` (live stdout/stderr lines while job running;
   {job_id, seq, ts, stream: stdout|stderr|event, payload})
- `schedule.ack` (schedule_version) — agent confirms it has applied a
   schedule push; lets the server surface "this host is N versions
   behind" without polling

**Server → agent:**
- `command.run` (kind, args)
- `command.cancel` (job_id)
- `schedule.set` (schedule_version, schedules: [...]) — full schedule
   list, agent reconciles local cron and replies with `schedule.ack`
- `config.update`
- `agent.update.available` (new version + package source URL —
   informational only; agent does not self-update, see §4.2)

The server fans `job.progress` and `log.stream` for a given job to all
browsers subscribed to `WS /api/jobs/:id/stream` (§6.1) without
transformation, so the schema is shared end-to-end.

**Protocol versioning.** Agents and the server each declare an integer
`protocol_version` in `hello`. The version bumps **only** on breaking
wire-format changes (not human-readable software releases). The server
maintains a `MinAgentProtocolVersion` constant; agents below it are
disconnected with `error: protocol_too_old` and a URL pointing at the
upgrade instructions. Symmetrically, an agent talking to a server that
advertises a `protocol_version` it does not recognise refuses to
proceed and surfaces a clear log message. This avoids the failure mode
of "weird JSON parse errors when v0.3 agent meets v0.5 server."

**Schedule reconciliation when the server is unreachable.** Agents
keep firing the **last-known-good** schedule pushed by the server,
indefinitely. Rationale: a missed backup because the controller is
down is a worse outcome than firing a schedule the user has since
edited. On reconnect, the server's view is canonical: the next
`schedule.set` overrides whatever the agent was running, the agent
replies `schedule.ack` with the new `schedule_version`, and the server
updates `Host.applied_schedule_version`. The UI surfaces drift
("schedule v7 pushed, agent applied v5") when an agent has been
offline.

### 6.3 Enrollment

1. Operator clicks "Add host" → server generates one-time token (TTL 1h)
2. Operator runs install script on endpoint with token
3. Agent calls `POST /api/agents/enroll` with token + host metadata
4. Server issues persistent agent credential (bearer token + TLS pin) and host record
5. Agent stores credential, opens WS connection

## 7. Security

### 7.1 Authentication
- **Phase 1:** username + password (argon2id), HTTP-only secure session cookies, CSRF tokens on state-changing requests
- **Phase 2:** OIDC (Authelia, Keycloak, Authentik)
- **Agents:** bearer token over TLS; pin server cert fingerprint at enrollment time

### 7.2 Authorization (Phase 1: simple roles)
- **admin:** everything
- **operator:** trigger jobs, edit schedules, restore
- **viewer:** read-only

### 7.3 Secret handling
- Restic repo passwords and REST-server credentials encrypted at rest
  in SQLite using a server-side key (loaded from env or file at
  startup, AEAD via `internal/crypto`).
- Operator supplies repo URL + username + password when minting an
  enrollment token. The token row holds them as a single encrypted
  blob; on `ConsumeEnrollmentToken` the blob is moved to a
  `host_credentials` row keyed by `host_id` (same tx).
- Pushed to agents over the authenticated WS as a `config.update`
  message — sent immediately after the agent's `hello` on every
  connect, and again whenever the operator edits the credential.
  Agents that connect before credentials exist proceed normally
  but refuse to start backup jobs until the push arrives.
- Agent persistence:
  - **Phase 1, Linux:** AEAD-encrypted file at
    `/var/lib/restic-manager/secrets.enc`, key stored in
    `agent.yaml` alongside the bearer (same 0600 trust boundary).
    Atomic writes (tmp+fsync+rename).
  - **Phase 2:** OS keyring where available — Windows DPAPI; Linux
    Secret Service via `pass` / `gnome-keyring` / `kwallet` when a
    session bus is present. The encrypted-file path stays as the
    fallback for headless boxes.
- Plaintext repo passwords never appear in `agent.yaml`, server logs,
  audit-log payloads, or job-log streams. The audit log records
  *that* a credential was set/changed and by whom, never the value.

### 7.4 Repo protection
- Restic REST server runs with `--append-only` for routine backups
- A separate non-append-only credential exists for `forget`/`prune` operations, used only when explicitly invoked from the UI by an admin/operator and audited

### 7.5 Audit
- Every state-changing UI action and every server→agent command logged with user, target, timestamp, and payload

## 8. UI

Stack: HTMX + Tailwind + Go html/templates. No SPA framework. Server-rendered, progressive enhancement.

