Merge pull request 'fix(version): single-source internal/version, fix dockerfile ldflags' (#27) from fix-version-ldflags into main

The Dockerfile only set `-X main.version=...`, so docker-built binaries
left `internal/version.Version` at its default "dev". The update logic
(host_update.go:61, hosts.go:94, fleet_update.go:101 et al.) compares
against `internal/version.Version`, so a v1.0.0 host always looked
out-of-date to a v1.0.0 server, the chip never cleared, and pressing
"update" re-downloaded the same bundled binary on a loop.

Collapse the two version sources: drop the `var version/commit/date`
locals in cmd/{server,agent}/main.go, route everything through
internal/version (now also carrying Date), and have both the Dockerfile
and the Makefile set the same single set of -X flags. Verified
end-to-end: make build and docker build both emit binaries whose
--version reflects the build VERSION.

.gitignore

@@ -45,3 +45,7 @@ coverage.html
 # tooling already skips paths starting with _, but ignore explicitly
 # so an accidental `git add cmd/.` can't sneak them into a release.
 /cmd/_*/
+
+# Local-only planning / scratch — never committed.
+/ask.md
+/docs/superpowers/

Makefile

@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ VERSION        ?= $(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || ec
 COMMIT         ?= $(shell git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo none)
 DATE           ?= $(shell date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)
 VERSION_PKG    := gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/version
-LDFLAGS        := -s -w -X main.version=$(VERSION) -X main.commit=$(COMMIT) -X main.date=$(DATE) \
+LDFLAGS        := -s -w \
-                  -X $(VERSION_PKG).Version=$(VERSION) -X $(VERSION_PKG).Commit=$(COMMIT)
+                  -X $(VERSION_PKG).Version=$(VERSION) \
+                  -X $(VERSION_PKG).Commit=$(COMMIT) \
+                  -X $(VERSION_PKG).Date=$(DATE)
 GOFLAGS        := -trimpath
 DOCKER_IMAGE   ?= gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager
 DOCKER_TAG     ?= dev

cmd/agent/main.go

@@ -22,12 +22,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/agent/wsclient"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/api"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/restic"
-)
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/version"
-
-var (
-	version = "dev"
-	commit  = "none"
-	date    = "unknown"
 )
 
 func main() {
@@ -66,7 +61,7 @@ func run() error {
 	flag.Parse()
 
 	if *showVersion {
-		fmt.Printf("restic-manager-agent %s (commit %s, built %s)\n", version, commit, date)
+		fmt.Printf("restic-manager-agent %s (commit %s, built %s)\n", version.Version, version.Commit, version.Date)
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -82,14 +77,14 @@ func run() error {
 		if *enrollServer == "" {
 			return errors.New("enrollment: -enroll-server is required with -enroll-token")
 		}
-		return doEnroll(*enrollServer, *enrollToken, cfg, version)
+		return doEnroll(*enrollServer, *enrollToken, cfg, version.Version)
 	}
 
 	// Announce-and-approve: -enroll-server set, no token, agent not
 	// yet enrolled. Run the announce flow inline; on success the cfg
 	// has the bearer + host_id and we drop into the normal run loop.
 	if !cfg.Enrolled() && *enrollServer != "" {
-		if err := doAnnounce(*enrollServer, cfg, version); err != nil {
+		if err := doAnnounce(*enrollServer, cfg, version.Version); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("announce: %w", err)
 		}
 	}
@@ -106,7 +101,7 @@ func run() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("sysinfo: %w", err)
 	}
 	slog.Info("agent starting",
-		"version", version,
+		"version", version.Version,
 		"host_id", cfg.HostID,
 		"server", cfg.ServerURL,
 		"restic_version", snap.ResticVersion,
@@ -136,7 +131,7 @@ func run() error {
 		CertPinSHA256: cfg.CertPinSHA256,
 		HelloPayload: api.HelloPayload{
 			ProtocolVersion: snap.ProtocolVersion,
-			AgentVersion:    version,
+			AgentVersion:    version.Version,
 			ResticVersion:   snap.ResticVersion,
 			Hostname:        snap.Hostname,
 			OS:              snap.OS,

