cmd/server/main.go

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/config"
 	rmhttp "gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/http"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/maintenance"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/oidc"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/ui"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/ws"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/store"
@@ -92,6 +93,17 @@ func run() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("ui: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	var oidcClient *oidc.Client
+	if cfg.OIDC != nil {
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		oidcClient, err = oidc.New(ctx, cfg.OIDC, cfg.BaseURL)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("oidc: %w", err)
+		}
+		slog.Info("oidc enabled", "issuer", cfg.OIDC.Issuer, "display", cfg.OIDC.DisplayName)
+	}
+
 	deps := rmhttp.Deps{
 		Cfg:             cfg,
 		Store:           st,
@@ -102,6 +114,7 @@ func run() error {
 		NotificationHub: notifHub,
 		UI:              renderer,
 		Version:         version,
+		OIDC:            oidcClient,
 	}
 
 	// First-run bootstrap: if the users table is empty, mint a one-time

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-05-p4-05-oidc-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+# P4-05 — OIDC Login Design
+
+> **Date:** 2026-05-05
+> **Status:** brainstorm complete; ready for plan
+> **Closes:** P4-05 (OIDC login)
+
+## Goal
+
+Wire OpenID Connect authentication as a sign-in path alongside the existing local-user system, so a deployment that already has an IdP (Authelia, Authentik, Keycloak, Okta, Auth0, etc.) can use it for restic-manager logins.
+
+## Architecture
+
+OIDC sits on top of the local-user system rather than replacing it. The first time a user signs in via OIDC the server **just-in-time provisions** a local user row marked `auth_source='oidc'`, with role derived from the IdP's `roles` claim. Subsequent sign-ins look up the same row by stable `oidc_subject` and refresh role + email from the latest claims. Once the row exists it behaves like any other local user — admin can disable it, force-logout, see it in audit logs, etc. — except password-login is rejected because there's no password.
+
+The Authorization Code flow (with PKCE) is implemented against the discovered well-known config of a single configured issuer. Front-channel logout: clicking Sign out drops the local session + redirects the browser to the IdP's `end_session_endpoint` (when advertised). Back-channel logout deferred.
+
+## Locked decisions
+
+| Decision | Pick |
+|---|---|
+| User lifecycle | **B** — JIT-provision local rows on first OIDC login (`auth_source='oidc'`, `oidc_subject`) |
+| Role mapping config | **A** — YAML/env, claim name configurable (default `groups`, matching Authelia / Keycloak / Authentik), default = deny on no-match |
+| Username source | `preferred_username`, fallback to `email` |
+| Username collision with existing local user | **Refuse** with clear remediation message |
+| Provider config | **Single provider** — `providers:` array can come later |
+| Login page layout | SSO button **above** password form; password form labelled "or sign in with a local account" |
+| OIDC users + password login | **Disabled** — `auth_source='oidc'` rows have empty `password_hash`; password form rejects them |
+| Logout shape | **Front-channel only** — drop session + redirect to `end_session_endpoint` when advertised |
+| Role re-evaluation | **At login only** — claims read at the OIDC callback; admin can disable mid-session locally |
+
+## Schema changes
+
+Migration 0019 — `users` extensions for OIDC bookkeeping:
+
+```sql
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN auth_source TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'local'
+  CHECK (auth_source IN ('local', 'oidc'));
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN oidc_subject TEXT;
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX users_oidc_subject ON users(oidc_subject)
+  WHERE oidc_subject IS NOT NULL;
+```
+
+Both column-level ALTERs (CLAUDE.md preference). The unique partial index defends the JIT-lookup invariant (one row per IdP subject) without blocking multiple rows with NULL oidc_subject (the local users).
+
+## Configuration
+
+```yaml
+# server config — extend existing config struct
+oidc:
+  issuer:        https://auth.example.com    # well-known config discovered from this
+  client_id:     restic-manager
+  client_secret: ${RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET}    # or via _FILE
+  display_name:  Authelia                    # button label "Sign in with <display_name>"; default "SSO"
+  scopes:        [openid, profile, email, groups]
+  role_claim:    groups                      # default if absent (matches Authelia / Keycloak / Authentik)
+  role_mapping:
+    rm-admins:    admin
+    rm-operators: operator
+    rm-viewers:   viewer
+  # Optional — auto-derived from BaseURL if absent.
+  redirect_url:  https://rm.example.com/auth/oidc/callback
+```
+
+Env-var overrides: `RM_OIDC_ISSUER`, `RM_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, `RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, `RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE`. Mapping is YAML-only (env doesn't fit a multi-key string→string map cleanly).
+
+When `oidc.issuer` is empty or missing, OIDC is disabled (current behaviour). No restart-toggle UI; this is a deploy-time setting.
+
+## Auth flow
+
+### Login start
+
+`GET /auth/oidc/login` — only mounted when OIDC is configured.
+
+1. Generate `state` (32 random bytes, base64) and `code_verifier` (64 random bytes, base64); compute `code_challenge = base64(sha256(code_verifier))`.
+2. Store `(state, code_verifier, created_at)` in a new ephemeral table (or in memory with a 5-minute TTL — see "trade-off" below).
+3. Redirect to `<authorization_endpoint>?response_type=code&client_id=...&redirect_uri=...&scope=...&state=...&code_challenge=...&code_challenge_method=S256`.
+
+### Callback
+
+`GET /auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=...` — also OIDC-only mount.
+
+1. Validate `state` against the stored value (one-shot — delete row on read). Reject if missing/expired/already used.
+2. Exchange `code` + `code_verifier` for tokens at `token_endpoint`.
+3. Validate the `id_token` JWT: signature against the JWKS endpoint, `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, `iat`, `nonce` (if used).
+4. Extract `sub`, `preferred_username`, `email`, and the configured `role_claim` (default `roles`).
+5. Pick username: `preferred_username` if non-empty, else `email`. Lowercase / trim per the existing local-user rules.
+6. Pick role: first match in `role_mapping` against the array of role-claim values. **No match → deny with a clear error page**, no row created.
+7. Look up user by `oidc_subject`. Three cases:
+   - **Found** — refresh `email`, `role`, `last_login_at`. Don't touch `username` (changing it would break audit trails; if the IdP changes the username, that's an operator concern). Log `user.oidc_login`.
+   - **Not found, username free** — INSERT row with `auth_source='oidc'`, `oidc_subject=<sub>`, `password_hash=''`, `must_change_password=0`. Log `user.created` with payload `{"auth_source":"oidc"}` + `user.oidc_login`.
+   - **Not found, username taken by a local user** — render an error page: "This OIDC user (`<sub>`) wants to sign in as `alice`, but a local user with that name already exists. Ask your administrator to either rename / remove the local user, or exclude this user from the OIDC mapping." 403, no row created. Log `user.oidc_login_blocked`.
+8. Drop a session cookie + `MarkUserLogin` (the existing helper).
+9. Redirect to `/`.
+
+### Logout
+
+`POST /logout` (existing handler) — augmented:
+
+1. Look up the session before deletion (we need the user row to know if they're an OIDC user).
+2. Delete the session as today.
+3. If the user is `auth_source='oidc'` AND the discovered `end_session_endpoint` is non-empty → 303 to `<end_session_endpoint>?id_token_hint=<id_token>&post_logout_redirect_uri=<base>/login`. Otherwise → existing 303 to `/login`.
+
+We need to keep the latest `id_token` per session to drive `id_token_hint`. Stash it in a new `sessions.id_token TEXT` column (one column-level ALTER on migration 0019 alongside the user columns), populated only for OIDC sessions.
+
+## State table
+
+Two reasonable shapes for the short-lived state used during the OAuth round-trip:
+
+- **In-memory map** with a 5-minute TTL sweeper. Simpler, but multi-process deployments lose it (no multi-process today, but Phase 5 OSS readiness might add).
+- **`oidc_state` table** — `(state_hash PK, code_verifier, created_at)`, swept on the same 60s alert-engine tick that already handles setup-token cleanup.
+
+I'll go with the **table**. Costs ~3 lines in the existing cleanup tick, behaves correctly under restarts, and survives a future scale-out. Migration 0019 includes:
+
+```sql
+CREATE TABLE oidc_state (
+  state_hash    TEXT PRIMARY KEY,    -- sha256(state) hex; raw state never persisted
+  code_verifier TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at    TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE INDEX oidc_state_created ON oidc_state(created_at);
+```
+
+## Login-page UI
+
+`/login` template branches based on `view.OIDCEnabled`:
+
+- **OIDC off** → current layout (just the password form).
+- **OIDC on** → an `Sign in with <provider name>` button at the top, then a faint divider line, then the existing password form labelled "Or sign in with a local account". Provider name comes from a new optional config `oidc.display_name` (defaults to "SSO").
+
+Failed-OIDC redirects (no role match, username collision, IdP error) land on `/login?oidc_error=<reason>` with a small banner above the buttons.
+
+## Audit actions
+
+New entries in the action vocabulary:
+
+- `user.oidc_login` (target_kind=user, target_id=user_id, payload `{"sub":"…"}`)
+- `user.oidc_login_blocked` (target_kind=user, target_id=oidc_subject when no row was created, payload `{"username":"…", "reason":"username_taken|no_role_match|other"}`)
+- `user.created` already exists; OIDC's first-time provisioning fires this with payload `{"auth_source":"oidc"}` so the audit log distinguishes admin-created from JIT-provisioned rows.
+
+## User-management UI changes
+
+Small additions, not new screens:
+
+- **Users list** — Status column adds a small `oidc` chip when `auth_source='oidc'` so admin can see at a glance which rows came from JIT-provisioning. Sortable by auth_source via the same sortable-headers pattern (lands as a small follow-up if anyone asks; out of scope for v1).
+- **Add user form** — disabled when OIDC is the only auth path, with a hint: "User provisioning is handled by your OIDC provider; users appear here on first sign-in." Configurable later via a `oidc.disable_local_users` flag if that becomes a real ask. Out of scope for v1; both paths stay open.
+- **Edit user form** — when `auth_source='oidc'`:
+  - Username field disabled (changing it would just be undone on next OIDC login)
+  - Role dropdown disabled, with a hint: "Role is managed by your OIDC provider's `roles` claim mapping. Edit the mapping in server config to change."
+  - Email field disabled (refreshed from IdP on each login)
+  - **Disable / Enable / Force logout** still work — disabling an OIDC user kicks their session and rejects future OIDC logins ("user disabled by administrator")
+  - **Regenerate setup link** hidden — there's no setup token for OIDC users
+- **Login UI** — password form rejects users with `auth_source='oidc'` ("This account uses single sign-on. Click the SSO button above.")
+
+## Middleware / handler changes
+
+- **Routes**: new public-band entries `GET /auth/oidc/login`, `GET /auth/oidc/callback`. Skipped entirely when OIDC isn't configured (`s.deps.OIDC == nil`).
+- **Logout handler** augmented to fetch the user row + decide between local logout (303 → `/login`) and OIDC logout (303 → `end_session_endpoint`).
+- **Login handler** rejects `auth_source='oidc'` users with the SSO-prompt error.
+- **Last-admin guard** — already covers OIDC users naturally because they live in the `users` table. The role-from-claims path could create a "every admin gets demoted to operator" situation if the IdP's claim mapping is wrong; the guard rejects that demotion at the moment it'd be applied (returns the user to the login page with `oidc_error=role_change_blocked` and audit entry; admin must fix the mapping or promote a local admin first).
+
+## Implementation outline
+
+1. **Schema** — migration 0019 (users.auth_source + oidc_subject, sessions.id_token, oidc_state table)
+2. **Config** — extend `internal/server/config` with the OIDC block + env-var overrides; load JWKS lazily
+3. **Discovery + JWKS** — small helper that fetches `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration` once at startup, caches `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `end_session_endpoint`, `jwks_uri`. JWKS refreshed on first failed verification.
+4. **Login start handler** — `/auth/oidc/login`
+5. **Callback handler** — `/auth/oidc/callback`, with the four claim-resolution branches
+6. **Logout handler augmentation** — branch on `auth_source`
+7. **Login form rejection** — local-user password form rejects OIDC accounts
+8. **State cleanup** — extend the alert engine's existing cleanup tick
+9. **UI** — `oidc` chip on users list, disabled fields on edit-form for OIDC users, login page SSO button + error banner
+10. **Tests** — config parse tests; happy-path callback test using a fake IdP (httptest server with a hand-rolled discovery doc + JWKS); username-collision test; no-role-match test; logout test
+11. **Sweep** — full Playwright walk against an actual IdP (Authelia in a Docker container) — admin gets in via OIDC, role mapping works, logout redirects through IdP, OIDC user can't password-login
+
+## Test strategy
+
+The IdP is the hard part to test cleanly. Two layers:
+
+- **Unit / integration tests** use a stub OIDC provider built into the test harness — `httptest.Server` exposing `.well-known/openid-configuration`, a token endpoint that signs minted JWTs with a test ECDSA key, and a JWKS endpoint serving the public key. This covers every code path without a real IdP. Pattern: each test mints its own claims and runs the callback against the stub.
+- **Smoke env** runs against a real Authelia container (existing `compose.smoke.yaml`-style file or one-liner `docker run`) for the final sweep — confirms the discovery doc isn't being misread, real JWT verification works, real `end_session_endpoint` redirect works.
+
+## Out of scope (deferred)
+
+- **Multi-provider** support (`providers:` array)
+- **Back-channel logout** (RFC 8138) — schema isn't blocked from adding it later
+- **UI-driven role mapping** (config-only in v1)
+- **Refresh tokens / mid-session role re-evaluation** — login-only refresh in v1
+- **`oidc.disable_local_users`** flag — both paths stay open in v1
+- **OIDC user dashboard chip / badges** beyond the small `oidc` indicator on the users list
+- **Per-user "auth source" filter on the users list** — sortable headers cover most of the use case
+
+## Risks / gotchas
+
+- **JWKS key rotation** — refresh on first failed verification is the standard fix; document the cache TTL (1h) in the config block.
+- **Clock skew** — accept `iat`/`exp` with a 60s leeway; matches what most OIDC libraries do.
+- **End-session 404 / not advertised** — degrade gracefully; just drop the session and 303 to `/login`. Don't 500 the logout because the IdP doesn't implement RP-initiated logout.
+- **Username changes at the IdP** — silently keep the local username (matches our locked decision: subject is the stable key, username is display-only). Document.
+- **Role claim is sometimes a string, sometimes an array, sometimes a comma-separated string** depending on IdP — normalise into `[]string` before mapping. Authelia/Keycloak emit arrays; some custom setups emit strings; handle both.
+- **Authelia `sub` is an opaque UUID, not the username** (Authelia 4.39+ default for new clients). Don't assume `sub` is human-readable; it's stable but display value is `preferred_username` or `email`. The locked design already keys lookups on `sub` and uses `preferred_username` for the display username, so this is just a correctness note.
+- **`end_session_endpoint` may not be published** (Authelia doesn't advertise it for many configs). The locked logout flow already degrades to "drop session + redirect to /login" when the discovery doc lacks it; no extra config needed.
+- **Password-form bypass for OIDC users via /api/auth/login (JSON)** — same rejection rule applies, not just the HTML form.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+- [ ] An OIDC user with `roles: ["rm-admins"]` can sign in, becomes an admin, is visible in `/settings/users` with an `oidc` chip
+- [ ] Same user signing in again resolves to the same row (no duplicate)
+- [ ] Same user with `roles: ["something-else"]` is denied, lands on `/login?oidc_error=no_role_match` with a banner, no row created
+- [ ] OIDC user can't password-login through `/login` or `/api/auth/login`
+- [ ] Admin disables an OIDC user → next OIDC login is rejected, existing session bounced (existing disable-mid-session)
+- [ ] Sign out as an OIDC user → 303 to IdP's end-session URL (when advertised); no end-session URL → 303 to `/login`
+- [ ] OIDC config absent → password login works exactly as today (zero behavioural change)
+- [ ] Username collision: a local `alice` exists, OIDC user with `preferred_username=alice` and a different `sub` → blocked at sign-in with the clear error page
+- [ ] Last-admin guard refuses to demote the only enabled admin even if the IdP's role mapping says otherwise
+- [ ] All existing tests pass; new test suite covers the four claim-resolution branches and logout

