Two warts surfaced during the smoke run:
- Agent was silent between "config.update applied" and "job
finished" — operators tailing journalctl saw no acknowledgement
that a command.run had landed. Adds Info logs at job-accept
({job_id, paths}) and at successful completion.
- The host.enrolled audit row had an empty {} payload. Now
carries {hostname, os, arch, has_repo_creds} so an audit-log
reader can answer "what got enrolled and did the operator
bundle creds with the token" without joining back to hosts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New internal/agent/secrets package: AEAD blob at
/var/lib/restic-manager/secrets.enc, atomic write (os.CreateTemp +
Sync + Rename), 0600. Key lives in agent.yaml as base64
(SecretsKey) — same trust boundary as the bearer token, minted on
first start via EnsureSecretsKey.
cmd/agent: dispatcher reads creds fresh from secrets.Load() on
each job rather than from in-memory config. config.update merges
the push with what's on disk and persists, so a daemon restart
keeps the latest values. Legacy plaintext repo_url/repo_password
in agent.yaml are silently migrated into secrets.enc on next start
and stripped from the YAML on the following save.
Tests: round-trip + wrong-key rejection + atomic-write
post-condition for secrets; key idempotence + legacy-field
parse/clear for config.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-hosted deployments already terminate TLS at Caddy/Traefik/nginx;
making the server do TLS too means double cert config, dual ACME
plumbing, and an untested code path. Drop RM_TLS_CERT/RM_TLS_KEY,
remove TLSEnabled() and the ListenAndServeTLS branch.
Replace the cookie's "Secure if TLS-in-process" check with a new
RM_COOKIE_SECURE flag (default true). Local HTTP-only testing sets
RM_COOKIE_SECURE=false; production is always behind a TLS proxy and
the cookie stays Secure.
Default port :8443 → :8080. docker-compose binds 127.0.0.1 only and
populates RM_TRUSTED_PROXY. spec.md §4.1/§10.1 rewritten with a
Caddyfile snippet and a hard "do not expose RM_LISTEN publicly"
warning. enrollResponse keeps cert_pin_sha256 in the shape but the
server can't introspect a cert it doesn't terminate — operator
pastes the proxy's hash into -cert-pin at install time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the operator → server → agent → restic → server roundtrip for
on-demand backups. The flow:
POST /api/hosts/{id}/jobs {kind:"backup",args:["/path"]}
→ server creates a queued Job row
→ server emits command.run over WS to the host's agent
→ agent dispatcher spawns runner.RunBackup in a goroutine
→ runner spawns `restic backup --json`, parses each line
→ forwards: job.started, log.stream (every line), job.progress
(throttled to 1/sec), job.finished (with summary stats blob)
→ server WS handler persists those into jobs / job_logs
P1-16 internal/restic: thin Locate + Env wrapper that runs `restic
backup --json`, scans stdout/stderr, parses BackupStatus +
BackupSummary, calls back into a LineHandler so the agent can fan
out to log.stream + job.progress. Treats exit code 3 as
"succeeded with issues" (matches restic's contract).
P1-18 store: jobs accessors (CreateJob, MarkJobStarted,
MarkJobFinished, AppendJobLog, GetJob).
P1-19 server: POST /api/hosts/{id}/jobs creates the Job row,
validates kind, dispatches via Hub.Send, audit-logs the action.
P1-20 agent runner: wraps restic.RunBackup with throttled progress
emission. Sender abstraction was added to wsclient.Handler so
background goroutines can keep replying after dispatch returns.
P1-21 server WS: dispatchAgentMessage now persists job.started,
job.finished, log.stream into the database. Browser fan-out for
live tailing lands with the UI work.
Agent gets repo_url + repo_password from agent.yaml in plaintext
for now (mode 0600, owned by service user); spec.md §7.3's keyring
storage moves there in P2. config.update over WS overrides the
in-memory copy (does not persist).
Build clean; all tests pass. End-to-end with a real restic still
needs a host that has restic installed — wire shape verified by
the existing hello/heartbeat round-trip test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the protocol layer end-to-end: an agent can be enrolled
through the operator UI, store credentials, dial back to the server
over WS, complete the protocol_version handshake, and stay
connected with periodic heartbeats.
Server side:
- P1-09 ws.Hub: one Conn per host_id, last-write-wins eviction,
json envelope writer with a write mutex, reader, error envelopes.
- P1-09 ws.AgentHandler: bearer-auth, accept upgrade, hello-stage
(10s deadline, protocol_version checked against
api.MinAgentProtocolVersion → ErrProtocolTooOld with help URL on
reject), main read loop, defer hub register/unregister.
- P1-10 POST /api/agents/enroll consumes a one-time token, mints a
persistent agent bearer (sha-256 stored), creates a host row.
- P1-10 POST /api/enrollment-tokens (operator, session-auth)
issues a 1h one-time token.
- P1-11 hello upserts agent_version + restic_version +
protocol_version on the host row, flips status to online.
- P1-12 heartbeat touches last_seen_at; background sweeper marks
hosts offline after 90s without one.
- store: hosts table accessors, host_schedule_version,
enrollment_tokens FK on consumed_host dropped (audit-only field;
the token gets burned before the host row exists).
Agent side:
- P1-13 internal/agent/config: yaml at /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml,
atomic Save (tmp+fsync+rename), Enrolled() helper.
- P1-15 internal/agent/wsclient: dial with bearer + optional
TLS cert pinning (sha-256 of leaf), exponential backoff with
jitter (1s → 60s cap), heartbeat goroutine, fatal handling for
ErrProtocolTooOld.
- P1-15 wsclient.Enroll: HTTP POST /api/agents/enroll with sysinfo.
- P1-17 internal/agent/sysinfo: hostname/OS/arch/restic-version
collection. restic detected by `restic version` parse; absent
restic doesn't block startup.
- cmd/agent: -enroll-server / -enroll-token flags drive first-run
enrollment then exit (so the install script can hand off to
systemd to run the persistent service).
End-to-end smoke verified: bootstrap → login → issue token →
enroll → run agent → server logs `ws agent connected` with the
right host_id and protocol_version 1.
All tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1-01 chi router, slog request log, graceful shutdown via signal
context. Health endpoint, /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout,
/api/bootstrap. Background sweeper for expired sessions and
enrollment tokens (15 min cadence).
P1-04 (sessions half) HttpOnly Secure-when-TLS cookie carrying a
base64url token; server stores SHA-256(token) so a stolen DB
doesn't yield credentials. Unknown user and bad password collapse
to the same 401 response code so a probe can't enumerate names.
P1-05 first-run admin bootstrap. On a fresh DB the server mints a
one-time token and prints it to stderr inside a banner. The
/api/bootstrap handler accepts {token, username, password},
creates the first admin, then becomes a 409 forever.
P1-07 (partial) audit hooks fire on auth.login and auth.bootstrap.
Full middleware-driven coverage lands with the rest of the API.
internal/server/config: env > YAML > defaults. RM_LISTEN /
RM_DATA_DIR / RM_BASE_URL / RM_TLS_CERT / RM_TLS_KEY /
RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE / RM_TRUSTED_PROXY (CIDR list, validated).
End-to-end smoke test passes: server boots on a fresh dir,
prints the bootstrap token, POST /api/bootstrap creates the admin,
POST /api/auth/login returns 200 with a session cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
steve