e3f8afbc7c
Reading state is now a per-(account,folder) floor plus an acked set of UIDs above it, instead of a single monotonic pointer. This makes acknowledgement per-message and order-independent so concurrent subagents can process and ack out of order. Internal compaction collapses contiguous acked runs into the floor to bound storage. Adds stateless search and ack commands; reads no longer mutate state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
325 lines
16 KiB
Markdown
325 lines
16 KiB
Markdown
# emcli — Specification
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**Status:** Draft for implementation
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**Source:** `specifications/PRD.md`
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**Date:** 2026-06-21
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## 1. Summary
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`emcli` is a single cross-platform Go binary that mediates all email access for an AI
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agent. The agent never holds email credentials and never connects to IMAP/SMTP directly —
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every read and send passes through `emcli`, which enforces user-configured restrictions.
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The goal is to contain the blast radius of agent hallucination when operating on live
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email: even with faulty instructions, the agent cannot read mail it is not permitted to
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see or send mail to recipients it is not permitted to contact.
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## 2. Goals & non-goals
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### Goals
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- Single static binary, no runtime dependencies, cross-compiled per OS/arch.
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- Email credentials and OAuth tokens are encrypted at rest and never exposed to the agent.
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- Per-account enforcement of read-only/read-write mode, inbound/outbound whitelists, and
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subject filtering.
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- Machine-readable JSON for agent commands; human-readable/interactive output for admin.
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- Auditable history of agent actions with configurable retention.
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### Non-goals
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- Not a full email client (no threading UI, no flags/labels management beyond what is
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needed, no draft management).
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- No graphical UI. TUI is used only for init and (re)configuration.
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- No multi-user/server mode — `emcli` is a local utility invoked per-process.
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## 3. Technology choices
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| Concern | Choice |
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| --- | --- |
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| Language/runtime | Go (no CGO) |
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| IMAP | `github.com/emersion/go-imap` |
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| SMTP | `github.com/emersion/go-smtp` |
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| MIME parsing/building | `github.com/emersion/go-message` |
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| SASL / XOAUTH2 | `github.com/emersion/go-sasl` |
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| SQLite | `modernc.org/sqlite` (pure Go) |
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| TUI | `github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea` (+ `lipgloss`) |
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| Crypto | Go stdlib `crypto/aes` + `crypto/cipher` (AES-256-GCM) |
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Rationale: the emersion email libraries are mature and designed to be used together,
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including XOAUTH2 for Gmail. Pure-Go SQLite avoids CGO so the binary is genuinely static
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and trivially cross-compiled.
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## 4. Architecture
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The binary is organized into independently testable packages:
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- **`store`** — encrypted SQLite config and state. Owns the schema, migrations, and
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field-level encryption of secret columns.
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- **`policy`** — pure enforcement functions: mode (RO/RW), whitelist-in, whitelist-out,
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subject regex, folder access. No I/O. The single gate every agent action passes through.
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- **`mail`** — IMAP read and SMTP send, including SASL XOAUTH2 and password auth.
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- **`oauth`** — loopback-redirect consent flow, refresh-token storage, automatic
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access-token refresh.
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- **`audit`** — append-only action log with retention-based purge.
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- **`cli`** — command dispatch and the two output surfaces (agent JSON, admin
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human-readable/TUI).
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### Trust boundary
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- The agent invokes only the **agent commands** (Section 7.1).
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- `EMCLI_KEY` is supplied by the environment/orchestrator that launches `emcli`, never as
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an argument the agent constructs. The agent has no command that reveals secret values.
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- All policy decisions happen inside `emcli`; the agent cannot bypass them because it has
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no other path to the mail servers.
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## 5. Configuration & secrets
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- **Encryption key:** `EMCLI_KEY` env var, a base64-encoded 32-byte key (AES-256). If
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absent or malformed, every command that touches the DB fails closed with an error
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envelope; no plaintext fallback.
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- **Database path:** `EMCLI_DB` env var; default `~/.config/emcli/emcli.db`
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(`%AppData%\emcli\emcli.db` on Windows).