go.mod

@@ -3,22 +3,26 @@ module gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager
 go 1.25.0
 
 require (
+	github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.14
+	github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0
 	github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5
+	github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1
 	github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.1
+	github.com/robfig/cron/v3 v3.0.1
 	golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0
+	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
 	modernc.org/sqlite v1.50.0
 )
 
 require (
-	github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.14 // indirect
 	github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
+	github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4 // indirect
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
 	github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
-	github.com/robfig/cron/v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0 // indirect
 	modernc.org/libc v1.72.0 // indirect
 	modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
 	modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
 github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.14 h1:9L0p0iKiNOibykf283eHkKUHHrpG7f65OE3BhhO7v9g=
 github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.14/go.mod h1:NX3SzP+inril6yawo5CQXx8+fk145lPDC6pumgx0mVg=
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 h1:V9orjXynvu5wiC9SemFTWnG4F45v403aIcjWo0d41+A=
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0/go.mod h1:DYCf24+ncYi+XkIH97GY1+dqoRlbaSI26KVTCI9SrY4=
 github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY=
 github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto=
 github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5 h1:Eg4myHZBjyvJmAFjFvWgrqDTXFyOzjj7YIm3L3mu6Ug=
 github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5/go.mod h1:X7Gx4mteadT3eDOMTsXzmI4/rwUpOwBHLpAfupzFJP0=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4 h1:moDMcTHmvE6Groj34emNPLs/qtYXRVcd6S7NHbHz3kA=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4/go.mod h1:x4oUasVrzR7071A4TnHLGSPpNOm2a21K9Kf04k1rs08=
+github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1 h1:kYf81DTWFe7t+1VvL7eS+jKFVWaUnK9cB1qbwn63YCY=
+github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1/go.mod h1:fxCRLWMO43lRc8nhHWY6LGqRcf+1gQWArsqaEUEa5bE=
 github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250317173921-a4b03ec1a45e h1:ijClszYn+mADRFY17kjQEVQ1XRhq2/JR1M3sGqeJoxs=
 github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250317173921-a4b03ec1a45e/go.mod h1:boTsfXsheKC2y+lKOCMpSfarhxDeIzfZG1jqGcPl3cA=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
@@ -25,6 +31,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0 h1:zO47/JPrL6vsNkINmLoo/PH1gcxpls50DNogFvB5ZGI=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0/go.mod h1:3muZ7vA7PBCE6xgPX7nkzzjiUq87kRItoJQM1Yo8S+Q=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.33.0 h1:tHFzIWbBifEmbwtGz65eaWyGiGZatSrT9prnU8DbVL8=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.33.0/go.mod h1:swjeQEj+6r7fODbD2cqrnje9PnziFuw4bmLbBZFrQ5w=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 h1:peZ/1z27fi9hUOFCAZaHyrpWG5lwe0RJEEEeH0ThlIs=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0/go.mod h1:YDBUJMTkDnJS+A4BP4eZBjCqtokkg1hODuPjwiGPO7Q=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=

internal/alert/engine.go

@@ -193,6 +193,9 @@ func (e *Engine) tick(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
 	if _, err := e.store.CleanupExpiredSetupTokens(ctx, now); err != nil {
 		slog.Warn("alert: cleanup expired setup tokens", "err", err)
 	}
+	if _, err := e.store.CleanupExpiredOIDCState(ctx, now.Add(-5*time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		slog.Warn("alert: cleanup expired oidc state", "err", err)
+	}
 
 	hosts, err := e.store.ListHosts(ctx)
 	if err != nil {

internal/server/config/config.go

@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ type Config struct {
 	// Defaults to true. Set RM_COOKIE_SECURE=false only for local HTTP
 	// testing — production deployments are always behind a TLS proxy
 	// and the cookie must be Secure.
-	CookieSecure bool `yaml:"cookie_secure"`
+	CookieSecure bool        `yaml:"cookie_secure"`
+	OIDCRaw      *OIDCConfig `yaml:"oidc"`
+	OIDC         *OIDCConfig `yaml:"-"`
 }
 
