fix(ws): raise bounded agent message limit
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@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@ import (
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// (not iota ints) makes traffic readable in logs and packet captures.
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type MessageType string
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// MaxWebSocketMessageBytes is the protocol-wide upper bound for one agent ↔
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// server envelope. Snapshot projections and restic JSON log events can exceed
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// coder/websocket's 32 KiB default on ordinary repositories, so both peers set
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// this limit explicitly. It remains bounded to protect either process from an
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// untrusted or malfunctioning peer allocating without limit.
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const MaxWebSocketMessageBytes int64 = 8 << 20
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// Agent → server message types.
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const (
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MsgHello MessageType = "hello"
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