P1-28: Tailwind standalone CLI wired into the Makefile. `make tailwind`
downloads the pinned v3.4.17 binary into bin/tailwindcss (gitignored),
builds web/styles/input.css → web/static/css/styles.css. `make build`
now runs the CSS pass first; `make tailwind-watch` for dev. Output is
embedded in the binary via web.FS — single static binary, no Node.
The CSS source carries every component class the v1 mockups defined
(status dots, buttons, host row, log viewer, progress bar, fields,
chips, snippet panel, empty state) so screens that land later can
just reach for them.
P1-23: html/template tree at web/templates with two layouts (base
with chrome, chromeless for login + bootstrap), one nav partial, and
two pages (dashboard placeholder, login). internal/server/ui parses
the tree at startup; ui_handlers.go in the http package wires:
GET / dashboard (303 → /login when unauthed)
GET /login sign-in form
POST /login consume form, mint session cookie, 303 → /
POST /logout drop cookie, 303 → /login
GET /static/* embedded Tailwind bundle
The HTML login flow shares store/session logic with /api/auth/login
via a new authenticateAndSession helper — same security guarantees,
two surface representations (HTML form / JSON).
Verified end-to-end: bootstrap → form-login → authed dashboard →
sign-out → 303 cycle works in the browser; Tailwind output emits
only the component classes referenced in the live templates (9.6kB
minified).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-hosted deployments already terminate TLS at Caddy/Traefik/nginx;
making the server do TLS too means double cert config, dual ACME
plumbing, and an untested code path. Drop RM_TLS_CERT/RM_TLS_KEY,
remove TLSEnabled() and the ListenAndServeTLS branch.
Replace the cookie's "Secure if TLS-in-process" check with a new
RM_COOKIE_SECURE flag (default true). Local HTTP-only testing sets
RM_COOKIE_SECURE=false; production is always behind a TLS proxy and
the cookie stays Secure.
Default port :8443 → :8080. docker-compose binds 127.0.0.1 only and
populates RM_TRUSTED_PROXY. spec.md §4.1/§10.1 rewritten with a
Caddyfile snippet and a hard "do not expose RM_LISTEN publicly"
warning. enrollResponse keeps cert_pin_sha256 in the shape but the
server can't introspect a cert it doesn't terminate — operator
pastes the proxy's hash into -cert-pin at install time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the protocol layer end-to-end: an agent can be enrolled
through the operator UI, store credentials, dial back to the server
over WS, complete the protocol_version handshake, and stay
connected with periodic heartbeats.
Server side:
- P1-09 ws.Hub: one Conn per host_id, last-write-wins eviction,
json envelope writer with a write mutex, reader, error envelopes.
- P1-09 ws.AgentHandler: bearer-auth, accept upgrade, hello-stage
(10s deadline, protocol_version checked against
api.MinAgentProtocolVersion → ErrProtocolTooOld with help URL on
reject), main read loop, defer hub register/unregister.
- P1-10 POST /api/agents/enroll consumes a one-time token, mints a
persistent agent bearer (sha-256 stored), creates a host row.
- P1-10 POST /api/enrollment-tokens (operator, session-auth)
issues a 1h one-time token.
- P1-11 hello upserts agent_version + restic_version +
protocol_version on the host row, flips status to online.
- P1-12 heartbeat touches last_seen_at; background sweeper marks
hosts offline after 90s without one.
- store: hosts table accessors, host_schedule_version,
enrollment_tokens FK on consumed_host dropped (audit-only field;
the token gets burned before the host row exists).
Agent side:
- P1-13 internal/agent/config: yaml at /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml,
atomic Save (tmp+fsync+rename), Enrolled() helper.
- P1-15 internal/agent/wsclient: dial with bearer + optional
TLS cert pinning (sha-256 of leaf), exponential backoff with
jitter (1s → 60s cap), heartbeat goroutine, fatal handling for
ErrProtocolTooOld.
- P1-15 wsclient.Enroll: HTTP POST /api/agents/enroll with sysinfo.
- P1-17 internal/agent/sysinfo: hostname/OS/arch/restic-version
collection. restic detected by `restic version` parse; absent
restic doesn't block startup.
- cmd/agent: -enroll-server / -enroll-token flags drive first-run
enrollment then exit (so the install script can hand off to
systemd to run the persistent service).
End-to-end smoke verified: bootstrap → login → issue token →
enroll → run agent → server logs `ws agent connected` with the
right host_id and protocol_version 1.
All tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1-01 chi router, slog request log, graceful shutdown via signal
context. Health endpoint, /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout,
/api/bootstrap. Background sweeper for expired sessions and
enrollment tokens (15 min cadence).
P1-04 (sessions half) HttpOnly Secure-when-TLS cookie carrying a
base64url token; server stores SHA-256(token) so a stolen DB
doesn't yield credentials. Unknown user and bad password collapse
to the same 401 response code so a probe can't enumerate names.
P1-05 first-run admin bootstrap. On a fresh DB the server mints a
one-time token and prints it to stderr inside a banner. The
/api/bootstrap handler accepts {token, username, password},
creates the first admin, then becomes a 409 forever.
P1-07 (partial) audit hooks fire on auth.login and auth.bootstrap.
Full middleware-driven coverage lands with the rest of the API.
internal/server/config: env > YAML > defaults. RM_LISTEN /
RM_DATA_DIR / RM_BASE_URL / RM_TLS_CERT / RM_TLS_KEY /
RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE / RM_TRUSTED_PROXY (CIDR list, validated).
End-to-end smoke test passes: server boots on a fresh dir,
prints the bootstrap token, POST /api/bootstrap creates the admin,
POST /api/auth/login returns 200 with a session cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
steve