 // Load resolves config in this order:
@@ -91,6 +93,16 @@ func Load(yamlPath string) (Config, error) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	var rawOIDC OIDCConfig
+	if c.OIDCRaw != nil {
+		rawOIDC = *c.OIDCRaw
+	}
+	oidc, err := loadOIDC(envSnapshot(), rawOIDC)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c, err
+	}
+	c.OIDC = oidc
+
 	return c, c.validate()
 }
 

internal/server/config/oidc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// internal/server/config/oidc.go — OIDC subsection of the server
+// config. Disabled when oidc.issuer is empty or absent.
+package config
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+)
+
+// OIDCConfig is the OIDC sub-block. The struct doubles as YAML schema;
+// loadOIDC applies env overlays on top and fills defaults.
+type OIDCConfig struct {
+	Issuer       string            `yaml:"issuer"`
+	ClientID     string            `yaml:"client_id"`
+	ClientSecret string            `yaml:"client_secret"`
+	DisplayName  string            `yaml:"display_name"`
+	Scopes       []string          `yaml:"scopes"`
+	RoleClaim    string            `yaml:"role_claim"`
+	RoleMapping  map[string]string `yaml:"role_mapping"`
+	RedirectURL  string            `yaml:"redirect_url"`
+}
+
+// loadOIDC merges YAML + env, applies defaults, validates. Returns
+// nil + nil when OIDC is disabled (issuer empty after merge); a
+// non-nil OIDCConfig means the caller should wire OIDC.
+//
+// Env vars (override YAML when set):
+//
+//	RM_OIDC_ISSUER, RM_OIDC_CLIENT_ID, RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET,
+//	RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE, RM_OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME,
+//	RM_OIDC_REDIRECT_URL.
+//
+// envs is passed in (rather than read with os.LookupEnv) so unit
+// tests can supply a fake env map.
+func loadOIDC(envs map[string]string, yaml OIDCConfig) (*OIDCConfig, error) {
+	c := yaml
+	if v, ok := envs["RM_OIDC_ISSUER"]; ok {
+		c.Issuer = v
+	}
+	if v, ok := envs["RM_OIDC_CLIENT_ID"]; ok {
+		c.ClientID = v
+	}
+	if v, ok := envs["RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"]; ok {
+		c.ClientSecret = v
+	}
+	if v, ok := envs["RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE"]; ok && v != "" {
+		body, err := os.ReadFile(v)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: oidc client_secret_file: %w", err)
+		}
+		c.ClientSecret = string(body)
+	}
+	if v, ok := envs["RM_OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME"]; ok {
+		c.DisplayName = v
+	}
+	if v, ok := envs["RM_OIDC_REDIRECT_URL"]; ok {
+		c.RedirectURL = v
+	}
+
+	if c.Issuer == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if c.ClientID == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("config: oidc.client_id required when issuer is set")
+	}
+	if c.ClientSecret == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("config: oidc.client_secret required when issuer is set")
+	}
+	if len(c.RoleMapping) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("config: oidc.role_mapping must have at least one entry")
+	}
+
+	if c.DisplayName == "" {
+		c.DisplayName = "SSO"
+	}
+	if c.RoleClaim == "" {
+		c.RoleClaim = "groups"
+	}
+	if len(c.Scopes) == 0 {
+		c.Scopes = []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"}
+	}
+	return &c, nil
+}
+
+// envSnapshot reads the OIDC env vars into a map. Lets the production
+// loadOIDC call site stay env-driven while tests pass an explicit
+// map.
+func envSnapshot() map[string]string {
+	keys := []string{
+		"RM_OIDC_ISSUER", "RM_OIDC_CLIENT_ID", "RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET",
+		"RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", "RM_OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME",
+		"RM_OIDC_REDIRECT_URL",
+	}
+	out := make(map[string]string, len(keys))
+	for _, k := range keys {
+		if v, ok := os.LookupEnv(k); ok {
+			out[k] = v
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}

internal/server/config/oidc_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+package config
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestOIDCParseDisabledWhenIssuerEmpty(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	c, err := loadOIDC(map[string]string{}, OIDCConfig{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if c != nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected nil OIDC config when issuer empty; got %+v", c)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCRejectMissingClientID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	yaml := OIDCConfig{Issuer: "https://x", ClientSecret: "s"}
+	if _, err := loadOIDC(map[string]string{}, yaml); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for missing client_id")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCRejectMissingClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	yaml := OIDCConfig{Issuer: "https://x", ClientID: "rm"}
+	if _, err := loadOIDC(map[string]string{}, yaml); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for missing client_secret")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCDefaultsApplied(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	yaml := OIDCConfig{
+		Issuer: "https://x", ClientID: "rm", ClientSecret: "s",
+		RoleMapping: map[string]string{"a": "admin"},
+	}
+	c, err := loadOIDC(map[string]string{}, yaml)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if c.RoleClaim != "groups" {
+		t.Errorf("role_claim default: got %q want groups", c.RoleClaim)
+	}
+	if c.DisplayName != "SSO" {
+		t.Errorf("display_name default: got %q want SSO", c.DisplayName)
+	}
+	wantScopes := []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"}
+	if len(c.Scopes) != len(wantScopes) {
+		t.Errorf("scopes default: got %v want %v", c.Scopes, wantScopes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	yaml := OIDCConfig{
+		Issuer: "https://from-yaml", ClientID: "yaml-id", ClientSecret: "yaml-secret",
+		RoleMapping: map[string]string{"x": "admin"},
+	}
+	envs := map[string]string{
+		"RM_OIDC_ISSUER":        "https://from-env",
+		"RM_OIDC_CLIENT_ID":     "env-id",
+		"RM_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET": "env-secret",
+	}
+	c, err := loadOIDC(envs, yaml)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if c.Issuer != "https://from-env" || c.ClientID != "env-id" || c.ClientSecret != "env-secret" {
+		t.Errorf("env override: got %+v", c)
+	}
+}

internal/server/http/auth.go

@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ func (s *Server) authenticateAndSession(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Req
 		// existence to a probing attacker.
 		return nil, errInvalidCredentials
 	}
+	if u.AuthSource == "oidc" {
+		return nil, errInvalidCredentials
+	}
 	if err := auth.VerifyPassword(u.PasswordHash, password); err != nil {
 		return nil, errInvalidCredentials
 	}

internal/server/http/oidc_handlers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+// oidc_handlers.go — OIDC sign-in handlers. Public routes when oidc
+// is configured (s.deps.OIDC != nil), otherwise not mounted.
+package http
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	stdhttp "net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/oklog/ulid/v2"
+
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/auth"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/oidc"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/store"
+)
+
+// handleOIDCLogin generates state + PKCE pair, persists them, and
+// redirects to the IdP authorization endpoint.
+func (s *Server) handleOIDCLogin(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
+	state, err := oidc.RandomState()
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Error("oidc login: state", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	verifier, challenge, err := oidc.PKCEPair()
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Error("oidc login: pkce", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := s.deps.Store.PutOIDCState(r.Context(),
+		oidc.HashState(state), verifier, time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
+		slog.Error("oidc login: persist state", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, s.deps.OIDC.AuthURL(state, challenge), stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleOIDCCallback(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
+	q := r.URL.Query()
+	code := q.Get("code")
+	state := q.Get("state")
+	if code == "" || state == "" {
+		s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "missing_params")
+		return
+	}
+	verifier, err := s.deps.Store.ConsumeOIDCState(r.Context(), oidc.HashState(state))
+	if err != nil {
+		s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "bad_state")
+		return
+	}
+	claims, rawIDToken, err := s.deps.OIDC.Exchange(r.Context(), code, verifier)
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Warn("oidc callback: exchange", "err", err)
+		s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "exchange_failed")
+		return
+	}
+
+	uname := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(claims.PreferredUsername))
+	if uname == "" {
+		uname = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(claims.Email))
+	}
+	if uname == "" || claims.Subject == "" {
+		s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "missing_claims")
+		return
+	}
+
+	role := s.deps.OIDC.MapRole(claims.Roles)
+	if role == "" {
+		_ = s.auditOIDCBlocked(r, claims, "no_role_match")
+		s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "no_role_match")
+		return
+	}
+
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+
+	// Returning OIDC user — refresh role + email + last_login.
+	existing, err := s.deps.Store.GetUserByOIDCSubject(r.Context(), claims.Subject)
+	if err == nil {
+		if existing.DisabledAt != nil {
+			s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "user_disabled")
+			return
+		}
+		_ = s.deps.Store.SetUserRole(r.Context(), existing.ID, store.Role(role))
+		_ = s.deps.Store.SetUserEmail(r.Context(), existing.ID, claims.Email)
+		_ = s.deps.Store.MarkUserLogin(r.Context(), existing.ID, now)
+		_ = s.deps.Store.AppendAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditEntry{
+			ID: ulid.Make().String(), UserID: &existing.ID, Actor: "user",
+			Action: "user.oidc_login", TargetKind: ptr("user"),
+			TargetID: &existing.ID, TS: now,
+		})
+		s.oidcDropSessionAndRedirect(w, r, existing.ID, rawIDToken, now)
+		return
+	} else if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		slog.Error("oidc callback: lookup by sub", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// New OIDC user — first check the username doesn't collide with
+	// a local user.
+	if _, err := s.deps.Store.GetUserByUsername(r.Context(), uname); err == nil {
+		_ = s.auditOIDCBlocked(r, claims, "username_taken")
+		s.oidcRedirectError(w, r, "username_taken")
+		return
+	} else if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		slog.Error("oidc callback: lookup by username", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// JIT-provision.
+	id := ulid.Make().String()
+	var emailPtr *string
+	if claims.Email != "" {
+		em := strings.ToLower(claims.Email)
+		emailPtr = &em
+	}
+	sub := claims.Subject
+	if err := s.deps.Store.CreateUser(r.Context(), store.User{
+		ID: id, Username: uname, PasswordHash: "",
+		Role: store.Role(role), Email: emailPtr,
+		AuthSource: "oidc", OIDCSubject: &sub,
+		CreatedAt: now,
+	}); err != nil {
+		slog.Error("oidc callback: provision", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	_ = s.deps.Store.MarkUserLogin(r.Context(), id, now)
+	_ = s.deps.Store.AppendAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditEntry{
+		ID: ulid.Make().String(), UserID: &id, Actor: "user",
+		Action: "user.created", TargetKind: ptr("user"), TargetID: &id,
+		TS:      now,
+		Payload: jsonMust(map[string]any{"auth_source": "oidc"}),
+	})
+	_ = s.deps.Store.AppendAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditEntry{
+		ID: ulid.Make().String(), UserID: &id, Actor: "user",
+		Action: "user.oidc_login", TargetKind: ptr("user"), TargetID: &id,
+		TS: now,
+	})
+	s.oidcDropSessionAndRedirect(w, r, id, rawIDToken, now)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) oidcDropSessionAndRedirect(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request, userID, idToken string, now time.Time) {
+	rawSession, err := auth.NewToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.Error("oidc: session token", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	hashed := auth.HashToken(rawSession)
+	if err := s.deps.Store.CreateSession(r.Context(), store.Session{
+		ID: hashed, UserID: userID, CreatedAt: now,
+		ExpiresAt: now.Add(8 * time.Hour),
+		IDToken:   idToken,
+	}, hashed); err != nil {
+		slog.Error("oidc: create session", "err", err)
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	stdhttp.SetCookie(w, &stdhttp.Cookie{
+		Name: sessionCookieName, Value: rawSession,
+		Path: "/", HttpOnly: true,
+		SameSite: stdhttp.SameSiteLaxMode,
+		Secure:   s.deps.Cfg.CookieSecure,
+		Expires:  now.Add(8 * time.Hour),
+	})
+	stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, "/", stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) oidcRedirectError(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request, code string) {
+	stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, "/login?oidc_error="+code, stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+
+// auditOIDCBlocked records a failed sign-in. user_id is nil because
+// no row was created; the IdP subject + reason go in the payload so
+// admin can correlate.
+func (s *Server) auditOIDCBlocked(r *stdhttp.Request, claims *oidc.Claims, reason string) error {
+	return s.deps.Store.AppendAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditEntry{
+		ID: ulid.Make().String(), UserID: nil, Actor: "system",
+		Action: "user.oidc_login_blocked", TargetKind: ptr("user"),
+		TargetID: nil, TS: time.Now().UTC(),
+		Payload: jsonMust(map[string]any{
+			"sub":      claims.Subject,
+			"username": claims.PreferredUsername,
+			"reason":   reason,
+		}),
+	})
+}
+
+// jsonMust marshals to json.RawMessage; on error returns nil so the
+// audit row still lands without the payload (best-effort).
+func jsonMust(v any) json.RawMessage {
+	b, err := json.Marshal(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return json.RawMessage(b)
+}

