7792aadb9470fabf27b91f8fa2543299f5b8f674
8 Commits
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f0dfa689fe |
P3 follow-up: editable target dir, conditional --no-ownership, UK lint
Three small follow-ups from review:
1. Restore target is now operator-editable. Default value is the
literal '\$HOME/rm-restore/<job-id>/' (agent expands \$HOME at
run time using os.UserHomeDir(); also handles \${HOME} and ~/
prefixes). Operator can replace with any absolute path.
- ui_restore.go validates the input is either absolute or starts
with one of the recognised prefixes; other env-var refs (\$PATH
etc.) are deliberately rejected so operator paths can't pick up
arbitrary agent env values.
- host_restore.html replaces the read-only mono-text display with
a real <input>; help text spells out that \$HOME resolves
agent-side and <job-id> is substituted on dispatch.
- install.sh + the systemd unit prep /root/rm-restore so the
default works under the sandbox: ReadWritePaths gains a soft
'-/root/rm-restore' entry (the '-' makes the bind-mount soft-fail
if missing, but install.sh pre-creates it root-owned 0700).
2. --no-ownership flag now gated on restic version. The flag was
added in restic 0.17 and 0.16 rejects it. Previously dropped it
wholesale — that meant new-dir restores silently preserved
ownership against design intent on 0.17+. Now the agent threads
its detected restic version (sysinfo already collects it) through
runner.Config -> restic.Env, and RunRestore appends --no-ownership
only when AtLeastVersion(0, 17) returns true. 0.16 hosts still
restore with original uid/gid; help text in the wizard explicitly
notes this. The previous 'Original ownership is preserved' copy
was wrong for new-dir mode and is corrected.
3. golangci-lint misspell locale switched US -> UK and the codebase
swept (73 corrections, mostly behaviour/serialise/recognise/honour).
Wire-format ErrorCode 'unauthorized' -> 'unauthorised' is a tiny
contract change but the agent doesn't parse those codes today and
no external API consumers exist yet. Tests passed before + after.
Tests:
- internal/restic/version_test.go covers Env.AtLeastVersion across
edge cases (empty, exact match, patch above, minor below, non-
numeric) and expandHome on \$HOME / \${HOME} / ~/, plus
pass-through for absolute paths and refusal of other env vars.
- ui_restore_test updated: TargetDir now starts '\$HOME/rm-restore/'
with the job_id substituted into the placeholder.
Live verified on the smoke env: default target restored to
/root/rm-restore/<job-id>/ as the agent's expanded \$HOME (2 files,
14 bytes); custom override '/tmp/custom-restore/<job-id>/' restored
into the agent's PrivateTmp namespace (1 file, 6 bytes); both jobs
'succeeded', exit 0.
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8ceb76c733 |
deploy: P2-17 install.ps1 (Windows installer)
Pwsh installer that detects arch, downloads $Server/agent/binary?os=windows&arch=amd64 to C:\Program Files\restic-manager\, runs the agent in -enroll-server [+ -enroll-token] mode (token flow OR announce-and-approve), then calls 'restic-manager-agent install' to register the SCM service. Surfaces existing scheduled tasks named *restic* without disabling. CLAUDE.md restage block updated to also stage install.ps1 alongside install.sh. |
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c565a7abd1 |
agent unit: drop SystemCallFilter — was killing restic with SIGSYS
Allow-list filter @system-service excludes some syscalls Go's runtime + restic's file scanner reach for; init job died immediately with "bad system call (core dumped)". CapabilityBounding already constrains what root can do; the Protect*/Restrict* toggles still cover network / kernel / mount / namespace. Net effect on the threat model is negligible vs the operational cost. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ee3ee241ea |
P1 polish: agent-as-root, init-repo flow, rest creds passthrough, UX fixes
Cohesive batch from a smoke-test session against a real rest-server.
