docs(plan): agent-readable account list

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-23 21:34:33 +01:00
parent 7039371f70
commit 64ff32ab29
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# Agent-readable `account list` Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Let an agent holding only `EMCLI_KEY` run `emcli account list` and get a reduced JSON view (name, from, can_send), while admin keeps the full text table and `account add/edit/remove` stay admin-only.
**Architecture:** Make `commandRole` subcommand-aware so `account list` routes to the agent role; branch the `list` renderer on whether the admin key is present (admin → existing text table; agent → standard `Success` JSON envelope). No schema change; `ListAccounts` already avoids decrypting secrets.
**Tech Stack:** Go, standard library (`flag`, `encoding/json`), existing `internal/cli` envelope helpers and `internal/crypto` key loaders.
## Global Constraints
- Agent output is the existing JSON envelope shape: `{"error":bool,"error_detail":{...},"data":{...}}` via `Success(...)` / `Failure(...)` in `internal/cli/envelope.go`.
- Admin `account list` output stays byte-for-byte the current human-readable table (`NAME MODE IMAP USER`).
- The agent (reduced) view exposes only `name`, `from`, `can_send` — never the IMAP host/port or login username.
- `from = Account.SendFrom()` (explicit `FromAddress`, else `Username`). `can_send = (Mode == "RW")`.
- `account add/edit/remove` remain admin-only (hard-require `EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY`, no fallback).
- Privilege detection: a caller is "admin" iff `crypto.AdminKeyFromEnv()` returns no error.
- Spec: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-23-agent-account-list-design.md`.
---
### Task 1: Route `account list` to the agent role and render by privilege
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/cli/run.go` (`commandRole`, its call site in `Run`)
- Modify: `internal/cli/admin.go` (the `list` branch of `runAccount`; add `crypto` import)
- Modify: `internal/cli/role_test.go` (`TestCommandRole`)
- Modify: `internal/cli/security_invariant_test.go` (refused-commands set)
- Create/Test: `internal/cli/account_list_test.go`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `store.Account.SendFrom() string`, `store.Account.Mode string`, `store.Store.ListAccounts() ([]store.Account, error)`, `crypto.AdminKeyFromEnv() ([]byte, error)`, `Success(map[string]any) Envelope`, `Failure(code, msg string) Envelope`, `Envelope.Write(io.Writer) error`, test helpers `adminEnv(t)`, `run(t, args...)`.
- Produces: `commandRole(args []string) store.Role` (signature changes from `commandRole(cmd string)`). Agent `account list` emits `{"data":{"accounts":[{"name":string,"from":string,"can_send":bool}]}}`.
- [ ] **Step 1: Rewrite `TestCommandRole` for the new signature and subcommand routing**
Replace the body of `TestCommandRole` in `internal/cli/role_test.go` with:
```go
func TestCommandRole(t *testing.T) {
adminCmds := [][]string{
{"whitelist"}, {"config"}, {"audit"},
{"account"}, {"account", "add"}, {"account", "edit"}, {"account", "remove"},
}
agentCmds := [][]string{
{"list"}, {"get"}, {"search"}, {"ack"}, {"send"}, {"doctor"},
{"account", "list"},
}
for _, c := range adminCmds {
if commandRole(c) != store.RoleAdmin {
t.Errorf("%v should be admin", c)
}
}
for _, c := range agentCmds {
if commandRole(c) != store.RoleAgent {
t.Errorf("%v should be agent", c)
}
}
}
```
Note: `init` is intentionally absent from this table. `commandRole({"init"})` falls through to the agent arm, but `Run` dispatches `init` via its own bootstrap path (which requires both keys), so its `commandRole` result is never used — asserting a role for it here would be both wrong and meaningless.
- [ ] **Step 2: Run the routing test to verify it fails to compile**
Run: `go test ./internal/cli/ -run TestCommandRole`
Expected: FAIL — compile error, `commandRole` takes `string`, called with `[]string`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Make `commandRole` subcommand-aware, update its call site, and fix the security invariant**
In `internal/cli/run.go`, replace:
```go
func commandRole(cmd string) store.Role {
switch cmd {
case "account", "whitelist", "config", "audit":
return store.RoleAdmin
default: // list, get, search, ack, send, doctor
return store.RoleAgent
}
}
```
with:
```go
func commandRole(args []string) store.Role {
switch args[0] {
case "account":
// account list is a read-only discovery view available to agents;
// add/edit/remove mutate config and require admin.
if len(args) >= 2 && args[1] == "list" {
return store.RoleAgent
}
return store.RoleAdmin
case "whitelist", "config", "audit":
return store.RoleAdmin
default: // list, get, search, ack, send, doctor
return store.RoleAgent
}
}
```
In `Run`, change the call site from `role := commandRole(cmd)` to `role := commandRole(args)`.