**Pages:**
- **Login**
- **Dashboard:** fleet overview (host cards: status, last backup, repo size, alerts)
- **Host detail:** tabs for Snapshots / Schedules / Jobs / Repo / Settings
- **Job detail:** live log streaming via WS, cancel button
- **Restore wizard:** host → snapshot → paths → target → confirm
- **Repos:** aggregate view across hosts
- **Alerts:** list, acknowledge
- **Settings:** users (admin), notification channels, agent download
- **Audit log**

## 9. Alerting

- **Triggers:** backup failed, backup hasn't run in N hours past its schedule, repo `check` failed, agent offline > N minutes, repo size growth anomaly
- **Channels (Phase 1):** webhook, ntfy, email (SMTP)
- **Channels (Phase 2+):** Discord, Slack, Pushover

## 10. Deployment

### 10.1 Control plane (Proxmox host or LXC)

The server is HTTP-only by design — operators front it with their own
TLS-terminating reverse proxy (Caddy / Traefik / nginx). Bind the
container to localhost so the only public path is through the proxy.

`docker-compose.yml`:
```yaml
services:
  restic-manager:
    image: ghcr.io/<owner>/restic-manager:latest
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
    volumes:
      - ./data:/data
    environment:
      - RM_DATA_DIR=/data
      - RM_LISTEN=:8080
      - RM_BASE_URL=https://restic.lab.example
      - RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE=/data/secret.key
      - RM_TRUSTED_PROXY=172.16.0.0/12   # CIDR of your reverse proxy
```

Reference Caddy snippet (operator's own Caddyfile, outside this repo):
```
restic.lab.example {
    encode zstd gzip
    reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
}
```
Caddy provisions and renews the cert; the agent's `cert_pin_sha256`
pins **Caddy's** leaf cert (that's what the agent actually sees).

`RM_LISTEN` is the source of truth for the server's bind address. The
`8080:8080` mapping above is just the matching default; change both
sides together if you pick a different port.

> ⚠️ Never expose `RM_LISTEN` directly on a public interface — the
> server has no TLS, no rate limiting, and no DDoS protection. That
> all belongs in the proxy.

### 10.2 Restic REST server (Unraid)

Standard `restic/rest-server` container, `--append-only`, `--private-repos`, htpasswd mounted, data path on the share.

### 10.3 Agent install

- **Linux:** `curl -fsSL https://restic.lab.example/install.sh | sudo RM_TOKEN=xxx sh`
- **Windows:** `iwr https://restic.lab.example/install.ps1 | iex` (with `$env:RM_TOKEN`)
- Installer drops binary + service unit, calls enroll endpoint, starts service

## 11. Testing strategy

- **Unit tests:** restic JSON parsing, schedule reconciliation, retention policy logic
- **Integration tests:** spin up real `restic` + `rest-server` in Docker, exercise full backup/snapshot/restore flows
- **End-to-end:** Playwright against a compose-up'd stack with one Linux agent in a sibling container
- **Cross-platform agent CI:** build matrix `linux/amd64`, `linux/arm64`, `windows/amd64`; smoke test on Windows runner

## 12. Repository layout

```
restic-manager/
├── cmd/
│   ├── server/
│   └── agent/
├── internal/
│   ├── api/             # shared API types
│   ├── server/
│   │   ├── http/
│   │   ├── ws/
│   │   └── ui/          # templates, handlers
│   ├── agent/
│   │   ├── service/     # systemd / windows service glue
│   │   ├── runner/      # restic invocation
│   │   └── scheduler/
│   ├── restic/          # restic CLI wrapper, --json parsing
│   ├── store/           # sqlite layer
│   ├── crypto/          # secret encryption
│   └── auth/
├── web/
│   ├── templates/
│   └── static/
├── deploy/
│   ├── docker-compose.yml
│   ├── Dockerfile.server
│   └── install/
│       ├── install.sh
│       └── install.ps1
├── docs/
├── LICENSE              # PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0
├── README.md
├── spec.md
└── tasks.md
```

## 13. Phased delivery

- **Phase 1 (MVP):** server skeleton, agent skeleton, enrollment, host list, snapshot list, on-demand backup, live job log
- **Phase 2:** schedules, retention, run-now for `forget`/`prune`/`check`/`unlock`, repo stats
- **Phase 3:** restore wizard, alerts (webhook/ntfy/email), audit log
- **Phase 4:** agent self-update, OIDC, multi-user/RBAC polish, repo trends
- **Phase 5:** OSS readiness — docs site, contribution guide, screenshot tour

## 14. Confirmed extensions (in scope)

These were originally listed as open questions and have been confirmed for inclusion. Slotted into phases below.

