Lands the operator → server → agent → restic → server roundtrip for
on-demand backups. The flow:
POST /api/hosts/{id}/jobs {kind:"backup",args:["/path"]}
→ server creates a queued Job row
→ server emits command.run over WS to the host's agent
→ agent dispatcher spawns runner.RunBackup in a goroutine
→ runner spawns `restic backup --json`, parses each line
→ forwards: job.started, log.stream (every line), job.progress
(throttled to 1/sec), job.finished (with summary stats blob)
→ server WS handler persists those into jobs / job_logs
P1-16 internal/restic: thin Locate + Env wrapper that runs `restic
backup --json`, scans stdout/stderr, parses BackupStatus +
BackupSummary, calls back into a LineHandler so the agent can fan
out to log.stream + job.progress. Treats exit code 3 as
"succeeded with issues" (matches restic's contract).
P1-18 store: jobs accessors (CreateJob, MarkJobStarted,
MarkJobFinished, AppendJobLog, GetJob).
P1-19 server: POST /api/hosts/{id}/jobs creates the Job row,
validates kind, dispatches via Hub.Send, audit-logs the action.
P1-20 agent runner: wraps restic.RunBackup with throttled progress
emission. Sender abstraction was added to wsclient.Handler so
background goroutines can keep replying after dispatch returns.
P1-21 server WS: dispatchAgentMessage now persists job.started,
job.finished, log.stream into the database. Browser fan-out for
live tailing lands with the UI work.
Agent gets repo_url + repo_password from agent.yaml in plaintext
for now (mode 0600, owned by service user); spec.md §7.3's keyring
storage moves there in P2. config.update over WS overrides the
in-memory copy (does not persist).
Build clean; all tests pass. End-to-end with a real restic still
needs a host that has restic installed — wire shape verified by
the existing hello/heartbeat round-trip test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1-14 deploy/install/restic-manager-agent.service: standard systemd
unit with the usual hardening switches (NoNewPrivileges, Protect*,
RestrictRealtime, MemoryDenyWriteExecute). Restart=always with a
5s backoff. Runs as a dedicated unprivileged restic-manager-agent
user; the install script creates it.
P1-29 deploy/install/install.sh: arch detection (amd64/arm64), pulls
the agent binary from /agent/binary, creates the service user
+ dirs (/etc/restic-manager, /var/lib/restic-manager), runs
enrollment via `agent -enroll-server -enroll-token`, lays down
the systemd unit, enables and starts it.
Honours the spec's "detect, don't auto-disable" rule for existing
schedulers: scans systemd timers, /etc/cron.d/*, /etc/cron.daily/*,
root crontab for restic-named entries and prints them with the
exact disable command — operator decides.
P1-31 server endpoints to ship the agent installation payload:
GET /agent/binary?os=linux&arch=amd64 → serves
<DataDir>/agent-binaries/restic-manager-agent-linux-amd64
GET /install/<file> → serves
<DataDir>/install/<file>
Both endpoints reject path traversal and return 404 if the file
isn't published. Operators drop the binaries + service unit into
these directories at release time. Signed-bundle verification is
deferred to Phase 5 OSS readiness.
All tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the protocol layer end-to-end: an agent can be enrolled
through the operator UI, store credentials, dial back to the server
over WS, complete the protocol_version handshake, and stay
connected with periodic heartbeats.
Server side:
- P1-09 ws.Hub: one Conn per host_id, last-write-wins eviction,
json envelope writer with a write mutex, reader, error envelopes.
- P1-09 ws.AgentHandler: bearer-auth, accept upgrade, hello-stage
(10s deadline, protocol_version checked against
api.MinAgentProtocolVersion → ErrProtocolTooOld with help URL on
reject), main read loop, defer hub register/unregister.
- P1-10 POST /api/agents/enroll consumes a one-time token, mints a
persistent agent bearer (sha-256 stored), creates a host row.
- P1-10 POST /api/enrollment-tokens (operator, session-auth)
issues a 1h one-time token.