In `internal/cli/security_invariant_test.go`, in `TestAgentKeyCannotRunAdminCommands`, replace the `adminAttempts` entry `{"account", "list"}` so the set covers a *mutating* account command instead (account list is now allowed for agents):
```go
adminAttempts := [][]string{
{"account", "add", "--name", "x", "--imap-host", "h", "--username", "u@x.com"},
{"config", "set", "audit_retention_days", "30"},
{"audit"},
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run the cli package tests to verify routing + invariant pass**
Run: `go test ./internal/cli/ -run 'TestCommandRole|TestAgentKeyCannotRunAdminCommands'`
Expected: PASS (both). The agent can no longer be proven to refuse `account list` — that is intended; the invariant now proves `account add` is refused and the DB is unchanged.
- [ ] **Step 5: Add the rendering tests (agent JSON view + admin text view)**
Create `internal/cli/account_list_test.go`:
```go
package cli
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// With only EMCLI_KEY set, `account list` emits the reduced JSON envelope:
// name/from/can_send, and never the IMAP host or login username.
func TestAccountListAgentJSONView(t *testing.T) {
adminEnv(t) // both keys + initialized temp DB
run(t, "account", "add", "--name", "work", "--mode", "RW",
"--imap-host", "imap.example.com", "--smtp-host", "smtp.example.com",
"--username", "login@example.com", "--from", "me@example.com")
run(t, "account", "add", "--name", "alerts", "--mode", "RO",
"--imap-host", "imap.example.com", "--username", "alerts@example.com")
// Drop the admin key → caller is an agent.
t.Setenv("EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY", "")
code, out, errOut := run(t, "account", "list")
if code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("agent account list should succeed: code=%d err=%q", code, errOut)
}
var env struct {
Error bool `json:"error"`
Data struct {
Accounts []struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
From string `json:"from"`
CanSend bool `json:"can_send"`
} `json:"accounts"`
} `json:"data"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &env); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output is not the agent envelope: %v\n%s", err, out)
}
if env.Error || len(env.Data.Accounts) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 accounts and no error, got %+v", env)
}
// The reduced view must not leak the IMAP host or the login username.
if strings.Contains(out, "imap.example.com") || strings.Contains(out, "login@example.com") {
t.Fatalf("agent view leaked host/username:\n%s", out)
}
got := map[string]struct {
from string
canSend bool
}{}
for _, a := range env.Data.Accounts {
got[a.Name] = struct {
from string
canSend bool
}{a.From, a.CanSend}
}
if g := got["work"]; g.from != "me@example.com" || !g.canSend {
t.Errorf("work: want from=me@example.com can_send=true, got %+v", g)
}
// alerts has no --from → SendFrom() falls back to the username.
if g := got["alerts"]; g.from != "alerts@example.com" || g.canSend {
t.Errorf("alerts: want from=alerts@example.com can_send=false, got %+v", g)
}
}
// With the admin key present, `account list` stays the full human-readable table.
func TestAccountListAdminTextView(t *testing.T) {
adminEnv(t)
run(t, "account", "add", "--name", "work", "--mode", "RW",
"--imap-host", "imap.example.com", "--smtp-host", "smtp.example.com",
"--username", "login@example.com", "--from", "me@example.com")
code, out, _ := run(t, "account", "list")
if code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("admin account list failed: code=%d", code)
}
for _, want := range []string{"NAME", "MODE", "IMAP", "USER", "imap.example.com:993", "login@example.com"} {
if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
t.Fatalf("admin view missing %q:\n%s", want, out)
}
}
if strings.Contains(out, `"accounts"`) {
t.Fatalf("admin view should be text, not JSON:\n%s", out)
}
}
```
- [ ] **Step 6: Run the rendering tests to verify the agent view fails**
Run: `go test ./internal/cli/ -run 'TestAccountListAgentJSONView|TestAccountListAdminTextView'`
Expected: `TestAccountListAdminTextView` PASS (already text); `TestAccountListAgentJSONView` FAIL — output is still the text table, so `json.Unmarshal` errors.
