Files
restic-manager/internal/agent/secrets/secrets.go
T
steve 27086783da P1-33: agent-side encrypted secrets store + push-on-update
New internal/agent/secrets package: AEAD blob at
/var/lib/restic-manager/secrets.enc, atomic write (os.CreateTemp +
Sync + Rename), 0600. Key lives in agent.yaml as base64
(SecretsKey) — same trust boundary as the bearer token, minted on
first start via EnsureSecretsKey.

cmd/agent: dispatcher reads creds fresh from secrets.Load() on
each job rather than from in-memory config. config.update merges
the push with what's on disk and persists, so a daemon restart
keeps the latest values. Legacy plaintext repo_url/repo_password
in agent.yaml are silently migrated into secrets.enc on next start
and stripped from the YAML on the following save.

Tests: round-trip + wrong-key rejection + atomic-write
post-condition for secrets; key idempotence + legacy-field
parse/clear for config.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 12:41:28 +01:00

118 lines
3.7 KiB
Go

// Package secrets persists the agent's restic repo credentials in an
// AEAD-encrypted file. Phase 1 stores them at rest under a 32-byte
// key kept in agent.yaml (same 0600 root-only trust boundary as the
// bearer token); Phase 2 will swap that for the OS keyring on
// platforms that have one (DPAPI / Secret Service / kwallet).
//
// The wire push path (server → agent over WS as `config.update`) is
// unchanged; this package owns only on-disk persistence.
package secrets
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"gitea.dcglab.co.uk/steve/restic-manager/internal/crypto"
)
// additionalData binds ciphertexts to the agent-secrets context, so a
// blob lifted from one role's file can't be replayed into another's
// row in some unrelated table that uses the same key. (Defence in
// depth — the key is per-host today, but cheap to be careful.)
const additionalData = "rm-agent-repo-creds-v1"
// Repo is the plaintext shape persisted inside the AEAD blob.
type Repo struct {
URL string `json:"repo_url,omitempty"`
Username string `json:"repo_username,omitempty"`
Password string `json:"repo_password,omitempty"`
}
// Empty reports whether the credential set is missing the bare
// minimum (URL + password) needed to run a backup.
func (r Repo) Empty() bool { return r.URL == "" || r.Password == "" }
// Store reads and writes the encrypted secrets file at Path, sealed
// under the 32-byte key Key.
type Store struct {
path string
a *crypto.AEAD
}
// New opens a Store. The key must be exactly crypto.KeyLen bytes
// (32). The file at path is not read here — call Load.
func New(path string, key []byte) (*Store, error) {
if path == "" {
return nil, errors.New("secrets: empty path")
}
a, err := crypto.NewAEAD(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("secrets: %w", err)
}
return &Store{path: path, a: a}, nil
}
// Load returns the persisted Repo, or a zero-value Repo (with no
// error) if the file does not exist yet — first-run agents have
// nothing on disk until the server pushes a config.update.
func (s *Store) Load() (Repo, error) {
body, err := os.ReadFile(s.path)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return Repo{}, nil
}
return Repo{}, fmt.Errorf("secrets: read %q: %w", s.path, err)
}
plain, err := s.a.Decrypt(string(body), []byte(additionalData))
if err != nil {
return Repo{}, fmt.Errorf("secrets: decrypt %q: %w", s.path, err)
}
var r Repo
if err := json.Unmarshal(plain, &r); err != nil {
return Repo{}, fmt.Errorf("secrets: parse %q: %w", s.path, err)
}
return r, nil
}
// Save replaces the on-disk blob atomically. Mode is 0600. Parent
// directory must already exist (the install script lays it down).
func (s *Store) Save(r Repo) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(r)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: marshal: %w", err)
}
ct, err := s.a.Encrypt(body, []byte(additionalData))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: encrypt: %w", err)
}
dir := filepath.Dir(s.path)
tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".secrets-*.tmp")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: create tmp: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmp.Name()
defer func() {
_ = tmp.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath) // no-op once Rename succeeds
}()
if err := tmp.Chmod(0o600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: chmod tmp: %w", err)
}
if _, err := tmp.WriteString(ct); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: write tmp: %w", err)
}
if err := tmp.Sync(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: fsync tmp: %w", err)
}
if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: close tmp: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, s.path); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("secrets: rename: %w", err)
}
return nil
}