internal/server/http/oidc_handlers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+package http
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	stdhttp "net/http"
+	"net/http/cookiejar"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/crypto"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/config"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/oidc"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/oidc/oidctest"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/store"
+)
+
+// newTestServerWithOIDC returns a Server wired to a stub IdP.
+// Returned ts is the httptest.Server fronting the actual server;
+// stub is the IdP for minting codes / configuring claims.
+func newTestServerWithOIDC(t *testing.T) (*Server, *httptest.Server, *oidctest.StubIdP) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	st, err := store.Open(context.Background(), filepath.Join(dir, "rm.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("store: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = st.Close() })
+
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "secret.key")
+	if err := crypto.GenerateKeyFile(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("genkey: %v", err)
+	}
+	key, _ := crypto.LoadKeyFromFile(keyPath)
+	aead, _ := crypto.NewAEAD(key)
+
+	stub := oidctest.New(t)
+	cfg := &config.OIDCConfig{
+		Issuer: stub.URL(), ClientID: "test-client", ClientSecret: "x",
+		Scopes: []string{"openid"}, RoleClaim: "groups",
+		RoleMapping: map[string]string{
+			"rm-admins":    "admin",
+			"rm-operators": "operator",
+			"rm-viewers":   "viewer",
+		},
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	oidcClient, err := oidc.New(ctx, cfg, "http://test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("oidc client: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	deps := Deps{
+		Cfg:   config.Config{Listen: ":0", DataDir: dir, SecretKeyFile: keyPath, BaseURL: "http://test"},
+		Store: st,
+		AEAD:  aead,
+		OIDC:  oidcClient,
+	}
+	s := New(deps)
+	ts := httptest.NewServer(s.srv.Handler)
+	t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
+	return s, ts, stub
+}
+
+func TestOIDCLoginRedirectsToIdP(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv, ts, _ := newTestServerWithOIDC(t)
+	c := &stdhttp.Client{CheckRedirect: func(*stdhttp.Request, []*stdhttp.Request) error {
+		return stdhttp.ErrUseLastResponse
+	}}
+	res, err := c.Get(ts.URL + "/auth/oidc/login")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer res.Body.Close()
+	if res.StatusCode != stdhttp.StatusSeeOther {
+		t.Errorf("status: got %d want 303", res.StatusCode)
+	}
+	loc := res.Header.Get("Location")
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "code_challenge=") || !strings.Contains(loc, "state=") {
+		t.Errorf("location: %q", loc)
+	}
+	_ = srv
+}
+
+// runCallback drives the auth code flow against the stub: kicks off
+// /auth/oidc/login (capturing the state), mints a code at the stub
+// with the given claims, then GETs /auth/oidc/callback. Returns the
+// final response.
+func runCallback(t *testing.T, ts *httptest.Server, stub *oidctest.StubIdP, claims map[string]any) *stdhttp.Response {
+	t.Helper()
+	jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
+	c := &stdhttp.Client{Jar: jar, CheckRedirect: func(*stdhttp.Request, []*stdhttp.Request) error {
+		return stdhttp.ErrUseLastResponse
+	}}
+	res, err := c.Get(ts.URL + "/auth/oidc/login")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("login: %v", err)
+	}
+	res.Body.Close()
+	authURL, _ := url.Parse(res.Header.Get("Location"))
+	state := authURL.Query().Get("state")
+
+	code := stub.MintCode(claims)
+	res, err = c.Get(ts.URL + "/auth/oidc/callback?code=" + code + "&state=" + state)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("callback: %v", err)
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+func TestOIDCCallbackHappyPathAdmin(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv, ts, stub := newTestServerWithOIDC(t)
+	res := runCallback(t, ts, stub, map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "admin-sub",
+		"preferred_username": "alice",
+		"email":              "alice@example.com",
+		"groups":             []string{"rm-admins"},
+		"aud":                "test-client",
+	})
+	defer res.Body.Close()
+	if res.StatusCode != stdhttp.StatusSeeOther || res.Header.Get("Location") != "/" {
+		t.Errorf("status: %d Location: %q", res.StatusCode, res.Header.Get("Location"))
+	}
+	u, err := srv.deps.Store.GetUserByOIDCSubject(t.Context(), "admin-sub")
+	if err != nil || u.AuthSource != "oidc" || u.Role != "admin" || u.Username != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("user: %+v err: %v", u, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCCallbackNoRoleMatchDeny(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	_, ts, stub := newTestServerWithOIDC(t)
+	res := runCallback(t, ts, stub, map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "other-sub",
+		"preferred_username": "bob",
+		"groups":             []string{"something-else"},
+		"aud":                "test-client",
+	})
+	defer res.Body.Close()
+	if res.StatusCode != stdhttp.StatusSeeOther {
+		t.Errorf("status: got %d want 303", res.StatusCode)
+	}
+	loc := res.Header.Get("Location")
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "oidc_error=no_role_match") {
+		t.Errorf("location: %q", loc)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCCallbackUsernameCollision(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv, ts, stub := newTestServerWithOIDC(t)
+	if err := srv.deps.Store.CreateUser(t.Context(), store.User{
+		ID: "local-alice", Username: "alice", PasswordHash: "x",
+		Role: store.RoleViewer, CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	res := runCallback(t, ts, stub, map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "remote-sub",
+		"preferred_username": "alice",
+		"groups":             []string{"rm-admins"},
+		"aud":                "test-client",
+	})
+	defer res.Body.Close()
+	loc := res.Header.Get("Location")
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "oidc_error=username_taken") {
+		t.Errorf("location: %q", loc)
+	}
+	if _, err := srv.deps.Store.GetUserByOIDCSubject(t.Context(), "remote-sub"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("collision should not have provisioned a user")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCCallbackReturningUserRefreshesRole(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv, ts, stub := newTestServerWithOIDC(t)
+	res := runCallback(t, ts, stub, map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "carol-sub",
+		"preferred_username": "carol",
+		"groups":             []string{"rm-operators"},
+		"aud":                "test-client",
+	})
+	res.Body.Close()
+	res = runCallback(t, ts, stub, map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "carol-sub",
+		"preferred_username": "carol",
+		"groups":             []string{"rm-admins"},
+		"aud":                "test-client",
+	})
+	res.Body.Close()
+	u, _ := srv.deps.Store.GetUserByOIDCSubject(t.Context(), "carol-sub")
+	if u.Role != "admin" {
+		t.Errorf("role refresh: got %q want admin", u.Role)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCLogoutRedirectsToEndSession(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv, ts, stub := newTestServerWithOIDC(t)
+	endSessionURL := stub.URL() + "/logout-end"
+	stub.SetEndSessionEndpoint(endSessionURL)
+
+	// Rebuild the OIDC client because end_session_endpoint is read at
+	// New() time from the discovery doc.
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	cfg := &config.OIDCConfig{
+		Issuer: stub.URL(), ClientID: "test-client", ClientSecret: "x",
+		Scopes: []string{"openid"}, RoleClaim: "groups",
+		RoleMapping: map[string]string{"rm-admins": "admin"},
+	}
+	newClient, err := oidc.New(ctx, cfg, "http://test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rebuild client: %v", err)
+	}
+	srv.deps.OIDC = newClient
+
+	// Sign in via the OIDC flow.
+	res := runCallback(t, ts, stub, map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "logout-sub",
+		"preferred_username": "lo",
+		"groups":             []string{"rm-admins"},
+		"aud":                "test-client",
+	})
+	res.Body.Close()
+	cookies := res.Cookies()
+	if len(cookies) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected session cookie after sign-in")
+	}
+	sessionCookie := cookies[0]
+
+	// POST /logout — should 303 to the end_session endpoint with
+	// id_token_hint + post_logout_redirect_uri.
+	c := &stdhttp.Client{CheckRedirect: func(*stdhttp.Request, []*stdhttp.Request) error {
+		return stdhttp.ErrUseLastResponse
+	}}
+	req, _ := stdhttp.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL+"/logout", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(sessionCookie)
+	res, err = c.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logout: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer res.Body.Close()
+	if res.StatusCode != stdhttp.StatusSeeOther {
+		t.Errorf("status: got %d want 303", res.StatusCode)
+	}
+	loc := res.Header.Get("Location")
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "/logout-end") {
+		t.Errorf("location not at end_session: %q", loc)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "id_token_hint=") {
+		t.Errorf("location missing id_token_hint: %q", loc)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "post_logout_redirect_uri=") {
+		t.Errorf("location missing post_logout_redirect_uri: %q", loc)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLocalLoginRejectsOIDCUser(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	srv, urlBase := newTestServer(t, false)
+	uid := "u-oidc"
+	sub := "sub-x"
+	if err := srv.deps.Store.CreateUser(t.Context(), store.User{
+		ID: uid, Username: "ouser", PasswordHash: "",
+		Role: store.RoleOperator, CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+		AuthSource: "oidc", OIDCSubject: &sub,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
+		"username": "ouser", "password": "anything",
+	})
+	res, err := stdhttp.Post(urlBase+"/api/auth/login",
+		"application/json", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("post: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer res.Body.Close()
+	if res.StatusCode != stdhttp.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Errorf("status: got %d want 401", res.StatusCode)
+	}
+}

internal/server/http/server.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/crypto"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/notification"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/config"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/oidc"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/ui"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/ws"
 	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/store"
@@ -45,6 +46,9 @@ type Deps struct {
 	// admin-bootstrap token printed in the server logs. While set, the
 	// /bootstrap endpoint accepts it to create the first admin user.
 	BootstrapToken string
+	// OIDC (optional). Non-nil when the operator has configured an
+	// IdP — handlers under /auth/oidc/* are mounted only when set.
+	OIDC *oidc.Client
 }
 
 // Server is the running HTTP server.
@@ -133,13 +137,19 @@ func (s *Server) routes(r chi.Router) {
 	r.Get("/ws/agent/pending", s.handlePendingWS)
 	r.Mount("/static/", staticHandler())
 
+	// POST /logout is always mounted — it handles both local and OIDC
+	// sessions and doesn't require the UI renderer.
+	r.Post("/logout", s.handleUILogoutPost)
 	if s.deps.UI != nil {
 		r.Get("/login", s.handleUILoginGet)
 		r.Post("/login", s.handleUILoginPost)
-		r.Post("/logout", s.handleUILogoutPost)
 		r.Get("/setup", s.handleUISetupGet)
 		r.Post("/setup", s.handleUISetupPost)
 	}
+	if s.deps.OIDC != nil {
+		r.Get("/auth/oidc/login", s.handleOIDCLogin)
+		r.Get("/auth/oidc/callback", s.handleOIDCCallback)
+	}
 
