Files
restic-manager/internal/auth/passwords.go
T
steve a781e95c94 P3 follow-up: editable target dir, conditional --no-ownership, UK lint
Three small follow-ups from review:

1. Restore target is now operator-editable. Default value is the
   literal '\$HOME/rm-restore/<job-id>/' (agent expands \$HOME at
   run time using os.UserHomeDir(); also handles \${HOME} and ~/
   prefixes). Operator can replace with any absolute path.
   - ui_restore.go validates the input is either absolute or starts
     with one of the recognised prefixes; other env-var refs (\$PATH
     etc.) are deliberately rejected so operator paths can't pick up
     arbitrary agent env values.
   - host_restore.html replaces the read-only mono-text display with
     a real <input>; help text spells out that \$HOME resolves
     agent-side and <job-id> is substituted on dispatch.
   - install.sh + the systemd unit prep /root/rm-restore so the
     default works under the sandbox: ReadWritePaths gains a soft
     '-/root/rm-restore' entry (the '-' makes the bind-mount soft-fail
     if missing, but install.sh pre-creates it root-owned 0700).

2. --no-ownership flag now gated on restic version. The flag was
   added in restic 0.17 and 0.16 rejects it. Previously dropped it
   wholesale — that meant new-dir restores silently preserved
   ownership against design intent on 0.17+. Now the agent threads
   its detected restic version (sysinfo already collects it) through
   runner.Config -> restic.Env, and RunRestore appends --no-ownership
   only when AtLeastVersion(0, 17) returns true. 0.16 hosts still
   restore with original uid/gid; help text in the wizard explicitly
   notes this. The previous 'Original ownership is preserved' copy
   was wrong for new-dir mode and is corrected.

3. golangci-lint misspell locale switched US -> UK and the codebase
   swept (73 corrections, mostly behaviour/serialise/recognise/honour).
   Wire-format ErrorCode 'unauthorized' -> 'unauthorised' is a tiny
   contract change but the agent doesn't parse those codes today and
   no external API consumers exist yet. Tests passed before + after.

Tests:
- internal/restic/version_test.go covers Env.AtLeastVersion across
  edge cases (empty, exact match, patch above, minor below, non-
  numeric) and expandHome on \$HOME / \${HOME} / ~/, plus
  pass-through for absolute paths and refusal of other env vars.
- ui_restore_test updated: TargetDir now starts '\$HOME/rm-restore/'
  with the job_id substituted into the placeholder.

Live verified on the smoke env: default target restored to
/root/rm-restore/<job-id>/ as the agent's expanded \$HOME (2 files,
14 bytes); custom override '/tmp/custom-restore/<job-id>/' restored
into the agent's PrivateTmp namespace (1 file, 6 bytes); both jobs
'succeeded', exit 0.
2026-05-04 17:27:52 +01:00

91 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

// Package auth handles password hashing (argon2id), session
// management, CSRF tokens, and bearer-token verification for agents.
package auth
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
// argon2id parameters following RFC 9106 §4 "second
// recommended option" (memory-constrained):
// - 64 MiB memory, 3 iterations, 4 lanes, 32-byte tag.
//
// These are tunable per-deployment if a beefy controller wants to
// crank them; we ship a defensible default.
const (
defaultMemoryKiB = 64 * 1024
defaultIterations = 3
defaultParallel = 4
defaultSaltLen = 16
defaultKeyLen = 32
)
// HashPassword returns an argon2id-encoded string of the form
//
// $argon2id$v=19$m=...,t=...,p=...$<salt>$<hash>
//
// safe to store in a TEXT column. The salt is freshly random per call.
func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
salt := make([]byte, defaultSaltLen)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("auth: read salt: %w", err)
}
hash := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt,
defaultIterations, defaultMemoryKiB, defaultParallel, defaultKeyLen)
return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
argon2.Version,
defaultMemoryKiB, defaultIterations, defaultParallel,
base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt),
base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(hash),
), nil
}
// VerifyPassword returns nil if password matches the encoded hash.
// On any decode error or mismatch the error is non-nil — callers
// should treat all non-nil returns as "invalid credentials" and not
// leak which case it was.
func VerifyPassword(encoded, password string) error {
parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
// "$argon2id$v=...$m=...,t=...,p=...$<salt>$<hash>" → 6 parts (leading empty)
if len(parts) != 6 || parts[1] != "argon2id" {
return errors.New("auth: unrecognised hash format")
}
var version int
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "v=%d", &version); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: parse version: %w", err)
}
if version != argon2.Version {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: unsupported argon2 version %d", version)
}
var memory, iterations uint32
var parallel uint8
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d",
&memory, &iterations, &parallel); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: parse params: %w", err)
}
salt, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[4])
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: decode salt: %w", err)
}
want, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[5])
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: decode hash: %w", err)
}
got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt,
iterations, memory, parallel, uint32(len(want)))
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) != 1 {
return errors.New("auth: invalid password")
}
return nil
}