c275f4ff4c
Lands the bottom three layers of Phase 1: P1-08 internal/api: protocol_version + envelope + every WS message shape from spec.md §6.2 (Hello, Heartbeat, Job*, Schedule*, etc). Wire-format tests pin the JSON shape so a rename here breaks tests instead of silently breaking the agent. P1-02 + P1-03 internal/store: SQLite via modernc.org/sqlite, embed.FS + a tiny version table for hand-rolled migrations. 0001_initial.sql covers every table from spec.md §5 plus enrollment_tokens and host_schedule_version. Typed accessors for users / sessions / enrollment / audit. WAL + foreign_keys + busy_timeout on by default. P1-06 internal/crypto: XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD wrapper with per-message random nonce. Key file lifecycle (generate + refuse-to-overwrite, load with size validation). Optional additionalData binds ciphertext to the row that owns it. P1-04 internal/auth (partial — passwords + tokens; sessions middleware lands with the HTTP handlers): argon2id following RFC 9106 (64 MiB / t=3 / p=4 / 32B), constant-time verify. HashToken stores SHA-256 of session/agent/enrollment tokens so a stolen DB doesn't hand over credentials. Build floor moves to Go 1.25 (modernc.org/sqlite v1.50+ requires it); CI + Dockerfile + README updated. Markdown lint diagnostics on tasks.md cleared. All packages tested. ~70 new tests pass in <1s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
82 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
82 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestHashAndVerify(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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pw := "correct horse battery staple"
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h, err := HashPassword(pw)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("hash: %v", err)
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(h, "$argon2id$") {
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t.Errorf("encoded form should start $argon2id$, got %q", h)
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}
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if err := VerifyPassword(h, pw); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("verify: %v", err)
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}
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if err := VerifyPassword(h, "wrong"); err == nil {
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t.Error("verify with wrong password should fail")
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}
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}
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func TestEachHashIsUnique(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Same password hashed twice → different encoded strings (different
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// salts). If this fails the salt is deterministic.
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a, _ := HashPassword("hunter2")
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b, _ := HashPassword("hunter2")
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if a == b {
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t.Fatal("two hashes of the same password collided — non-random salt?")
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}
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}
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func TestVerifyRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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cases := []string{
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"",
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"not-a-hash",
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"$argon2i$v=19$m=64,t=3,p=4$AAAA$BBBB", // wrong variant
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"$argon2id$", // truncated
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"$argon2id$v=99$m=64,t=3,p=4$AAAA$BBBB", // bad version
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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if err := VerifyPassword(c, "anything"); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("should reject malformed hash %q", c)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestNewTokenUnique(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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a, err := NewToken()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
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}
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b, _ := NewToken()
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if a == b {
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t.Fatal("two tokens collided — broken randomness")
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}
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if len(a) < 40 {
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t.Errorf("token suspiciously short: %q (%d bytes)", a, len(a))
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}
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}
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func TestHashTokenStable(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Same input → same hash. This is not a security property, just a
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// sanity check that we're using a regular hash not a salted one.
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h1 := HashToken("foo")
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h2 := HashToken("foo")
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if h1 != h2 {
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t.Errorf("HashToken not deterministic: %q vs %q", h1, h2)
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}
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if len(h1) != 64 { // sha256 hex
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t.Errorf("expected 64-char hex hash, got %d", len(h1))
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}
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}
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