 	// Viewer band — anyone authenticated can read.
 	r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {

internal/server/http/ui_handlers.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
 	stdhttp "net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -921,7 +922,14 @@ func (s *Server) handleUILoginGet(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request)
 		stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, "/", stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
 		return
 	}
-	view := ui.ViewData{Version: s.version()}
+	view := ui.ViewData{
+		Version:   s.version(),
+		OIDCError: r.URL.Query().Get("oidc_error"),
+	}
+	if s.deps.OIDC != nil {
+		view.OIDCEnabled = true
+		view.OIDCDisplayName = s.deps.OIDC.DisplayName()
+	}
 	if err := s.deps.UI.Render(w, "login", view); err != nil {
 		slog.Error("ui: render login", "err", err)
 		stdhttp.Error(w, "internal", stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -947,6 +955,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleUILoginPost(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request)
 			Username: username,
 			Error:    "Invalid username or password.",
 		}
+		if s.deps.OIDC != nil {
+			view.OIDCEnabled = true
+			view.OIDCDisplayName = s.deps.OIDC.DisplayName()
+		}
 		w.WriteHeader(stdhttp.StatusUnauthorized)
 		if err := s.deps.UI.Render(w, "login", view); err != nil {
 			slog.Error("ui: render login (post-fail)", "err", err)
@@ -956,12 +968,37 @@ func (s *Server) handleUILoginPost(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request)
 	stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, "/", stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
 }
 
-// handleUILogoutPost is the form-submit twin of /api/auth/logout. It
+// handleUILogoutPost is the form-submit twin of /api/auth/logout. For
-// drops the session cookie and redirects to /login.
+// local sessions it drops the cookie and redirects to /login. For OIDC
+// sessions, if the IdP advertised an end_session_endpoint it performs
+// RP-initiated logout by redirecting there with id_token_hint and
+// post_logout_redirect_uri.
 func (s *Server) handleUILogoutPost(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
-	if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil {
+	c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
-		_ = s.deps.Store.DeleteSession(r.Context(), auth.HashToken(c.Value))
+	if err != nil {
+		stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, "/login", stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
+		return
 	}
+	hash := auth.HashToken(c.Value)
+	sess, _ := s.deps.Store.LookupSession(r.Context(), hash)
+	_ = s.deps.Store.DeleteSession(r.Context(), hash)
+
+	// Default: drop session, go to /login.
+	dest := "/login"
+
+	// OIDC session with a discovered end_session_endpoint? Compose
+	// the IdP logout URL with id_token_hint + post_logout_redirect_uri.
+	if sess != nil && sess.IDToken != "" && s.deps.OIDC != nil &&
+		s.deps.OIDC.EndSessionEndpoint() != "" {
+		v := url.Values{}
+		v.Set("id_token_hint", sess.IDToken)
+		if base := strings.TrimRight(s.deps.Cfg.BaseURL, "/"); base != "" {
+			v.Set("post_logout_redirect_uri", base+"/login")
+		}
+		dest = s.deps.OIDC.EndSessionEndpoint() + "?" + v.Encode()
+	}
+
+	// Clear the cookie.
 	stdhttp.SetCookie(w, &stdhttp.Cookie{
 		Name:     sessionCookieName,
 		Value:    "",
@@ -971,5 +1008,5 @@ func (s *Server) handleUILogoutPost(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request
 		Secure:   s.deps.Cfg.CookieSecure,
 		SameSite: stdhttp.SameSiteLaxMode,
 	})
-	stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, "/login", stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
+	stdhttp.Redirect(w, r, dest, stdhttp.StatusSeeOther)
 }

internal/server/http/ui_users.go

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ type userRow struct {
 	LastLoginAt        string // pre-formatted "2006-01-02 15:04:05" or "never"
 	Disabled           bool
 	MustChangePassword bool
+	AuthSource         string
 }
 
 func (s *Server) handleUIUsersList(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
@@ -104,6 +105,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleUIUsersList(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request)
 			Role: string(ux.Role), LastLoginAt: ll,
 			Disabled:           ux.DisabledAt != nil,
 			MustChangePassword: ux.MustChangePassword,
+			AuthSource:         ux.AuthSource,
 		})
 	}
 
@@ -157,7 +159,8 @@ type userFormPage struct {
 	// to add a username that already exists (disabled). Triggers a
 	// banner on the edit page explaining why and steering them at
 	// the Re-enable button. See handleUIUserNewPost's collision branch.
-	Reenable bool
+	Reenable   bool
+	AuthSource string
 }
 
 func (s *Server) handleUIUserNewGet(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
@@ -294,8 +297,9 @@ func (s *Server) handleUIUserEditGet(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Reques
 	view.Page = userFormPage{
 		Mode: "edit", ID: target.ID, Username: target.Username,
 		Email: em, Role: string(target.Role),
-		Disabled: target.DisabledAt != nil,
+		Disabled:   target.DisabledAt != nil,
-		Reenable: r.URL.Query().Get("reenable") == "1",
+		Reenable:   r.URL.Query().Get("reenable") == "1",
+		AuthSource: target.AuthSource,
 	}
 	_ = s.deps.UI.Render(w, "user_edit", view)
 }
@@ -315,6 +319,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleUIUserEditPost(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Reque
 		stdhttp.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
+	if target.AuthSource == "oidc" {
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "OIDC users cannot have role/email edited locally", stdhttp.StatusForbidden)
+		return
+	}
 	role, ok := validRole(r.PostForm.Get("role"))
 	if !ok {
 		stdhttp.Error(w, "bad role", stdhttp.StatusBadRequest)

internal/server/oidc/oidc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+// Package oidc wraps go-oidc + oauth2 in the small surface the
+// HTTP handlers need: discovery, code-exchange config, ID-token
+// verification, and role-claim resolution.
+package oidc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	gooidc "github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
+	"golang.org/x/oauth2"
+
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/config"
+)
+
+// Client bundles the discovered provider + a pre-built oauth2.Config.
+// Constructed once at server start; safe for concurrent use.
+type Client struct {
+	cfg        *config.OIDCConfig
+	provider   *gooidc.Provider
+	verifier   *gooidc.IDTokenVerifier
+	oauth      *oauth2.Config
+	endSession string // discovered end_session_endpoint, "" if none
+}
+
+// New discovers the provider's well-known config and builds a Client.
+// Network call — should be invoked once at startup with a context
+// carrying a sane timeout. Returns an error on a 4xx/5xx from
+// discovery so the operator finds out at startup, not on first login.
+func New(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.OIDCConfig, baseURL string) (*Client, error) {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("oidc: config nil")
+	}
+	prov, err := gooidc.NewProvider(ctx, cfg.Issuer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: discovery: %w", err)
+	}
+	redir := cfg.RedirectURL
+	if redir == "" {
+		redir = strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/") + "/auth/oidc/callback"
+	}
+	oa := &oauth2.Config{
+		ClientID:     cfg.ClientID,
+		ClientSecret: cfg.ClientSecret,
+		Endpoint:     prov.Endpoint(),
+		RedirectURL:  redir,
+		Scopes:       cfg.Scopes,
+	}
+	verifier := prov.Verifier(&gooidc.Config{ClientID: cfg.ClientID})
+
+	// Pull end_session_endpoint out of the discovery doc — go-oidc
+	// doesn't expose it as a typed field, but the underlying claims
+	// blob does.
+	var doc struct {
+		EndSessionEndpoint string `json:"end_session_endpoint"`
+	}
+	_ = prov.Claims(&doc)
+
+	return &Client{
+		cfg:        cfg,
+		provider:   prov,
+		verifier:   verifier,
+		oauth:      oa,
+		endSession: doc.EndSessionEndpoint,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// AuthURL returns the URL to redirect the browser to for the
+// Authorization Code + PKCE flow. State + verifier are caller-
+// supplied so the caller can persist them in the oidc_state table.
+func (c *Client) AuthURL(state, codeChallenge string) string {
+	return c.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state,
+		oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", codeChallenge),
+		oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
+	)
+}
+
+// Exchange swaps a code+verifier for a token set and verifies the
+// id_token. Returns the parsed Claims and the raw id_token (the
+// caller stashes the raw on the session for RP-initiated logout).
+func (c *Client) Exchange(ctx context.Context, code, verifier string) (*Claims, string, error) {
+	tok, err := c.oauth.Exchange(ctx, code,
+		oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", verifier))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("oidc: token exchange: %w", err)
+	}
+	rawID, ok := tok.Extra("id_token").(string)
+	if !ok || rawID == "" {
+		return nil, "", errors.New("oidc: id_token missing from token response")
+	}
+	idTok, err := c.verifier.Verify(ctx, rawID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("oidc: verify id_token: %w", err)
+	}
+	var raw map[string]any
+	if err := idTok.Claims(&raw); err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("oidc: claims: %w", err)
+	}
+	// Many IdPs (Authelia among them) only return minimal claims in
+	// the ID token and put profile/email/groups on /userinfo. Fetch
+	// userinfo and merge — id_token claims win on conflict so the
+	// signed assertion remains authoritative.
+	if ui, err := c.provider.UserInfo(ctx, oauth2.StaticTokenSource(tok)); err == nil {
+		var uiClaims map[string]any
+		if err := ui.Claims(&uiClaims); err == nil {
+			for k, v := range uiClaims {
+				if _, present := raw[k]; !present {
+					raw[k] = v
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return parseClaims(raw, c.cfg.RoleClaim), rawID, nil
+}
+
+// EndSessionEndpoint exposes the discovered end_session URL ("" if
+// the IdP doesn't advertise one).
+func (c *Client) EndSessionEndpoint() string { return c.endSession }
+
+// DisplayName for the SSO button on the login page.
+func (c *Client) DisplayName() string { return c.cfg.DisplayName }
+
+// MapRole returns the role for the first matching claim value; "" if
+// none match. Caller treats "" as deny.
+func (c *Client) MapRole(roles []string) string {
+	for _, r := range roles {
+		if mapped, ok := c.cfg.RoleMapping[r]; ok {
+			return mapped
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// Claims is the minimal projection the callback handler cares about.
+type Claims struct {
+	Subject           string
+	PreferredUsername string
+	Email             string
+	Roles             []string // normalised from string|[]string|csv
+}
+
+// parseClaims pulls the four fields we need from the raw id_token
+// claims. The 'roles' field is normalised from the three shapes
+// IdPs emit (string, []string, comma-separated string).
+func parseClaims(raw map[string]any, roleClaim string) *Claims {
+	c := &Claims{}
+	if v, ok := raw["sub"].(string); ok {
+		c.Subject = v
+	}
+	if v, ok := raw["preferred_username"].(string); ok {
+		c.PreferredUsername = v
+	}
+	if v, ok := raw["email"].(string); ok {
+		c.Email = v
+	}
+	switch v := raw[roleClaim].(type) {
+	case string:
+		for _, p := range strings.Split(v, ",") {
+			p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
+			if p != "" {
+				c.Roles = append(c.Roles, p)
+			}
+		}
+	case []any:
+		for _, item := range v {
+			if s, ok := item.(string); ok && s != "" {
+				c.Roles = append(c.Roles, s)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+// RandomState generates 32 random bytes URL-safe base64-encoded —
+// used as the 'state' parameter on the authorization request.
+// Caller is expected to compute sha256(state) for storage.
+func RandomState() (string, error) {
+	var b [32]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
+}
+
+// PKCEPair generates a code_verifier (base64-url 64 chars) and the
+// corresponding S256 code_challenge.
+func PKCEPair() (verifier, challenge string, err error) {
+	var b [48]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+		return "", "", err
+	}
+	verifier = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:])
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
+	challenge = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+	return verifier, challenge, nil
+}
+
+// HashState returns sha256(state) hex — used as the primary key in
+// the oidc_state table (so a DB leak doesn't leak active states).
+func HashState(state string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(state))
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", sum)
+}