cmd/server/main.go

@@ -26,12 +26,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/ui"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/ws"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/store"
-)
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/version"
-
-var (
-	version = "dev"
-	commit  = "none"
-	date    = "unknown"
 )
 
 func main() {
@@ -47,7 +42,7 @@ func run() error {
 	flag.Parse()
 
 	if *showVersion {
-		fmt.Printf("restic-manager-server %s (commit %s, built %s)\n", version, commit, date)
+		fmt.Printf("restic-manager-server %s (commit %s, built %s)\n", version.Version, version.Commit, version.Date)
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -123,7 +118,7 @@ func run() error {
 		NotificationHub: notifHub,
 		UpdateWatcher:   updateWatcher,
 		UI:              renderer,
-		Version:         version,
+		Version:         version.Version,
 		OIDC:            oidcClient,
 		Metrics:         metricsRegistry,
 	}
@@ -177,7 +172,7 @@ func run() error {
 
 	errCh := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
-		slog.Info("server listening", "addr", cfg.Listen, "version", version)
+		slog.Info("server listening", "addr", cfg.Listen, "version", version.Version)
 		errCh <- srv.Start()
 	}()
 

deploy/Dockerfile.server

@@ -26,7 +26,11 @@ ARG DATE=unknown
 ARG TARGETOS
 ARG TARGETARCH
 
-ENV LDFLAGS="-s -w -X main.version=${VERSION} -X main.commit=${COMMIT} -X main.date=${DATE}"
+ENV VERSION_PKG="gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/version"
+ENV LDFLAGS="-s -w \
+    -X ${VERSION_PKG}.Version=${VERSION} \
+    -X ${VERSION_PKG}.Commit=${COMMIT} \
+    -X ${VERSION_PKG}.Date=${DATE}"
 
 # Server: built for the image's runtime arch.
 RUN GOOS=${TARGETOS} GOARCH=${TARGETARCH} \

internal/version/version.go

@@ -13,4 +13,8 @@ var (
 	// Commit is the short git SHA. Informational only; surfaced via
 	// /api/version but not used for any comparison.
 	Commit = ""
+
+	// Date is the RFC3339 build timestamp. Informational only; printed
+	// by `--version` but not used for any comparison.
+	Date = "unknown"
 )

tasks.md

@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ Sizes: **S** = under a day, **M** = 1–3 days, **L** = 3–7 days.
 > **Sweep verified (smoke env):** admin adds operator → setup link generated → curl-as-new-user fetches /setup (200, page shows username) → POSTs password → 303 to / + Set-Cookie → operator authenticated → 200 on /, 200 on /settings/account, **403 on /settings/users** (admin-only) → admin disables user → operator's next request is **401** + session row count drops to 0 → audit log shows `user.created` + `user.setup_completed` for the cycle. All 26 implementation tasks landed; full `go test ./...` green.
 - [x] **P4-05** (L) OIDC login (generic provider config, group → role mapping)
 