Themed bullets:
* Agent runs as root, sandboxed via systemd. CapabilityBoundingSet
drops to CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH + restore caps; ProtectSystem=strict
with ReadWritePaths confined to /etc + /var/lib/restic-manager;
NoNewPrivileges blocks escalation. Install script no longer
creates a service user. spec.md §4.2 / §14.1 / §14.3 explain the
rationale (matches UrBackup / Veeam / Bareos defaults; trying to
back up "everything" as an unprivileged user creates silent skips
on /home, /root, /var/lib/* with no upside vs the threat model
the agent already implies).
* Init-repo end-to-end. New JobKind="init" wired through agent
runner, restic.Env.RunInit, server dispatcher, and a UI button
(red "Initialise repo" in the run-now panel). hosts.repo_initialised_at
flips on init success, on backup success, or on a non-empty
snapshots.report. The "Run now" / "Init" / "Retry" branching now
drives both the dashboard host row and the host-detail panel.
Migrations 0004 (column), 0005 (jobs.kind CHECK widened — using
the safe create-new-then-rename pattern; first version corrupted
job_logs.job_id FK), 0006 (cleans up job_logs FK on already-
affected DBs).
* rest-server creds embedded at exec time only. restic.Env gains
RepoUsername; mergeRestCreds() builds the user:pass@-prefixed URL
inside envSlice() and never assigns it back to the struct, so
nothing slog-able ever sees the cleartext form. RedactURL helper
for any future surface that needs to log a URL safely. Both
helpers tested.
* Add-host UX. Repo password is now optional — server mints a
24-byte URL-safe random one and surfaces it once, alongside an
htpasswd snippet ("echo PASS | htpasswd -B -i ... USERNAME") so
the operator pastes one command on the rest-server host and one
on the endpoint. Result page also links the install snippet at
/install/install.sh (was /install.sh — 404'd before) and pipes
to bash (not sh — script uses set -o pipefail and other
bashisms; on Debian/Ubuntu sh is dash).
* Late-subscriber race in JobHub. A fast-failing job could finish
(DB write + Broadcast) before the browser's HX-Redirect → page
load → WS-connect path completed, so the JS sat forever waiting
on a job.finished that already passed. JobHub split into
Register + Send + Run; handleJobStream now subscribes first,
re-fetches the job, and sends a synthetic job.finished if the
state is already terminal.
* HTMX error visibility. New toast partial listens to
htmx:responseError and surfaces the response body as a
bottom-right toast — every server-side validation error now
becomes visible without per-handler JS wiring. Also handles
custom rm:toast events for future server-pushed notifications
via the HX-Trigger header. Themed via existing CSS vars.
* Dashboard rows are now whole-row clickable to host detail
(CSS card-link pattern: absolute-positioned anchor + .row-action
z-index restoration so the action button stays clickable).
"View →" on a running job links to /jobs/<id> rather than
/hosts/<id> since the row click already covers the host page.
* "Run first" / "Run first backup" → "Run now" everywhere for
consistency.
* runbook (docs/e2e-smoke.md) updated — live-log streaming step
now reflects P1-26; mentions the browser-driven Run-now flow.
* _diag/dump-creds — moved out of cmd/ so go build doesn't pick
it up; .gitignore now excludes /_diag/ entirely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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41a4043af3 |
server: drop in-process TLS — HTTP-only behind reverse proxy
Self-hosted deployments already terminate TLS at Caddy/Traefik/nginx; making the server do TLS too means double cert config, dual ACME plumbing, and an untested code path. Drop RM_TLS_CERT/RM_TLS_KEY, remove TLSEnabled() and the ListenAndServeTLS branch. Replace the cookie's "Secure if TLS-in-process" check with a new RM_COOKIE_SECURE flag (default true). Local HTTP-only testing sets RM_COOKIE_SECURE=false; production is always behind a TLS proxy and the cookie stays Secure. Default port :8443 → :8080. docker-compose binds 127.0.0.1 only and populates RM_TRUSTED_PROXY. spec.md §4.1/§10.1 rewritten with a Caddyfile snippet and a hard "do not expose RM_LISTEN publicly" warning. enrollResponse keeps cert_pin_sha256 in the shape but the server can't introspect a cert it doesn't terminate — operator pastes the proxy's hash into -cert-pin at install time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e8eccd20c2 |
phase 1: agent install path — systemd unit, install.sh, asset endpoints
P1-14 deploy/install/restic-manager-agent.service: standard systemd
unit with the usual hardening switches (NoNewPrivileges, Protect*,
RestrictRealtime, MemoryDenyWriteExecute). Restart=always with a
5s backoff. Runs as a dedicated unprivileged restic-manager-agent
user; the install script creates it.