internal/server/oidc/oidc_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package oidc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/config"
+	"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/server/oidc/oidctest"
+)
+
+func TestClientExchangeAgainstStub(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	stub := oidctest.New(t)
+	cfg := &config.OIDCConfig{
+		Issuer: stub.URL(), ClientID: "test-client", ClientSecret: "x",
+		Scopes: []string{"openid"}, RoleClaim: "groups",
+		RoleMapping: map[string]string{"rm-admins": "admin"},
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	c, err := New(ctx, cfg, "http://rm.example")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new client: %v", err)
+	}
+	code := stub.MintCode(map[string]any{
+		"sub":                "abc",
+		"preferred_username": "alice",
+		"email":              "alice@example.com",
+		"groups":             []string{"rm-admins"},
+	})
+	verifier, _, err := PKCEPair()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pkce: %v", err)
+	}
+	claims, raw, err := c.Exchange(ctx, code, verifier)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("exchange: %v", err)
+	}
+	if claims.Subject != "abc" || claims.PreferredUsername != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("claims: %+v", claims)
+	}
+	if c.MapRole(claims.Roles) != "admin" {
+		t.Errorf("role: got %q", c.MapRole(claims.Roles))
+	}
+	if raw == "" {
+		t.Error("raw id_token must be non-empty")
+	}
+}

internal/server/oidc/oidctest/stub.go

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+// Package oidctest provides a minimal OIDC provider for tests —
+// discovery doc, JWKS, and a token endpoint. Each test mints its
+// own claims; the stub signs them with an ECDSA P-256 key and the
+// production verifier accepts them because the JWKS is fetched live
+// from the stub.
+//
+// Usage:
+//
+//	stub := oidctest.New(t)
+//	code := stub.MintCode(map[string]any{
+//	    "sub":                "abc",
+//	    "preferred_username": "alice",
+//	    "groups":             []string{"rm-admins"},
+//	})
+//	// stub.URL() is the issuer URL; pass to oidc.New as Issuer
+package oidctest
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	stdhttp "net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
+)
+
+// StubIdP is an httptest-backed OIDC provider. Each test creates a
+// fresh one via New(t); cleanup is registered on t.
+type StubIdP struct {
+	t   *testing.T
+	srv *httptest.Server
+
+	mu         sync.Mutex
+	priv       *ecdsa.PrivateKey
+	kid        string
+	claims     map[string]map[string]any // code → claims
+	endSession string                    // optional, set by SetEndSessionEndpoint
+}
+
+// New constructs a stub IdP listening on a random port. Cleanup is
+// registered on t.
+func New(t *testing.T) *StubIdP {
+	t.Helper()
+	priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("oidctest: genkey: %v", err)
+	}
+	s := &StubIdP{
+		t:      t,
+		priv:   priv,
+		kid:    "stub-key",
+		claims: map[string]map[string]any{},
+	}
+	mux := stdhttp.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", s.discovery)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/jwks.json", s.jwks)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/token", s.token)
+	s.srv = httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(s.srv.Close)
+	return s
+}
+
+// URL returns the base URL of the stub — pass as Issuer to
+// oidc.New().
+func (s *StubIdP) URL() string { return s.srv.URL }
+
+// MintCode produces an authorization code that the stub will exchange
+// for an id_token containing the supplied claims.
+func (s *StubIdP) MintCode(claims map[string]any) string {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	code := fmt.Sprintf("code-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
+	s.claims[code] = claims
+	return code
+}
+
+// SetEndSessionEndpoint configures the stub to advertise an
+// end_session_endpoint in its discovery doc. Used by the logout
+// test in E1.
+func (s *StubIdP) SetEndSessionEndpoint(url string) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.endSession = url
+}
+
+func (s *StubIdP) discovery(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, _ *stdhttp.Request) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	endSession := s.endSession
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	doc := map[string]any{
+		"issuer":                                s.srv.URL,
+		"authorization_endpoint":                s.srv.URL + "/authorize",
+		"token_endpoint":                        s.srv.URL + "/token",
+		"jwks_uri":                              s.srv.URL + "/jwks.json",
+		"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"ES256"},
+		"response_types_supported":              []string{"code"},
+		"subject_types_supported":               []string{"public"},
+	}
+	if endSession != "" {
+		doc["end_session_endpoint"] = endSession
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(doc)
+}
+
+func (s *StubIdP) jwks(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, _ *stdhttp.Request) {
+	pub := s.priv.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+	x := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(padTo32(pub.X.Bytes()))
+	y := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(padTo32(pub.Y.Bytes()))
+	keys := map[string]any{
+		"keys": []map[string]any{{
+			"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "alg": "ES256",
+			"use": "sig", "kid": s.kid,
+			"x": x, "y": y,
+		}},
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(keys)
+}
+
+func (s *StubIdP) token(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
+	_ = r.ParseForm()
+	code := r.PostForm.Get("code")
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	claims, ok := s.claims[code]
+	if ok {
+		delete(s.claims, code)
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if !ok {
+		stdhttp.Error(w, "bad code", stdhttp.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	if _, ok := claims["iss"]; !ok {
+		claims["iss"] = s.srv.URL
+	}
+	if _, ok := claims["aud"]; !ok {
+		claims["aud"] = "test-client"
+	}
+	now := time.Now().Unix()
+	claims["iat"] = now
+	claims["exp"] = now + 600
+
+	jc := jwt.MapClaims{}
+	for k, v := range claims {
+		jc[k] = v
+	}
+	tk := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, jc)
+	tk.Header["kid"] = s.kid
+	signed, err := tk.SignedString(s.priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		stdhttp.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
+		return
+	}
+	resp := map[string]any{
+		"access_token": "stub-access",
+		"token_type":   "Bearer",
+		"id_token":     signed,
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
+}
+
+// padTo32 left-pads an integer big-endian byte slice to 32 bytes,
+// the size required by P-256 JWK x/y components.
+func padTo32(b []byte) []byte {
+	if len(b) >= 32 {
+		return b
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, 32)
+	copy(out[32-len(b):], b)
+	return out
+}

internal/server/ui/ui.go

@@ -56,6 +56,19 @@ type ViewData struct {
 	// today; other pages can adopt the same field.
 	Error string
 
+	// OIDCEnabled is true when the server has an OIDC provider
+	// configured. The login page uses it to show the SSO button.
+	OIDCEnabled bool
+
+	// OIDCDisplayName is the human-readable label for the OIDC
+	// provider (e.g. "Authelia"). Shown on the SSO button.
+	OIDCDisplayName string
+
+	// OIDCError holds an error code returned via ?oidc_error=… after
+	// a failed OIDC callback. The login page maps it to a user-facing
+	// message.
+	OIDCError string
+
 	// Page carries page-specific data. Concrete type is the page's
 	// own struct.
 	Page any

internal/store/migrations/0019_oidc.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- 0019_oidc.sql
+--
+-- OIDC bookkeeping. Three independent additions land in one
+-- migration to keep the related changes together:
+--
+--   1. users.auth_source     — 'local' | 'oidc'. Local users get
+--                              the default; first OIDC sign-in JITs
+--                              a row with auth_source='oidc'.
+--   2. users.oidc_subject    — IdP's stable 'sub' claim. Indexed
+--                              uniquely (partial; NULLs allowed).
+--   3. sessions.id_token     — last id_token for OIDC sessions, used
+--                              as id_token_hint on RP-initiated
+--                              logout. NULL for local sessions.
+--   4. oidc_state            — short-lived state for the OAuth round-
+--                              trip (state + PKCE code_verifier).
+--                              Swept on the alert engine tick.
+--
+-- All column-level ALTERs (CLAUDE.md preference; safe under
+-- foreign_keys=ON).
+
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN auth_source TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'local'
+  CHECK (auth_source IN ('local', 'oidc'));
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN oidc_subject TEXT;
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX users_oidc_subject ON users(oidc_subject)
+  WHERE oidc_subject IS NOT NULL;
+
+ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN id_token TEXT;
+
+CREATE TABLE oidc_state (
+  state_hash    TEXT PRIMARY KEY,    -- sha256(state) hex; raw never persisted
+  code_verifier TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at    TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE INDEX oidc_state_created ON oidc_state(created_at);

internal/store/oidc_state.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// PutOIDCState stores the (state_hash, code_verifier) pair created
+// at /auth/oidc/login start. Called once per login attempt.
+func (s *Store) PutOIDCState(ctx context.Context, stateHash, verifier string, createdAt time.Time) error {
+	_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO oidc_state (state_hash, code_verifier, created_at)
+		 VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
+		stateHash, verifier,
+		createdAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: put oidc state: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ConsumeOIDCState atomically reads + deletes the row in one go,
+// returning the code_verifier. Single-use — a re-play returns
+// ErrNotFound. Used by the OIDC callback handler.
+func (s *Store) ConsumeOIDCState(ctx context.Context, stateHash string) (string, error) {
+	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: begin: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	var verifier string
+	err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT code_verifier FROM oidc_state WHERE state_hash = ?`,
+		stateHash).Scan(&verifier)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			return "", ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: consume oidc state: %w", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`DELETE FROM oidc_state WHERE state_hash = ?`, stateHash); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: delete oidc state: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: commit: %w", err)
+	}
+	return verifier, nil
+}
+
+// CleanupExpiredOIDCState removes entries created before cutoff.
+// Called on the alert engine's 60s tick alongside setup-token sweep.
+func (s *Store) CleanupExpiredOIDCState(ctx context.Context, cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
+	res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`DELETE FROM oidc_state WHERE created_at < ?`,
+		cutoff.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("store: cleanup oidc state: %w", err)
+	}
+	n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
+	return n, nil
+}

internal/store/oidc_state_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func newOIDCStateTestStore(t *testing.T) *Store {
+	t.Helper()
+	st, err := Open(context.Background(), filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rm.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = st.Close() })
+	return st
+}
+
+func TestOIDCStatePutAndConsume(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	st := newOIDCStateTestStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+
+	if err := st.PutOIDCState(ctx, "hash1", "verifier-1", now); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("put: %v", err)
+	}
+	v, err := st.ConsumeOIDCState(ctx, "hash1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("consume: %v", err)
+	}
+	if v != "verifier-1" {
+		t.Errorf("verifier: got %q want %q", v, "verifier-1")
+	}
+	if _, err := st.ConsumeOIDCState(ctx, "hash1"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("re-consume should fail")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOIDCStateCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	st := newOIDCStateTestStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+
+	_ = st.PutOIDCState(ctx, "stale", "v-stale", now.Add(-10*time.Minute))
+	_ = st.PutOIDCState(ctx, "fresh", "v-fresh", now)
+
+	cutoff := now.Add(-5 * time.Minute)
+	n, err := st.CleanupExpiredOIDCState(ctx, cutoff)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("cleanup: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("cleanup count: got %d want 1", n)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.ConsumeOIDCState(ctx, "stale"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("stale entry should have been deleted")
+	}
+	if _, err := st.ConsumeOIDCState(ctx, "fresh"); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("fresh entry should still be readable: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/store/sessions.go