-> **As shipped (2026-05-05):** Authorization Code + PKCE (S256) against any OIDC IdP advertising standard discovery. Config is YAML+env (`oidc.issuer`, `oidc.client_id`, `oidc.client_secret`/`_file`, `oidc.role_claim` default `groups`, `oidc.role_mapping`, `oidc.display_name`, `oidc.redirect_url`); empty issuer → OIDC disabled, no routes mounted. Migration 0019 adds `users.auth_source`/`oidc_subject` (partial unique index on `oidc_subject`), `sessions.id_token`, and a small `oidc_state` table for state+verifier round-trip (cleaned up every alert tick, 5 min TTL). Login page renders **Sign in with `<display_name>`** above the local form when OIDC is enabled; the SSO button kicks off a 303 to the IdP with state + S256 code_challenge persisted server-side. Callback verifies ID token, fetches `/userinfo` to merge claims (Authelia / many IdPs only put `sub` in the ID token and surface `preferred_username`/`email`/`groups` from userinfo), maps the first matching group to a role; **no match → deny banner**, no row created, audit `user.oidc_login_blocked`. Username-collision with an existing local user → same deny path with `username_taken`. New user → JIT-provisioned with `auth_source='oidc'`, `oidc_subject=<sub>`, `password_hash=''`. Returning user → looked up by `oidc_subject` (stable when usernames change at the IdP), role + email refreshed on every login. Local password login is rejected for `auth_source='oidc'` users. Logout posts to `/logout` and, when the IdP advertised `end_session_endpoint`, follows up with RP-initiated logout (carries `id_token_hint` + `post_logout_redirect_uri=BaseURL`); when not advertised (Authelia in our smoke env), the local session is cleared and the browser lands on `/login`. Users list shows a small **oidc** chip beside enabled/disabled; the edit page disables username/email/role for OIDC users (server-side guard mirrors UI, returns 403). Force-logout, disable, and the last-admin guard from P4-04 all still apply. **Live Authelia sweep verified all four paths against `https://auth.example.invalid`:** rm-admin → admin role + JIT row + chip + readonly edit; rm-operator → operator JIT, 403 on `/settings/users`; rm-viewer → viewer JIT, 403 on `/hosts/new`; rm-other (group not in role_mapping) → no_role_match banner, no row created, audit logged. Returning rm-admin login resolved to the same row by sub. Screenshots in `_diag/p4-05-sweep/`. Out-of-scope and on Phase 6 candidate list: refresh tokens, back-channel logout, multiple providers, post-login PKCE for the cookie itself.
+> **As shipped (2026-05-05):** Authorization Code + PKCE (S256) against any OIDC IdP advertising standard discovery. Config is YAML+env (`oidc.issuer`, `oidc.client_id`, `oidc.client_secret`/`_file`, `oidc.role_claim` default `groups`, `oidc.role_mapping`, `oidc.display_name`, `oidc.redirect_url`); empty issuer → OIDC disabled, no routes mounted. Migration 0019 adds `users.auth_source`/`oidc_subject` (partial unique index on `oidc_subject`), `sessions.id_token`, and a small `oidc_state` table for state+verifier round-trip (cleaned up every alert tick, 5 min TTL). Login page renders **Sign in with `<display_name>`** above the local form when OIDC is enabled; the SSO button kicks off a 303 to the IdP with state + S256 code_challenge persisted server-side. Callback verifies ID token, fetches `/userinfo` to merge claims (Authelia / many IdPs only put `sub` in the ID token and surface `preferred_username`/`email`/`groups` from userinfo), maps the first matching group to a role; **no match → deny banner**, no row created, audit `user.oidc_login_blocked`. Username-collision with an existing local user → same deny path with `username_taken`. New user → JIT-provisioned with `auth_source='oidc'`, `oidc_subject=<sub>`, `password_hash=''`. Returning user → looked up by `oidc_subject` (stable when usernames change at the IdP), role + email refreshed on every login. Local password login is rejected for `auth_source='oidc'` users. Logout posts to `/logout` and, when the IdP advertised `end_session_endpoint`, follows up with RP-initiated logout (carries `id_token_hint` + `post_logout_redirect_uri=BaseURL`); when not advertised (Authelia in our smoke env), the local session is cleared and the browser lands on `/login`. Users list shows a small **oidc** chip beside enabled/disabled; the edit page disables username/email/role for OIDC users (server-side guard mirrors UI, returns 403). Force-logout, disable, and the last-admin guard from P4-04 all still apply. **Live Authelia sweep verified all four paths against local auth:** rm-admin → admin role + JIT row + chip + readonly edit; rm-operator → operator JIT, 403 on `/settings/users`; rm-viewer → viewer JIT, 403 on `/hosts/new`; rm-other (group not in role_mapping) → no_role_match banner, no row created, audit logged. Returning rm-admin login resolved to the same row by sub. Screenshots in `_diag/p4-05-sweep/`. Out-of-scope and on Phase 6 candidate list: refresh tokens, back-channel logout, multiple providers, post-login PKCE for the cookie itself.
 
 - [x] **P4-07** (S) Per-host tags + dashboard filtering by tag