P1-29 deploy/install/install.sh: arch detection (amd64/arm64), pulls
the agent binary from /agent/binary, creates the service user
+ dirs (/etc/restic-manager, /var/lib/restic-manager), runs
enrollment via `agent -enroll-server -enroll-token`, lays down
the systemd unit, enables and starts it.
Honours the spec's "detect, don't auto-disable" rule for existing
schedulers: scans systemd timers, /etc/cron.d/*, /etc/cron.daily/*,
root crontab for restic-named entries and prints them with the
exact disable command — operator decides.
P1-31 server endpoints to ship the agent installation payload:
GET /agent/binary?os=linux&arch=amd64 → serves
<DataDir>/agent-binaries/restic-manager-agent-linux-amd64
GET /install/<file> → serves
<DataDir>/install/<file>
Both endpoints reject path traversal and return 404 if the file
isn't published. Operators drop the binaries + service unit into
these directories at release time. Signed-bundle verification is
deferred to Phase 5 OSS readiness.
All tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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c275f4ff4c |
phase 1 foundations: api types, store, crypto, auth
Lands the bottom three layers of Phase 1: P1-08 internal/api: protocol_version + envelope + every WS message shape from spec.md §6.2 (Hello, Heartbeat, Job*, Schedule*, etc). Wire-format tests pin the JSON shape so a rename here breaks tests instead of silently breaking the agent. P1-02 + P1-03 internal/store: SQLite via modernc.org/sqlite, embed.FS + a tiny version table for hand-rolled migrations. 0001_initial.sql covers every table from spec.md §5 plus enrollment_tokens and host_schedule_version. Typed accessors for users / sessions / enrollment / audit. WAL + foreign_keys + busy_timeout on by default. P1-06 internal/crypto: XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD wrapper with per-message random nonce. Key file lifecycle (generate + refuse-to-overwrite, load with size validation). Optional additionalData binds ciphertext to the row that owns it. P1-04 internal/auth (partial — passwords + tokens; sessions middleware lands with the HTTP handlers): argon2id following RFC 9106 (64 MiB / t=3 / p=4 / 32B), constant-time verify. HashToken stores SHA-256 of session/agent/enrollment tokens so a stolen DB doesn't hand over credentials. Build floor moves to Go 1.25 (modernc.org/sqlite v1.50+ requires it); CI + Dockerfile + README updated. Markdown lint diagnostics on tasks.md cleared. All packages tested. ~70 new tests pass in <1s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c9368de904 |
phase 0: project bootstrap
P0-01 Go module + cmd/server + cmd/agent skeletons + internal/ tree
P0-02 LICENSE (PolyForm NC 1.0.0), README, CONTRIBUTING
P0-03 golangci-lint, pre-commit, .editorconfig, .gitignore
P0-04 Gitea Actions CI: test (race+coverage), lint, cross-platform build matrix
P0-05 Dockerfile.server (multi-stage, distroless/static), docker-compose.yml
P0-06 Makefile with build/test/lint/fmt/run/release targets
build, vet, test, and cross-compile to linux/{amd64,arm64} + windows/amd64
all verified locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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