@@ -12,13 +12,14 @@ import (
 // insert; the raw token is what the caller hands to the user (cookie).
 func (s *Store) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, sess Session, tokenHash string) error {
 	_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO sessions (id, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, ua)
+		`INSERT INTO sessions (id, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, ua, id_token)
-		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
 		tokenHash,
 		sess.UserID,
 		sess.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
 		sess.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
-		sess.IP, sess.UA)
+		nullableStr(sess.IP), nullableStr(sess.UA),
+		nullableStr(sess.IDToken))
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("store: create session: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -32,15 +33,15 @@ func (s *Store) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, sess Session, tokenHash strin
 // of valid token hashes.
 func (s *Store) LookupSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (*Session, error) {
 	row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT id, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, ua
+		`SELECT id, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, ua, id_token
 		 FROM sessions
 		 WHERE id = ? AND expires_at > ?`,
 		tokenHash, time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
 
 	var sess Session
 	var created, expires string
-	var ip, ua sql.NullString
+	var ip, ua, idTok sql.NullString
-	if err := row.Scan(&sess.ID, &sess.UserID, &created, &expires, &ip, &ua); err != nil {
+	if err := row.Scan(&sess.ID, &sess.UserID, &created, &expires, &ip, &ua, &idTok); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 			return nil, ErrNotFound
 		}
@@ -62,6 +63,9 @@ func (s *Store) LookupSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (*Session,
 	if ua.Valid {
 		sess.UA = ua.String
 	}
+	if idTok.Valid {
+		sess.IDToken = idTok.String
+	}
 	return &sess, nil
 }
 

internal/store/sessions_test.go

@@ -43,3 +43,34 @@ func TestDeleteSessionsByUserID(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("hash1 should be gone")
 	}
 }
+
+func TestSessionRoundTripsIDToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	s := openTestStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+
+	uid := "u-oidc"
+	if err := s.CreateUser(ctx, User{
+		ID: uid, Username: "ouser", PasswordHash: "",
+		Role: RoleOperator, CreatedAt: now,
+		AuthSource: "oidc",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create user: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := s.CreateSession(ctx, Session{
+		ID: "h1", UserID: uid, CreatedAt: now,
+		ExpiresAt: now.Add(time.Hour),
+		IDToken:   "eyJ.fake.jwt",
+	}, "h1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := s.LookupSession(ctx, "h1")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("lookup: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.IDToken != "eyJ.fake.jwt" {
+		t.Errorf("id_token round trip: got %q", got.IDToken)
+	}
+}

internal/store/types.go

@@ -16,8 +16,18 @@ type User struct {
 	Email              *string    // optional; nil = not set
 	DisabledAt         *time.Time // nil = enabled
 	MustChangePassword bool
-	CreatedAt          time.Time
+	// AuthSource is "local" (created by admin or bootstrap) or
-	LastLoginAt        *time.Time
+	// "oidc" (JIT-provisioned on first OIDC sign-in). Local users
+	// authenticate via password; OIDC users via the IdP and have an
+	// empty PasswordHash.
+	AuthSource string
+	// OIDCSubject is the stable 'sub' claim from the IdP. Set only
+	// when AuthSource == "oidc". Used for fast lookup on subsequent
+	// sign-ins; the username/email may change at the IdP but sub
+	// stays stable.
+	OIDCSubject *string
+	CreatedAt   time.Time
+	LastLoginAt *time.Time
 }
 
 // Role enumerates the access tiers from spec.md §7.2.
@@ -40,6 +50,10 @@ type Session struct {
 	ExpiresAt time.Time
 	IP        string
 	UA        string
+	// IDToken is the OIDC id_token captured at sign-in for OIDC
+	// sessions; empty for local-user sessions. Used as
+	// id_token_hint on RP-initiated logout.
+	IDToken string
 }
 
 // Host mirrors the hosts table. The P2 redesign moved repo-related

internal/store/users.go

@@ -18,12 +18,18 @@ func (s *Store) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, u User) error {
 	if u.MustChangePassword {
 		must = 1
 	}
+	authSource := u.AuthSource
+	if authSource == "" {
+		authSource = "local"
+	}
 	_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, password_hash, role, email,
-		                    must_change_password, created_at)
+		                    must_change_password, auth_source,
-		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		                    oidc_subject, created_at)
+		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
 		u.ID, u.Username, u.PasswordHash, string(u.Role),
-		nullable(u.Email), must,
+		nullable(u.Email), must, authSource,
+		nullable(u.OIDCSubject),
 		u.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("store: create user: %w", err)
@@ -31,24 +37,49 @@ func (s *Store) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, u User) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// userSelectCols centralises the column list every read path uses so
+// scanUser stays in lockstep.
+const userSelectCols = `id, username, password_hash, role, email,
+                         disabled_at, must_change_password,
+                         auth_source, oidc_subject,
+                         created_at, last_login_at`
+
 // GetUserByUsername resolves a user case-insensitively.
 func (s *Store) GetUserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*User, error) {
 	row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT id, username, password_hash, role, email, disabled_at,
+		`SELECT `+userSelectCols+` FROM users WHERE LOWER(username) = LOWER(?)`,
-		        must_change_password, created_at, last_login_at
+		username)
-		 FROM users WHERE LOWER(username) = LOWER(?)`, username)
 	return scanUser(row.Scan)
 }
 
 // GetUserByID looks up a user by id. Returns ErrNotFound on miss.
 func (s *Store) GetUserByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*User, error) {
 	row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT id, username, password_hash, role, email, disabled_at,
+		`SELECT `+userSelectCols+` FROM users WHERE id = ?`, id)
-		        must_change_password, created_at, last_login_at
-		 FROM users WHERE id = ?`, id)
 	return scanUser(row.Scan)
 }
 
+// GetUserByOIDCSubject finds the user JIT-provisioned on a previous
+// OIDC sign-in. ErrNotFound on miss.
+func (s *Store) GetUserByOIDCSubject(ctx context.Context, sub string) (*User, error) {
+	row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT `+userSelectCols+` FROM users WHERE oidc_subject = ?`, sub)
+	return scanUser(row.Scan)
+}
+
+// SetUserOIDCSubject pins an existing user row to an IdP subject.
+// Used by tests today; reserved for a future "link a local user to
+// OIDC" flow.
+func (s *Store) SetUserOIDCSubject(ctx context.Context, id, authSource, sub string) error {
+	_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE users SET auth_source = ?, oidc_subject = ? WHERE id = ?`,
+		authSource, sub, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: set oidc subject: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // UserSort selects the column ListUsers orders by. OrderBy is
 // allowlisted in usersOrderColumn so callers can't inject SQL via
 // this field. Empty / unknown OrderBy falls back to "username".
@@ -88,9 +119,8 @@ func (s *Store) ListUsers(ctx context.Context, sort UserSort) ([]User, error) {
 		// Default: username ASC (alphabetical), matching pre-sort behaviour.
 		asc = true
 	}
-	q := `SELECT id, username, password_hash, role, email, disabled_at,
+	q := `SELECT ` + userSelectCols + ` FROM users ORDER BY ` +
-	             must_change_password, created_at, last_login_at
+		usersOrderColumn(sort.OrderBy, asc)
-	      FROM users ORDER BY ` + usersOrderColumn(sort.OrderBy, asc)
 	rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, q)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: list users: %w", err)
@@ -220,11 +250,13 @@ func (s *Store) SetPasswordHash(ctx context.Context, id, hash string) error {
 func scanUser(scan func(...any) error) (*User, error) {
 	var u User
 	var role string
-	var email, disabledAt, lastLogin sql.NullString
+	var email, disabledAt, oidcSub, lastLogin sql.NullString
 	var must int
+	var authSource string
 	var created string
 	if err := scan(&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.PasswordHash, &role,
-		&email, &disabledAt, &must, &created, &lastLogin); err != nil {
+		&email, &disabledAt, &must, &authSource, &oidcSub,
+		&created, &lastLogin); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 			return nil, ErrNotFound
 		}
@@ -240,6 +272,11 @@ func scanUser(scan func(...any) error) (*User, error) {
 		u.DisabledAt = &t
 	}
 	u.MustChangePassword = must == 1
+	u.AuthSource = authSource
+	if oidcSub.Valid {
+		v := oidcSub.String
+		u.OIDCSubject = &v
+	}
 	t, _ := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, created)
 	u.CreatedAt = t
 	if lastLogin.Valid {

internal/store/users_test.go

@@ -165,6 +165,54 @@ func TestCreateUserLowercasesUsername(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestGetUserByOIDCSubject(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	s := openTestStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	sub := "sub-abc-123"
+
+	if err := s.CreateUser(ctx, User{
+		ID: "u1", Username: "alice", PasswordHash: "",
+		Role: RoleAdmin, CreatedAt: now,
+		AuthSource: "oidc", OIDCSubject: &sub,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, err := s.GetUserByOIDCSubject(ctx, sub)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get by sub: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got.ID != "u1" || got.AuthSource != "oidc" {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected: %+v", got)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.GetUserByOIDCSubject(ctx, "nope"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Errorf("missing sub: want ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSetUserOIDCSubject(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	s := openTestStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+
+	if err := s.CreateUser(ctx, User{
+		ID: "u1", Username: "alice", PasswordHash: "x",
+		Role: RoleAdmin, CreatedAt: now,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
+	}
+	sub := "sub-456"
+	if err := s.SetUserOIDCSubject(ctx, "u1", "oidc", sub); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set: %v", err)
+	}
+	got, _ := s.GetUserByID(ctx, "u1")
+	if got.AuthSource != "oidc" || got.OIDCSubject == nil || *got.OIDCSubject != sub {
+		t.Errorf("after set: %+v", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestEnrollmentTokenSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := openTestStore(t)

