Files
restic-manager/internal/server/http/auth.go
T
steve a781e95c94 P3 follow-up: editable target dir, conditional --no-ownership, UK lint
Three small follow-ups from review:

1. Restore target is now operator-editable. Default value is the
   literal '\$HOME/rm-restore/<job-id>/' (agent expands \$HOME at
   run time using os.UserHomeDir(); also handles \${HOME} and ~/
   prefixes). Operator can replace with any absolute path.
   - ui_restore.go validates the input is either absolute or starts
     with one of the recognised prefixes; other env-var refs (\$PATH
     etc.) are deliberately rejected so operator paths can't pick up
     arbitrary agent env values.
   - host_restore.html replaces the read-only mono-text display with
     a real <input>; help text spells out that \$HOME resolves
     agent-side and <job-id> is substituted on dispatch.
   - install.sh + the systemd unit prep /root/rm-restore so the
     default works under the sandbox: ReadWritePaths gains a soft
     '-/root/rm-restore' entry (the '-' makes the bind-mount soft-fail
     if missing, but install.sh pre-creates it root-owned 0700).

2. --no-ownership flag now gated on restic version. The flag was
   added in restic 0.17 and 0.16 rejects it. Previously dropped it
   wholesale — that meant new-dir restores silently preserved
   ownership against design intent on 0.17+. Now the agent threads
   its detected restic version (sysinfo already collects it) through
   runner.Config -> restic.Env, and RunRestore appends --no-ownership
   only when AtLeastVersion(0, 17) returns true. 0.16 hosts still
   restore with original uid/gid; help text in the wizard explicitly
   notes this. The previous 'Original ownership is preserved' copy
   was wrong for new-dir mode and is corrected.

3. golangci-lint misspell locale switched US -> UK and the codebase
   swept (73 corrections, mostly behaviour/serialise/recognise/honour).
   Wire-format ErrorCode 'unauthorized' -> 'unauthorised' is a tiny
   contract change but the agent doesn't parse those codes today and
   no external API consumers exist yet. Tests passed before + after.

Tests:
- internal/restic/version_test.go covers Env.AtLeastVersion across
  edge cases (empty, exact match, patch above, minor below, non-
  numeric) and expandHome on \$HOME / \${HOME} / ~/, plus
  pass-through for absolute paths and refusal of other env vars.
- ui_restore_test updated: TargetDir now starts '\$HOME/rm-restore/'
  with the job_id substituted into the placeholder.

Live verified on the smoke env: default target restored to
/root/rm-restore/<job-id>/ as the agent's expanded \$HOME (2 files,
14 bytes); custom override '/tmp/custom-restore/<job-id>/' restored
into the agent's PrivateTmp namespace (1 file, 6 bytes); both jobs
'succeeded', exit 0.
2026-05-04 17:27:52 +01:00

211 lines
5.9 KiB
Go

package http
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/json"
stdhttp "net/http"
"time"
"github.com/oklog/ulid/v2"
"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/auth"
"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/store"
)
const (
sessionCookieName = "rm_session"
sessionTTL = 24 * time.Hour
bootstrapCookie = "rm_bootstrap_used"
)
type loginRequest struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"`
}
type loginResponse struct {
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
Role string `json:"role"`
}
func (s *Server) handleLogin(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
var req loginRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_json", err.Error())
return
}
u, err := s.authenticateAndSession(w, r, req.Username, req.Password)
if err != nil {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_credentials", "")
return
}
writeJSON(w, stdhttp.StatusOK, loginResponse{UserID: u.ID, Role: string(u.Role)})
}
// authenticateAndSession verifies credentials, mints a session cookie,
// records the login + audit, and returns the user. Any failure
// (unknown user, wrong password, db error) is collapsed into a single
// error — the caller decides how to surface it. Shared by JSON and
// HTML login flows.
func (s *Server) authenticateAndSession(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request,
username, password string,
) (*store.User, error) {
u, err := s.deps.Store.GetUserByUsername(r.Context(), username)
if err != nil {
// Same response for unknown user vs bad password — don't leak
// existence to a probing attacker.
return nil, errInvalidCredentials
}
if err := auth.VerifyPassword(u.PasswordHash, password); err != nil {
return nil, errInvalidCredentials
}
token, err := auth.NewToken()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
sess := store.Session{
UserID: u.ID,
CreatedAt: now,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(sessionTTL),
IP: r.RemoteAddr,
UA: r.UserAgent(),
}
if err := s.deps.Store.CreateSession(r.Context(), sess, auth.HashToken(token)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_ = s.deps.Store.MarkUserLogin(r.Context(), u.ID, now)
stdhttp.SetCookie(w, &stdhttp.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookieName,
Value: token,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: s.deps.Cfg.CookieSecure,
SameSite: stdhttp.SameSiteLaxMode,
Expires: sess.ExpiresAt,
})
_ = s.deps.Store.AppendAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditEntry{
ID: ulid.Make().String(),
UserID: &u.ID,
Actor: "user",
Action: "auth.login",
TS: now,
})
return u, nil
}
// errInvalidCredentials is the sentinel returned by
// authenticateAndSession for any failure that maps to a 401 in HTTP.
var errInvalidCredentials = errAuth("invalid_credentials")
type errAuth string
func (e errAuth) Error() string { return string(e) }
func (s *Server) handleLogout(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil {
_ = s.deps.Store.DeleteSession(r.Context(), auth.HashToken(c.Value))
}
stdhttp.SetCookie(w, &stdhttp.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookieName,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: s.deps.Cfg.CookieSecure,
SameSite: stdhttp.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
w.WriteHeader(stdhttp.StatusNoContent)
}
type bootstrapRequest struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"`
}
// handleBootstrap creates the first admin user. The endpoint accepts
// the one-time token printed in the server logs on first run, and is
// disabled the moment a user row exists.
func (s *Server) handleBootstrap(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) {
n, err := s.deps.Store.CountUsers(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "")
return
}
if n > 0 {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusConflict, "already_initialised",
"a user already exists; bootstrap is disabled")
return
}
if s.deps.BootstrapToken == "" {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusServiceUnavailable, "no_token",
"bootstrap token not configured")
return
}
var req bootstrapRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_json", err.Error())
return
}
// Constant-time compare keeps timing analysis off the table.
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(req.Token), []byte(s.deps.BootstrapToken)) != 1 {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_token", "")
return
}
if req.Username == "" || len(req.Password) < 12 {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, "weak_password",
"password must be at least 12 characters")
return
}
hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
if err != nil {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "")
return
}
u := store.User{
ID: ulid.Make().String(),
Username: req.Username,
PasswordHash: hash,
Role: store.RoleAdmin,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
if err := s.deps.Store.CreateUser(r.Context(), u); err != nil {
writeJSONError(w, stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "")
return
}
_ = s.deps.Store.AppendAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditEntry{
ID: ulid.Make().String(),
UserID: &u.ID,
Actor: "system",
Action: "auth.bootstrap",
TS: u.CreatedAt,
})
writeJSON(w, stdhttp.StatusCreated, loginResponse{
UserID: u.ID, Role: string(u.Role),
})
}
// ----- json helpers --------------------------------------------------
type jsonError struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"message,omitempty"`
}
func writeJSON(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
func writeJSONError(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, status int, code, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, status, jsonError{Code: code, Message: msg})
}