Cleanup pass over the repo so CI can enforce lint going forward
without the only-new-issues escape hatch:
* gofumpt -w across the tree (31 hits, all formatting)
* misspell --fix (25 hits, US-locale spelling) — but reverted on
api.JobCancelled = "cancelled" since that literal is the wire +
DB CHECK constraint value, plus matched the case in store/fleet.go
back to "cancelled" and added //nolint:misspell on both for the
next time someone reaches for the auto-fix
* Wrap every `defer rows.Close()` / `defer stmt.Close()` /
`defer res.Body.Close()` in `defer func() { _ = .Close() }()`
to satisfy errcheck without losing the close itself
* websocket.Dial callers (1 prod, 4 tests) now capture + close the
upgrade response Body — coder/websocket can return res with a nil
Body on success, so the test deferred-closes guard against that
* Annotate the two genuine-by-design nilerr cases with //nolint
comments explaining why nil-on-error is the contract (cookie
missing = no session; ctx cancelled mid-backoff = clean shutdown)
* Add brief godoc on the 10 exported const groups + types that
revive flagged (api.HostOS/HostArch/JobKind/JobStatus/LogStream/
ErrorCode, restic.EventKind, store.Role, web.FS)
* Drop the unused (*Server).userByID method
* Inline the unparam baseView(active) — every UI page is under
the dashboard primary nav today
Result: `golangci-lint run ./...` reports 0 issues. CI lint job
no longer needs only-new-issues: true; X-06 follow-up entry in
tasks.md removed.
Self-hosted deployments already terminate TLS at Caddy/Traefik/nginx;
making the server do TLS too means double cert config, dual ACME
plumbing, and an untested code path. Drop RM_TLS_CERT/RM_TLS_KEY,
remove TLSEnabled() and the ListenAndServeTLS branch.
Replace the cookie's "Secure if TLS-in-process" check with a new
RM_COOKIE_SECURE flag (default true). Local HTTP-only testing sets
RM_COOKIE_SECURE=false; production is always behind a TLS proxy and
the cookie stays Secure.
Default port :8443 → :8080. docker-compose binds 127.0.0.1 only and
populates RM_TRUSTED_PROXY. spec.md §4.1/§10.1 rewritten with a
Caddyfile snippet and a hard "do not expose RM_LISTEN publicly"
warning. enrollResponse keeps cert_pin_sha256 in the shape but the
server can't introspect a cert it doesn't terminate — operator
pastes the proxy's hash into -cert-pin at install time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1-01 chi router, slog request log, graceful shutdown via signal
context. Health endpoint, /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout,
/api/bootstrap. Background sweeper for expired sessions and
enrollment tokens (15 min cadence).
P1-04 (sessions half) HttpOnly Secure-when-TLS cookie carrying a
base64url token; server stores SHA-256(token) so a stolen DB
doesn't yield credentials. Unknown user and bad password collapse
to the same 401 response code so a probe can't enumerate names.
P1-05 first-run admin bootstrap. On a fresh DB the server mints a
one-time token and prints it to stderr inside a banner. The
/api/bootstrap handler accepts {token, username, password},
creates the first admin, then becomes a 409 forever.
P1-07 (partial) audit hooks fire on auth.login and auth.bootstrap.
Full middleware-driven coverage lands with the rest of the API.
internal/server/config: env > YAML > defaults. RM_LISTEN /
RM_DATA_DIR / RM_BASE_URL / RM_TLS_CERT / RM_TLS_KEY /
RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE / RM_TRUSTED_PROXY (CIDR list, validated).
End-to-end smoke test passes: server boots on a fresh dir,
prints the bootstrap token, POST /api/bootstrap creates the admin,
POST /api/auth/login returns 200 with a session cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
steve