tasks.md

@@ -308,7 +308,10 @@ Sizes: **S** = under a day, **M** = 1–3 days, **L** = 3–7 days.
 > **Schema:** migration 0017 adds `email`, `disabled_at`, `must_change_password` plus a UNIQUE INDEX on LOWER(username) (lowercase normalisation in Go on every CreateUser); 0018 adds `user_setup_tokens`. Both column-level ALTERs per CLAUDE.md preference. Email is metadata only in v1 (no SMTP-the-link); the SMTP channel infrastructure from P3-06 makes that a one-page follow-up.
 >
 > **Sweep verified (smoke env):** admin adds operator → setup link generated → curl-as-new-user fetches /setup (200, page shows username) → POSTs password → 303 to / + Set-Cookie → operator authenticated → 200 on /, 200 on /settings/account, **403 on /settings/users** (admin-only) → admin disables user → operator's next request is **401** + session row count drops to 0 → audit log shows `user.created` + `user.setup_completed` for the cycle. All 26 implementation tasks landed; full `go test ./...` green.
-- [ ] **P4-05** (L) OIDC login (generic provider config, group → role mapping)
+- [x] **P4-05** (L) OIDC login (generic provider config, group → role mapping)
+
+> **As shipped (2026-05-05):** Authorization Code + PKCE (S256) against any OIDC IdP advertising standard discovery. Config is YAML+env (`oidc.issuer`, `oidc.client_id`, `oidc.client_secret`/`_file`, `oidc.role_claim` default `groups`, `oidc.role_mapping`, `oidc.display_name`, `oidc.redirect_url`); empty issuer → OIDC disabled, no routes mounted. Migration 0019 adds `users.auth_source`/`oidc_subject` (partial unique index on `oidc_subject`), `sessions.id_token`, and a small `oidc_state` table for state+verifier round-trip (cleaned up every alert tick, 5 min TTL). Login page renders **Sign in with `<display_name>`** above the local form when OIDC is enabled; the SSO button kicks off a 303 to the IdP with state + S256 code_challenge persisted server-side. Callback verifies ID token, fetches `/userinfo` to merge claims (Authelia / many IdPs only put `sub` in the ID token and surface `preferred_username`/`email`/`groups` from userinfo), maps the first matching group to a role; **no match → deny banner**, no row created, audit `user.oidc_login_blocked`. Username-collision with an existing local user → same deny path with `username_taken`. New user → JIT-provisioned with `auth_source='oidc'`, `oidc_subject=<sub>`, `password_hash=''`. Returning user → looked up by `oidc_subject` (stable when usernames change at the IdP), role + email refreshed on every login. Local password login is rejected for `auth_source='oidc'` users. Logout posts to `/logout` and, when the IdP advertised `end_session_endpoint`, follows up with RP-initiated logout (carries `id_token_hint` + `post_logout_redirect_uri=BaseURL`); when not advertised (Authelia in our smoke env), the local session is cleared and the browser lands on `/login`. Users list shows a small **oidc** chip beside enabled/disabled; the edit page disables username/email/role for OIDC users (server-side guard mirrors UI, returns 403). Force-logout, disable, and the last-admin guard from P4-04 all still apply. **Live Authelia sweep verified all four paths against `https://auth.dcglab.co.uk`:** rm-admin → admin role + JIT row + chip + readonly edit; rm-operator → operator JIT, 403 on `/settings/users`; rm-viewer → viewer JIT, 403 on `/hosts/new`; rm-other (group not in role_mapping) → no_role_match banner, no row created, audit logged. Returning rm-admin login resolved to the same row by sub. Screenshots in `_diag/p4-05-sweep/`. Out-of-scope and on Phase 6 candidate list: refresh tokens, back-channel logout, multiple providers, post-login PKCE for the cookie itself.
+
 - [x] **P4-07** (S) Per-host tags + dashboard filtering by tag
 
 > **As shipped (2026-05-05):** Tag column already existed on the hosts schema (JSON array, round-tripped through the Host struct since Phase 1) but had no edit UI or filter. Added `Store.SetHostTags` + `Store.DistinctHostTags` (the latter via `json_each` for autocomplete + chip-row population). Inline editor on the host detail header: `+ tag` button reveals a comma-separated input with `<datalist>` autocomplete from the fleet's distinct tags; submit lowercases / trims / dedupes server-side. Tag chips on the host header link to the dashboard pre-filtered. Dashboard chip-row above the hosts table — `All / <tag1> / <tag2> …` with the active chip highlighted via a new `.tag-active` style; `?tag=foo` filters the list with the count showing `N of M`. Operator-band POST `/hosts/{id}/tags` audited as `host.tags_updated`.

web/templates/pages/login.html

@@ -10,6 +10,18 @@
 
     <h2 class="text-lg font-medium tracking-[-0.005em] text-center mb-7">Sign in to continue</h2>
 
+    {{if .OIDCError}}
+      <div class="panel rounded-[7px] p-4 mb-5"
+           style="border-color: color-mix(in oklch, var(--bad), transparent 60%);">
+        <div class="text-bad text-[12.5px]">
+          {{if eq .OIDCError "no_role_match"}}Your account does not match any role mapping. Contact your administrator.
+          {{else if eq .OIDCError "username_taken"}}A local account with the same username already exists. Contact your administrator.
+          {{else if eq .OIDCError "user_disabled"}}Your account has been disabled. Contact your administrator.
+          {{else}}Sign-in via SSO failed ({{.OIDCError}}). Try again or use a local account.{{end}}
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    {{end}}
+
     {{if .Error}}
       <div class="mb-4 px-3 py-2.5 rounded-[5px] text-xs"
            style="background: color-mix(in oklch, var(--bad), transparent 88%); border: 1px solid color-mix(in oklch, var(--bad), transparent 70%); color: oklch(0.85 0.10 25);">
@@ -17,6 +29,17 @@
       </div>
     {{end}}
 
+    {{if .OIDCEnabled}}
+      <a href="/auth/oidc/login" class="btn btn-primary btn-block btn-lg mb-4">
+        Sign in with {{.OIDCDisplayName}}
+      </a>
+      <div class="flex items-center gap-3 my-5 text-[11px] text-ink-fade uppercase tracking-[0.08em]">
+        <div class="flex-1 border-t border-line-soft"></div>
+        <span>or sign in with a local account</span>
+        <div class="flex-1 border-t border-line-soft"></div>
+      </div>
+    {{end}}
+
     <form method="post" action="/login">
       <div class="mb-3.5">
         <label class="field-label" for="login-username">Username</label>
@@ -33,7 +56,7 @@
       <p class="text-pretty text-xs text-ink-mute leading-[1.65]">
         Forgot your password? An admin can reset it from
         <span class="mono text-ink-mid">Settings → Users</span>.
-        There’s no recovery email — this is self-hosted infrastructure.
+        There's no recovery email — this is self-hosted infrastructure.
       </p>
     </div>
   </div>

web/templates/pages/user_edit.html

@@ -67,9 +67,20 @@
     {{end}}
   {{else}}
     {{/* new + edit form. */}}
+    {{if and (eq $page.Mode "edit") (eq $page.AuthSource "oidc")}}
+      <div class="panel rounded-[7px] p-4 mb-5 mt-7"
+           style="border-color: color-mix(in oklch, var(--accent), transparent 60%);
+                  background: color-mix(in oklch, var(--accent), transparent 95%);">
+        <div class="text-[12.5px] text-ink-mute leading-[1.6]">
+          This user is provisioned via OIDC. Username, role, and email are
+          managed by your IdP and refreshed on each sign-in. Disable /
+          Enable / Force logout still work locally.
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    {{end}}
     <form method="post"
           action="{{if eq $page.Mode "new"}}/settings/users/new{{else}}/settings/users/{{$page.ID}}/edit{{end}}"
-          class="panel mt-7 rounded-[7px] p-6 space-y-4">
+          class="panel rounded-[7px] p-6 space-y-4 {{if and (eq $page.Mode "edit") (eq $page.AuthSource "oidc")}}mt-3{{else}}mt-7{{end}}">
       <div>
         <label class="field-label" for="username">Username</label>
         <input id="username" name="username" type="text"
@@ -82,11 +93,13 @@
       <div>
         <label class="field-label" for="email">Email <span class="text-ink-fade font-normal">· optional</span></label>
         <input id="email" name="email" type="email" class="field"
+               {{if and (eq $page.Mode "edit") (eq $page.AuthSource "oidc")}}readonly disabled{{end}}
                value="{{$page.Email}}" autocomplete="off" />
       </div>
       <div>
         <label class="field-label" for="role">Role</label>
-        <select id="role" name="role" class="field">
+        <select id="role" name="role" class="field"
+                {{if and (eq $page.Mode "edit") (eq $page.AuthSource "oidc")}}disabled{{end}}>
           <option value="admin"    {{if eq $page.Role "admin"}}selected{{end}}>admin</option>
           <option value="operator" {{if eq $page.Role "operator"}}selected{{end}}>operator</option>
           <option value="viewer"   {{if eq $page.Role "viewer"}}selected{{end}}>viewer</option>
@@ -104,9 +117,11 @@
       <div class="panel mt-5 rounded-[7px] p-6">
         <div class="text-[12.5px] text-ink mb-3 font-medium">Other actions</div>
         <div class="flex gap-2 flex-wrap">
-          <form method="post" action="/settings/users/{{$page.ID}}/regenerate-setup">
+          {{if ne $page.AuthSource "oidc"}}
-            <button type="submit" class="btn">Regenerate setup link</button>
+            <form method="post" action="/settings/users/{{$page.ID}}/regenerate-setup">
-          </form>
+              <button type="submit" class="btn">Regenerate setup link</button>
+            </form>
+          {{end}}
           <form method="post" action="/settings/users/{{$page.ID}}/force-logout">
             <button type="submit" class="btn">Force logout</button>
           </form>

web/templates/pages/users.html

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
           {{if .Disabled}}<span class="tag" style="color: var(--ink-fade);">disabled</span>
           {{else if .MustChangePassword}}<span class="tag" style="color: var(--warn); border-color: color-mix(in oklch, var(--warn), transparent 60%); background: color-mix(in oklch, var(--warn), transparent 92%);">setup pending</span>
           {{else}}<span class="tag" style="color: var(--ok);">enabled</span>{{end}}
+          {{if eq .AuthSource "oidc"}}<span class="tag" style="color: var(--accent); border-color: color-mix(in oklch, var(--accent), transparent 60%); background: color-mix(in oklch, var(--accent), transparent 92%); margin-left: 4px;">oidc</span>{{end}}
         </div>
         <div class="text-right">
           <a href="/settings/users/{{.ID}}/edit" class="btn">Edit</a>