The `schedules` table was already laid down in migration 0001; this
slice adds the Go-side data model, store CRUD with atomic version
bumps, and REST endpoints.
* `store.Schedule` + `RetentionPolicy` + `ScheduleOptions` typed
views (the wire form on the agent side keeps retention/options
as raw JSON since the agent just forwards them to restic).
* Store CRUD: CreateSchedule / GetSchedule / ListSchedulesByHost /
UpdateSchedule / DeleteSchedule. Each mutation bumps
`host_schedule_version` atomically in the same tx via UPSERT on
`host_schedule_version`. SetHostAppliedScheduleVersion records
what the agent has confirmed via schedule.ack (P2-02 will use it).
* REST endpoints under /api/hosts/{id}/schedules + /{sid}:
GET (list, with the version envelope so callers can detect
drift), POST (create), PUT (update — kind is immutable), DELETE.
* Validation: cron expressions parse via robfig/cron/v3 (same
parser the agent will use, so anything that validates here will
fire there); kind ∈ {backup, forget, prune, check} (init/unlock
are operator-only one-shot kinds, not schedulable); backup
schedules require ≥1 path; hooks rejected on non-backup kinds
(spec §14.3).
* All mutations audit-logged.
* Tests: store-level CRUD + version-bump invariants; REST happy
path (create→list→update→delete with version progression); REST
validation table covers each rejection code.
newTestServerWithHub now sets BootstrapToken so the schedules
handler tests can use the existing login flow without a parallel
test-server constructor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the protocol layer end-to-end: an agent can be enrolled
through the operator UI, store credentials, dial back to the server
over WS, complete the protocol_version handshake, and stay
connected with periodic heartbeats.
Server side:
- P1-09 ws.Hub: one Conn per host_id, last-write-wins eviction,
json envelope writer with a write mutex, reader, error envelopes.
- P1-09 ws.AgentHandler: bearer-auth, accept upgrade, hello-stage
(10s deadline, protocol_version checked against
api.MinAgentProtocolVersion → ErrProtocolTooOld with help URL on
reject), main read loop, defer hub register/unregister.
- P1-10 POST /api/agents/enroll consumes a one-time token, mints a
persistent agent bearer (sha-256 stored), creates a host row.
- P1-10 POST /api/enrollment-tokens (operator, session-auth)
issues a 1h one-time token.
- P1-11 hello upserts agent_version + restic_version +
protocol_version on the host row, flips status to online.
- P1-12 heartbeat touches last_seen_at; background sweeper marks
hosts offline after 90s without one.
- store: hosts table accessors, host_schedule_version,
enrollment_tokens FK on consumed_host dropped (audit-only field;
the token gets burned before the host row exists).
Agent side:
- P1-13 internal/agent/config: yaml at /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml,
atomic Save (tmp+fsync+rename), Enrolled() helper.
- P1-15 internal/agent/wsclient: dial with bearer + optional
TLS cert pinning (sha-256 of leaf), exponential backoff with
jitter (1s → 60s cap), heartbeat goroutine, fatal handling for
ErrProtocolTooOld.
- P1-15 wsclient.Enroll: HTTP POST /api/agents/enroll with sysinfo.
- P1-17 internal/agent/sysinfo: hostname/OS/arch/restic-version
collection. restic detected by `restic version` parse; absent
restic doesn't block startup.
- cmd/agent: -enroll-server / -enroll-token flags drive first-run
enrollment then exit (so the install script can hand off to
systemd to run the persistent service).
End-to-end smoke verified: bootstrap → login → issue token →
enroll → run agent → server logs `ws agent connected` with the
right host_id and protocol_version 1.
All tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1-01 chi router, slog request log, graceful shutdown via signal
context. Health endpoint, /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout,
/api/bootstrap. Background sweeper for expired sessions and
enrollment tokens (15 min cadence).
P1-04 (sessions half) HttpOnly Secure-when-TLS cookie carrying a
base64url token; server stores SHA-256(token) so a stolen DB
doesn't yield credentials. Unknown user and bad password collapse
to the same 401 response code so a probe can't enumerate names.
P1-05 first-run admin bootstrap. On a fresh DB the server mints a
one-time token and prints it to stderr inside a banner. The
/api/bootstrap handler accepts {token, username, password},
creates the first admin, then becomes a 409 forever.
P1-07 (partial) audit hooks fire on auth.login and auth.bootstrap.
Full middleware-driven coverage lands with the rest of the API.
internal/server/config: env > YAML > defaults. RM_LISTEN /
RM_DATA_DIR / RM_BASE_URL / RM_TLS_CERT / RM_TLS_KEY /
RM_SECRET_KEY_FILE / RM_TRUSTED_PROXY (CIDR list, validated).
End-to-end smoke test passes: server boots on a fresh dir,
prints the bootstrap token, POST /api/bootstrap creates the admin,
POST /api/auth/login returns 200 with a session cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the bottom three layers of Phase 1:
P1-08 internal/api: protocol_version + envelope + every WS message
shape from spec.md §6.2 (Hello, Heartbeat, Job*, Schedule*, etc).
Wire-format tests pin the JSON shape so a rename here breaks
tests instead of silently breaking the agent.
P1-02 + P1-03 internal/store: SQLite via modernc.org/sqlite,
embed.FS + a tiny version table for hand-rolled migrations.
0001_initial.sql covers every table from spec.md §5 plus
enrollment_tokens and host_schedule_version. Typed accessors
for users / sessions / enrollment / audit. WAL + foreign_keys
+ busy_timeout on by default.
P1-06 internal/crypto: XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD wrapper with
per-message random nonce. Key file lifecycle (generate +
refuse-to-overwrite, load with size validation). Optional
additionalData binds ciphertext to the row that owns it.
P1-04 internal/auth (partial — passwords + tokens; sessions
middleware lands with the HTTP handlers): argon2id following
RFC 9106 (64 MiB / t=3 / p=4 / 32B), constant-time verify.
HashToken stores SHA-256 of session/agent/enrollment tokens
so a stolen DB doesn't hand over credentials.
Build floor moves to Go 1.25 (modernc.org/sqlite v1.50+ requires
it); CI + Dockerfile + README updated. Markdown lint diagnostics
on tasks.md cleared.
All packages tested. ~70 new tests pass in <1s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
steve