### 14.1 Cross-host restore

Restore a snapshot taken on host A onto host B (e.g. recover a dead box onto a fresh one, clone a workload onto a sibling host, restore a developer's home dir onto a new laptop).

- **Credential model:** target host's agent receives a temporary, server-issued read credential for the source host's repo, scoped to a single restore job and revoked immediately after
- **Path remapping:** UI allows rewriting source paths to target paths (e.g. `/home/alice` → `/home/alice-new`)
- **Permissions:** restore runs as root (the agent's process; see §4.2). The agent retains `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`/`CAP_FOWNER`/`CAP_CHOWN` precisely so it can recreate ownership on the target. The "service user is non-root" warning that appeared in earlier drafts is moot.
- **Phase:** 3 (with the restore wizard)

### 14.2 Bandwidth limiting

Per-host upload/download caps for backup, restore, and prune jobs.

- Exposed on the schedule editor as optional `--limit-upload` / `--limit-download` (KB/s)
- Also overridable on run-now jobs via the UI
- Persisted in `Schedule.options` (JSON blob) so the schema stays stable
- **Phase:** 2 (with scheduling)

### 14.3 Pre/post backup hooks

Per-host shell commands run before and after a backup job. Use cases: `mysqldump`/`pg_dump` to a staging path, stop/start Docker containers, quiesce a service, post-backup notifications.

- **Schema:** `Schedule.pre_hook` and `Schedule.post_hook` (string, optional). For more complex cases, `Host.pre_hook_default` / `Host.post_hook_default` apply to all schedules on that host unless overridden
- **Applicability:** hooks are only meaningful for `kind = backup` schedules. The API rejects non-null `pre_hook` / `post_hook` on any other schedule kind (`forget`, `prune`, `check`) with a clear validation error rather than silently ignoring them. The same constraint applies to `Host.pre_hook_default` / `Host.post_hook_default`: they only fire for backup schedules on that host
- **Execution:** agent runs hooks via the host's default shell (`/bin/sh` Linux, `cmd.exe` or PowerShell Windows — host-configurable). Hooks inherit the agent's process — i.e. **root by default** (see §4.2). A per-hook `run_as` field lets the operator drop privileges for a specific hook (`run_as: postgres` for a `pg_dump` hook, etc.); the agent uses `setuid`/`setgid` before exec rather than shelling out to `sudo`. Hooks running as root is what makes `docker stop`, `mysqldump`, `systemctl reload` etc. work without per-host setup, which is what the user expects when typing them into the UI.
- **Failure semantics:** `pre_hook` non-zero exit aborts the backup and marks the job failed. `post_hook` runs on both success and failure (with `RM_JOB_STATUS` env var); its own exit code is recorded but does not change the backup job's final status
- **Stdout/stderr:** captured into `JobLog` like restic output, prefixed `pre_hook:` / `post_hook:`
- **Security:** hooks are stored encrypted; only admins can edit them; every edit audit-logged
- **Phase:** 2 (with scheduling)

### 14.4 Prometheus `/metrics` endpoint

Standard Prometheus exposition on `/metrics`, protected by either bearer token or IP allow-list.

- **Metrics (per host):**
  - `restic_manager_last_backup_timestamp_seconds{host=...}`
  - `restic_manager_last_backup_status{host=...}` (1=success, 0=failure)
  - `restic_manager_repo_size_bytes{host=...}`
  - `restic_manager_snapshot_count{host=...}`
  - `restic_manager_agent_online{host=...}` (1/0)
  - `restic_manager_job_duration_seconds_bucket{kind=...,host=...}` (histogram)
- **Server-level:** `restic_manager_jobs_total{kind=...,status=...}`, `restic_manager_alerts_active`, `restic_manager_build_info`
- **Phase:** 4 (alongside repo trend charts — both rely on the same time-series data)

## 15. Future considerations (not yet committed)

- Read-only share links for snapshot listings (auditor view) — out of scope for personal/lab use; revisit if multi-tenant or org use cases emerge
