steve
bb4ed3502d
P5-01 — Documentation site under docs/book/ rendered with mdBook
(downloaded via Makefile, same static-binary pattern as Tailwind).
Structured chapters: getting started, concepts, operations,
security, reference. `make docs` / `make docs-watch`. Generated
output gitignored.
P5-02 — CONTRIBUTING.md rewritten from placeholder to a full
guide. CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md adapted from Contributor Covenant for a
single-maintainer project. .gitea/issue_template/{bug,feature}.md
and PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md.
P5-04 — Six README screenshots captured live from a fresh server
bootstrap (login, empty dashboard, add-host, alerts, settings,
audit log). README rewritten to centre the screenshot grid and
link out to the docs site.
P5-05 — SECURITY.md with disclosure policy (3-day ack, 30-day
default window), scope in/out, threat-model summary, operator
hardening checklist. Mirrored as a docs-site chapter.
P5-06 — End-to-end test harness. e2e/compose.e2e.yml brings up
server + sibling Linux agent (alpine + restic) + restic/rest-server.
Agent uses announce-and-approve so Playwright can drive the full
operator flow: bootstrap → login → accept pending → backup →
verify terminal status. Second spec scrapes /metrics to assert
the P6-04 endpoint surface. .gitea/workflows/e2e.yml runs on every
PR; local how-to in docs/e2e.md.
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Reporting vulnerabilities
The full disclosure policy lives in
SECURITY.md
at the repo root. The short version:
- Don't open a public issue.
- Send a Gitea private message to
steveon https://gitea.dcglab.co.uk, or email the address on the maintainer's profile, with a subject like[SECURITY] restic-manager: <one-line summary>. - Expect an acknowledgement within 3 working days; escalate through the other channel if you don't get one.
- Default disclosure window is 30 days from confirmed report to public disclosure, faster if a PoC is already circulating, slower only by mutual agreement.
What to include
A description of the issue and the impact, the affected component (server / agent / install script / docs), the version, and reproduction steps. A working PoC is welcome but not required — a credible threat model is enough.
In scope vs. out of scope
See the full policy. Quick highlights:
- In scope: server, agent, install scripts, docker image, docker-compose reference, crypto choices, docs that lead to insecure configs.
- Out of scope: restic itself (report upstream), unpatched third-party deps (report upstream first), pre-authenticated admin abuse (admins are designed to have full power), DoS on deployments without the recommended reverse proxy.