- [ ] **Step 7: Split the `list` branch by privilege in `runAccount`**
In `internal/cli/admin.go`, add the crypto import. Change the import block:
```go
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"strconv"
"git.dcglab.co.uk/steve/emcli/internal/crypto"
"git.dcglab.co.uk/steve/emcli/internal/store"
"git.dcglab.co.uk/steve/emcli/internal/tui"
)
```
Replace the `case "list":` block (currently):
```go
case "list":
accs, err := st.ListAccounts()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errOut, "list: %v\n", err)
return 1
}
fmt.Fprintf(out, "%-16s %-4s %-28s %s\n", "NAME", "MODE", "IMAP", "USER")
for _, a := range accs {
fmt.Fprintf(out, "%-16s %-4s %-28s %s\n",
a.Name, a.Mode, fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", a.IMAPHost, a.IMAPPort), a.Username)
}
return 0
```
with:
```go
case "list":
// Holding the admin key means the caller is the human admin (full
// detail). An agent holds only EMCLI_KEY and gets a reduced JSON view.
_, adminErr := crypto.AdminKeyFromEnv()
isAdmin := adminErr == nil
accs, err := st.ListAccounts()
if err != nil {
if isAdmin {
fmt.Fprintf(errOut, "list: %v\n", err)
} else {
_ = Failure(CodeDB, err.Error()).Write(out)
}
return 1
}
if !isAdmin {
items := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(accs))
for _, a := range accs {
items = append(items, map[string]any{
"name": a.Name,
"from": a.SendFrom(),
"can_send": a.Mode == "RW",
})
}
_ = Success(map[string]any{"accounts": items}).Write(out)
return 0
}
fmt.Fprintf(out, "%-16s %-4s %-28s %s\n", "NAME", "MODE", "IMAP", "USER")
for _, a := range accs {
fmt.Fprintf(out, "%-16s %-4s %-28s %s\n",
a.Name, a.Mode, fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", a.IMAPHost, a.IMAPPort), a.Username)
}
return 0
```
- [ ] **Step 8: Run the full cli package test suite**
Run: `go test ./internal/cli/`
Expected: PASS (all tests, including the two new rendering tests, the routing test, and the security invariant).
- [ ] **Step 9: Run the whole module to confirm nothing else regressed**
Run: `go build ./... && go test ./...`
Expected: build clean; all packages PASS.
- [ ] **Step 10: Commit**
```bash
git add internal/cli/run.go internal/cli/admin.go internal/cli/role_test.go \
internal/cli/security_invariant_test.go internal/cli/account_list_test.go
git commit -m "feat(cli): agent-readable account list (reduced JSON view)
account list now routes to the agent role; an agent (EMCLI_KEY only) gets a
JSON envelope of name/from/can_send, while the admin keeps the full text
table. account add/edit/remove stay admin-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>"
```
---
### Task 2: Update user and agent documentation
**Files:**
- Modify: `USER-MANUAL.md` (command-kinds note, role table, cheatsheet)
- Modify: `skills/emcli/SKILL.md` (allowed-commands note, command table, do/don't)
- Modify: `skills/emcli/AGENTIC-MANUAL.md` (§4 account discovery)
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: behavior shipped in Task 1 (agent `account list``{"data":{"accounts":[{name,from,can_send}]}}`).
- Produces: docs only; no code interface.
- [ ] **Step 1: USER-MANUAL — note that `account list` is the one agent-readable admin view**
In `USER-MANUAL.md`, in the "Two kinds of commands" block, change the Admin bullet (line ~36) from:
```
- **Admin commands** (`init`, `account`, `whitelist`, `config`, `audit`) require `EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY`
and are for *you*, the human. They print human-readable text or open an interactive form.
```
to:
```
- **Admin commands** (`init`, `account add/edit/remove`, `whitelist`, `config`, `audit`) require
`EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY` and are for *you*, the human. They print human-readable text or open an
interactive form. (`account list` is the one exception — it is also an agent command; see below.)
```
- [ ] **Step 2: USER-MANUAL — update the role table**
Replace the role table rows (lines ~127-128):
```
| `list`, `get`, `search`, `ack`, `send`, `doctor` | Agent (`EMCLI_KEY` or `EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY`) |
| `account`, `whitelist`, `config`, `audit` | Admin (`EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY` required) |
```
with:
```
| `list`, `get`, `search`, `ack`, `send`, `doctor`, `account list` | Agent (`EMCLI_KEY` or `EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY`) |
| `account add/edit/remove`, `whitelist`, `config`, `audit` | Admin (`EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY` required) |
`account list` is dual-role: with the admin key it prints the full `NAME MODE IMAP USER` table;
with only `EMCLI_KEY` (an agent) it prints a JSON envelope exposing just `name`, `from`, and
`can_send` — no host or login username.
