testing: bootstrap UI, agent reliability, NS-01..04 + alert username
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Smoothes the rough edges that came up exercising a live deployment.

First-run bootstrap UI: /bootstrap renders a username + password form
that uses the in-memory token directly (operator no longer copies it
out of the log); /login redirects there while bootstrap is available.

Agent reliability: failJob synthetic envelopes so command.run early
returns no longer hang the server-side job; runtime probe of restic
restore --help drives --no-ownership instead of version sniffing
(0.18.x had it removed). Server unit re-shaped: ProtectSystem=full
plus ReadWritePaths=/etc/restic-manager, no ProtectHome — restore
can now write anywhere a user might want.

Restore wizard: default target is /root/rm-restore/<job-id>/ with
clearer help text. Re-init confirm input uses .field (was .input,
which doesn't exist — text was invisible).

NS-01 host delete: store DeleteHost, admin-band /hosts/{id}/delete
with hostname-confirm danger zone, audit, FK cascade, live WS close.

NS-02 enrollment-token recovery: outstanding-tokens panel on
/hosts/new, regenerate (preserves attachments) and revoke handlers
+ audit, store-level ListOutstandingEnrollmentTokens and
DeleteEnrollmentToken.

NS-03 repo init / probe surface: migration 0020 adds
hosts.repo_status + repo_status_error; WS handler projects every
init job's outcome onto the host row (idempotent already-initialised
collapses to ready); creds-save resets status and dispatches a fresh
probe; /hosts/{id}/repo/probe retry endpoint with banner.

NS-04 dashboard live + sort + filter: query-string filter
(q/status/repo_status/tag/sort/dir), 5s htmx live poll mirroring the
alerts pattern with a localStorage live toggle, sortable column
headers, filter row + clear.

Alerts page: ack'd-by line resolves user_id ULID to username.

Compose.yaml ignored — host-specific.
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-05 22:03:15 +01:00
parent b91fe56c83
commit 3800b34a2b
40 changed files with 2135 additions and 109 deletions
+4 -6
View File
@@ -49,12 +49,10 @@ detect_arch() {
ensure_dirs() {
install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "$RM_CONFIG_DIR"
install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "$RM_STATE_DIR"
# Default new-directory restore target: $HOME/rm-restore. Pre-create
# so the systemd unit's ReadWritePaths bind-mount applies cleanly
# (paths that don't exist when systemd starts get a soft-fail
# because of the '-' prefix, but the agent then can't mkdir into
# the read-only /root). Mode 0700 + root-owned matches the threat
# model — files restored here are operator-readable as root.
# Default new-directory restore target: $HOME/rm-restore. With the
# current unit (ProtectSystem=full, no ReadWritePaths pin) the agent
# can mkdir anywhere on real filesystems, so this is just a courtesy
# pre-create so the wizard's default lands in a tidy spot.
install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root /root/rm-restore
}
+19 -10
View File
@@ -33,17 +33,26 @@ CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_FOWNER CAP_CHOWN
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_FOWNER CAP_CHOWN
# Hardening — blocks privilege escalation even from root, and
# confines writes / network / kernel access to what restic actually
# needs. Filesystem reads stay open: that's the whole job.
# confines kernel / namespace / privilege surface. Filesystem reads
# stay open (that's the whole job) and restore writes are
# unrestricted: a backup tool whose entire purpose is "put files
# back where they belong" can't have ProtectHome=read-only or
# ProtectSystem=strict without breaking on the first cross-user
# restore. ProtectSystem=full keeps /usr, /boot, /efi read-only so a
# compromised agent can't swap out /usr/bin/restic or drop a kernel
# module, while leaving /home, /root, /var, /opt, /srv, /tmp etc.
# writable for arbitrary restore targets. The agent is treated as a
# high-trust component (it runs operator hooks as root and holds
# repo credentials); the residual hardening is about kernel + privesc
# protection, not write confinement.
NoNewPrivileges=true
ProtectSystem=strict
# /etc/restic-manager: agent.yaml + secrets.enc.
# /var/lib/restic-manager: agent state (currently unused but reserved).
# /root/rm-restore: default target for new-directory restores
# ($HOME/rm-restore/<job-id>/ resolves here for User=root).
# ReadWritePaths overrides ProtectHome=read-only on this subdir only.
ReadWritePaths=/etc/restic-manager /var/lib/restic-manager -/root/rm-restore
ProtectHome=read-only
ProtectSystem=full
# ProtectSystem=full mounts /usr, /boot, /efi *and* /etc read-only.
# The agent rewrites /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml on enrolment and
# whenever a new SecretsKey is minted, so we need a targeted
# write-exemption for that dir. No exemption for the rest of /etc:
# the agent has no business editing /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, etc.
ReadWritePaths=/etc/restic-manager
ProtectHostname=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true