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3800b34a2b
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Smoothes the rough edges that came up exercising a live deployment.
First-run bootstrap UI: /bootstrap renders a username + password form
that uses the in-memory token directly (operator no longer copies it
out of the log); /login redirects there while bootstrap is available.
Agent reliability: failJob synthetic envelopes so command.run early
returns no longer hang the server-side job; runtime probe of restic
restore --help drives --no-ownership instead of version sniffing
(0.18.x had it removed). Server unit re-shaped: ProtectSystem=full
plus ReadWritePaths=/etc/restic-manager, no ProtectHome — restore
can now write anywhere a user might want.
Restore wizard: default target is /root/rm-restore/<job-id>/ with
clearer help text. Re-init confirm input uses .field (was .input,
which doesn't exist — text was invisible).
NS-01 host delete: store DeleteHost, admin-band /hosts/{id}/delete
with hostname-confirm danger zone, audit, FK cascade, live WS close.
NS-02 enrollment-token recovery: outstanding-tokens panel on
/hosts/new, regenerate (preserves attachments) and revoke handlers
+ audit, store-level ListOutstandingEnrollmentTokens and
DeleteEnrollmentToken.
NS-03 repo init / probe surface: migration 0020 adds
hosts.repo_status + repo_status_error; WS handler projects every
init job's outcome onto the host row (idempotent already-initialised
collapses to ready); creds-save resets status and dispatches a fresh
probe; /hosts/{id}/repo/probe retry endpoint with banner.
NS-04 dashboard live + sort + filter: query-string filter
(q/status/repo_status/tag/sort/dir), 5s htmx live poll mirroring the
alerts pattern with a localStorage live toggle, sortable column
headers, filter row + clear.
Alerts page: ack'd-by line resolves user_id ULID to username.
Compose.yaml ignored — host-specific.
78 lines
3.3 KiB
Desktop File
78 lines
3.3 KiB
Desktop File
[Unit]
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Description=restic-manager agent
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Documentation=https://gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager
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After=network-online.target
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Wants=network-online.target
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[Service]
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Type=simple
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ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/restic-manager-agent -config /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml
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Restart=always
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RestartSec=5
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# The agent runs as root. A fleet-backup tool needs to read every
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# file on the system regardless of DAC permissions; running as a
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# dedicated unprivileged user means either silent skips on /home,
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# /root, /var/lib/<other-daemons>, or operators having to add the
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# service user to every group whose files they want backed up. Both
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# are worse than the threat model already implies (the agent holds
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# repo credentials, executes arbitrary restic, and runs operator-
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# defined hooks — its blast radius is already large).
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#
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# The mitigation is aggressive systemd sandboxing of the root
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# process: drop all capabilities except the few we need, deny
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# writes outside our state dirs, and forbid privilege escalation.
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User=root
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Group=root
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# CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH lets us read any file regardless of DAC perms
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# (the "backup everything" capability). CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is needed
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# during restore for chown/chmod to recreate ownership. Drop the
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# rest — root in this process means "can read", not "can do".
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CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_FOWNER CAP_CHOWN
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AmbientCapabilities=CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_FOWNER CAP_CHOWN
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# Hardening — blocks privilege escalation even from root, and
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# confines kernel / namespace / privilege surface. Filesystem reads
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# stay open (that's the whole job) and restore writes are
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# unrestricted: a backup tool whose entire purpose is "put files
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# back where they belong" can't have ProtectHome=read-only or
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# ProtectSystem=strict without breaking on the first cross-user
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# restore. ProtectSystem=full keeps /usr, /boot, /efi read-only so a
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# compromised agent can't swap out /usr/bin/restic or drop a kernel
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# module, while leaving /home, /root, /var, /opt, /srv, /tmp etc.
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# writable for arbitrary restore targets. The agent is treated as a
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# high-trust component (it runs operator hooks as root and holds
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# repo credentials); the residual hardening is about kernel + privesc
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# protection, not write confinement.
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NoNewPrivileges=true
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ProtectSystem=full
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# ProtectSystem=full mounts /usr, /boot, /efi *and* /etc read-only.
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# The agent rewrites /etc/restic-manager/agent.yaml on enrolment and
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# whenever a new SecretsKey is minted, so we need a targeted
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# write-exemption for that dir. No exemption for the rest of /etc:
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# the agent has no business editing /etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers, etc.
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ReadWritePaths=/etc/restic-manager
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ProtectHostname=true
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ProtectKernelTunables=true
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ProtectKernelModules=true
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ProtectKernelLogs=true
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ProtectControlGroups=true
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ProtectClock=true
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PrivateTmp=true
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
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RestrictRealtime=true
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RestrictSUIDSGID=true
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RestrictNamespaces=true
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LockPersonality=true
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MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
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# (No SystemCallFilter — the cap drop above already constrains what
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# root can do; an allow-list filter killed restic with SIGSYS during
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# init because @system-service excludes some of the syscalls Go's
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# runtime + restic's file scanner reach for. The Protect*/Restrict*
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# toggles still cover network / kernel / mount / namespace.)
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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