- P1-11 hello upserts agent_version + restic_version +
protocol_version on the host row, flips status to online.
- P1-12 heartbeat touches last_seen_at; background sweeper marks
hosts offline after 90s without one.
- store: hosts table accessors, host_schedule_version,
enrollment_tokens FK on consumed_host dropped (audit-only field;
the token gets burned before the host row exists).
Agent side:
- P1-13 internal/agent/config: yaml at /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml,
atomic Save (tmp+fsync+rename), Enrolled() helper.
- P1-15 internal/agent/wsclient: dial with bearer + optional
TLS cert pinning (sha-256 of leaf), exponential backoff with
jitter (1s → 60s cap), heartbeat goroutine, fatal handling for
ErrProtocolTooOld.
- P1-15 wsclient.Enroll: HTTP POST /api/agents/enroll with sysinfo.
- P1-17 internal/agent/sysinfo: hostname/OS/arch/restic-version
collection. restic detected by `restic version` parse; absent
restic doesn't block startup.
- cmd/agent: -enroll-server / -enroll-token flags drive first-run
enrollment then exit (so the install script can hand off to
systemd to run the persistent service).
End-to-end smoke verified: bootstrap → login → issue token →
enroll → run agent → server logs `ws agent connected` with the
right host_id and protocol_version 1.
All tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1-01 chi router, slog request log, graceful shutdown via signal
context. Health endpoint, /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout,
/api/bootstrap. Background sweeper for expired sessions and
enrollment tokens (15 min cadence).
P1-04 (sessions half) HttpOnly Secure-when-TLS cookie carrying a
base64url token; server stores SHA-256(token) so a stolen DB
doesn't yield credentials. Unknown user and bad password collapse
to the same 401 response code so a probe can't enumerate names.
P1-05 first-run admin bootstrap. On a fresh DB the server mints a
one-time token and prints it to stderr inside a banner. The
/api/bootstrap handler accepts {token, username, password},
creates the first admin, then becomes a 409 forever.
P1-07 (partial) audit hooks fire on auth.login and auth.bootstrap.
Full middleware-driven coverage lands with the rest of the API.
internal/server/config: env > YAML > defaults. RM_LISTEN /
RM_DATA_DIR / RM_BASE_URL / RM_TLS_CERT / RM_TLS_KEY /
RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE / RM_TRUSTED_PROXY (CIDR list, validated).
End-to-end smoke test passes: server boots on a fresh dir,
prints the bootstrap token, POST /api/bootstrap creates the admin,
POST /api/auth/login returns 200 with a session cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the bottom three layers of Phase 1:
P1-08 internal/api: protocol_version + envelope + every WS message
shape from spec.md §6.2 (Hello, Heartbeat, Job*, Schedule*, etc).
Wire-format tests pin the JSON shape so a rename here breaks
tests instead of silently breaking the agent.
P1-02 + P1-03 internal/store: SQLite via modernc.org/sqlite,
embed.FS + a tiny version table for hand-rolled migrations.
0001_initial.sql covers every table from spec.md §5 plus
enrollment_tokens and host_schedule_version. Typed accessors
for users / sessions / enrollment / audit. WAL + foreign_keys
+ busy_timeout on by default.
P1-06 internal/crypto: XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD wrapper with
per-message random nonce. Key file lifecycle (generate +
refuse-to-overwrite, load with size validation). Optional
additionalData binds ciphertext to the row that owns it.
P1-04 internal/auth (partial — passwords + tokens; sessions
middleware lands with the HTTP handlers): argon2id following
RFC 9106 (64 MiB / t=3 / p=4 / 32B), constant-time verify.
HashToken stores SHA-256 of session/agent/enrollment tokens
so a stolen DB doesn't hand over credentials.
Build floor moves to Go 1.25 (modernc.org/sqlite v1.50+ requires
it); CI + Dockerfile + README updated. Markdown lint diagnostics
on tasks.md cleared.
All packages tested. ~70 new tests pass in <1s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
steve