```
- [ ] **Step 3: USER-MANUAL — annotate the cheatsheet**
In the cheatsheet (line ~597), change:
```
emcli account list # list accounts (no secrets)
```
to:
```
emcli account list # full table (admin) / name+from+can_send JSON (agent)
```
- [ ] **Step 4: SKILL.md — carve `account list` out of the forbidden-commands rule**
In `skills/emcli/SKILL.md`, change the first bullet (lines ~20-24):
```
- **You only run agent commands:** `list`, `get`, `search`, `ack`, `send`, `doctor`. You are
provided only `EMCLI_KEY` (the agent key), which authorises these commands and nothing else.
Account setup, passwords, whitelists, and config are the **user's** job (admin commands that
require `EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY`) — do not run or suggest running `account`, `whitelist`, `config`,
`audit`, or `init`. You have only `EMCLI_KEY` (agent key); `emcli` will refuse admin commands
with a privilege error.
```
to:
```
- **You only run agent commands:** `list`, `get`, `search`, `ack`, `send`, `doctor`, and
`account list` (to discover accounts). You are provided only `EMCLI_KEY` (the agent key), which
authorises these and nothing else. Account *setup* (`account add/edit/remove`), passwords,
whitelists, and config are the **user's** job (admin commands that require `EMCLI_ADMIN_KEY`) —
do not run or suggest running `account add/edit/remove`, `whitelist`, `config`, `audit`, or
`init`. `emcli` will refuse those with a privilege error.
```
- [ ] **Step 5: SKILL.md — add `account list` to the command table**
In the command table (after the `send` row, line ~122), add:
```
| `emcli account list` | Discover accounts: JSON `name` / `from` / `can_send` per account |
```
- [ ] **Step 6: SKILL.md — fix the "don't" bullet**
Change (lines ~147-148):
```
- ❌ Don't run admin commands (`account`/`whitelist`/`config`/`audit`/`init`) — you have only
`EMCLI_KEY` (agent key); `emcli` will refuse admin commands with a privilege error.
```
to:
```
- ❌ Don't run admin commands (`account add/edit/remove`, `whitelist`, `config`, `audit`, `init`) —
you have only `EMCLI_KEY` (agent key); `emcli` will refuse them with a privilege error.
(`account list` is allowed — use it to discover accounts.)
```
Also change the ✅ bullet (line ~145) from `Ask the user for the account name; keep bodies plain text.` to:
```
- ✅ Discover accounts with `emcli account list`, or ask the user; keep bodies plain text.
```
- [ ] **Step 7: AGENTIC-MANUAL — document discovery via `account list`**
In `skills/emcli/AGENTIC-MANUAL.md`, replace the body of `## 4. Find the account(s)` (lines ~88-97):
```
You refer to an account by name (e.g. `gmail`, `work`). Ask the user which account to use.
`emcli doctor` is an agent command (authorised by `EMCLI_KEY`), so you can run it to check that
configured accounts connect and authenticate:
```bash
emcli doctor # all accounts
emcli doctor --account gmail
```
Just take the account name from the user and start with the workflow in `SKILL.md`.
```
with:
```
You refer to an account by name (e.g. `gmail`, `work`). Discover the configured accounts yourself
with `emcli account list` (an agent command authorised by `EMCLI_KEY`); it prints a JSON envelope
with one entry per account:
```bash
emcli account list
# {"error":false,"error_detail":{},"data":{"accounts":[
# {"name":"gmail","from":"me@gmail.com","can_send":true},
# {"name":"alerts","from":"alerts@x.com","can_send":false}]}}
```
`name` is what you pass to `--account`; `from` is the send-as identity; `can_send` is false for
read-only accounts (they reject `send`). If unsure which to use, ask the user. `emcli doctor`
(also an agent command) checks that accounts connect and authenticate:
```bash
emcli doctor # all accounts
emcli doctor --account gmail
```
Then start with the workflow in `SKILL.md`.
```
- [ ] **Step 8: Sanity-check the docs render and reference reality**
Run: `grep -n "account list" USER-MANUAL.md skills/emcli/SKILL.md skills/emcli/AGENTIC-MANUAL.md`
Expected: each file shows the updated `account list` references; no remaining text claims the agent cannot run `account list`.
- [ ] **Step 9: Commit**
```bash
git add USER-MANUAL.md skills/emcli/SKILL.md skills/emcli/AGENTIC-MANUAL.md
git commit -m "docs: agent can discover accounts via account list
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>"
```
---
## Notes for the implementer
- Run all Go commands from the repo root (`/home/steve/src/emcli`).
- The two intentional red states are Step 2 (compile error) and Step 6 (agent JSON test) in Task 1. Every other test run must be green.
- Do not change the admin text table or add columns to it — admin output must stay identical.
- `adminEnv(t)` and `run(t, ...)` live in `internal/cli/admin_test.go`; `b64Key`/`b64AgentKey` in `internal/cli/run_test.go`. No new helpers are needed.