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- **Field-level encryption:** secret columns are stored as AES-256-GCM ciphertext with a
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random 96-bit nonce per value, prefixed to the ciphertext. Non-secret config remains
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plaintext for debuggability. Decryption with the wrong key fails (GCM auth tag) and is
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surfaced as an error, never silently ignored.
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Secret columns: account password, OAuth client secret, OAuth refresh token.
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## 6. Data model (SQLite)
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```
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accounts
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id INTEGER PK
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name TEXT UNIQUE -- agent-facing identifier
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mode TEXT -- 'RO' | 'RW'
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imap_host TEXT
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imap_port INTEGER
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imap_security TEXT -- 'tls' | 'starttls'
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smtp_host TEXT -- nullable for RO accounts
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smtp_port INTEGER
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smtp_security TEXT -- 'tls' | 'starttls'
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auth_type TEXT -- 'password' | 'oauth2'
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username TEXT
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enc_password BLOB -- encrypted (password auth)
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enc_oauth_client_id BLOB -- encrypted (oauth2)
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enc_oauth_client_secret BLOB -- encrypted (oauth2)
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enc_oauth_refresh_token BLOB -- encrypted (oauth2)
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whitelist_in_enabled INTEGER -- 0 | 1
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whitelist_out_enabled INTEGER -- 0 | 1
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subject_regex TEXT -- nullable; blank/null = no subject filter
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process_backlog INTEGER -- 0 | 1; baseline policy for newly-seen folders
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-- 0 (default) = floor at current max UID
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-- 1 = floor at 0 (process existing mail)
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whitelist_in
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account_id INTEGER FK
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address TEXT -- exact addr or '@domain.com'
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whitelist_out
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account_id INTEGER FK
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address TEXT
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folder_state -- one row per folder ever seen
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account_id INTEGER FK
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folder TEXT
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uidvalidity INTEGER
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floor_uid INTEGER -- nothing at or below this is ever "new"
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PRIMARY KEY (account_id, folder)
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acked -- individual processed UIDs above the floor
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account_id INTEGER FK
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folder TEXT
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uidvalidity INTEGER
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uid INTEGER
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PRIMARY KEY (account_id, folder, uid)
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audit_log
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id INTEGER PK
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ts TEXT -- RFC3339 UTC
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account TEXT
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action TEXT -- 'list' | 'get' | 'send' | 'ack' | 'search'
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target TEXT -- folder, UID(s), or recipient set
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result TEXT -- 'allowed' | 'blocked'
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reason TEXT -- nullable; populated on block
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settings
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key TEXT PK
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value TEXT
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-- includes: audit_retention_days, schema_version
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```
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Notes:
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- Folders are agent-specified; there is no folder whitelist. Read state is tracked per
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`(account, folder)`.
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- **"New" is a seen-set, not a watermark.** A message is "new" when it exists in the
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folder, its `uid > floor_uid`, and its `uid` is not in `acked`. This makes
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acknowledgement per-message and order-independent — essential when the agent fans
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processing out to concurrent subagents that finish out of order.
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- **Floor baseline.** On first contact with a folder, `floor_uid` is set from the
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account's `process_backlog` policy: the current highest UID (default — existing mail is
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treated as already handled) or `0` (process the existing backlog).
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- **Compaction (internal, invisible to the agent).** When `acked` holds a contiguous run
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of UIDs immediately above `floor_uid`, that run is collapsed: `floor_uid` advances past
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it and the rows are deleted. This bounds storage without changing what counts as new. A
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folder processed strictly in order degenerates to a single floor value with an empty
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`acked` set (i.e. the watermark case); out-of-order processing leaves short-lived holes
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above the floor until they fill in.
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- **UIDVALIDITY change.** If the server reports a different `UIDVALIDITY` for a folder than
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the stored value, UIDs are no longer comparable: `folder_state` and `acked` for that
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folder are reset and the floor re-baselined per `process_backlog`.
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## 7. Command surface
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### 7.1 Agent commands (JSON output only)
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All agent commands emit a single JSON object (Section 8) and nothing else on stdout.
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All read commands are **stateless** — they never mutate floor or ack state. The only
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command that advances read state is `ack`.
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**`emcli list --account <name> --folder <folder> [--new] [--before <uid>] [--since <uid>] [--limit N]`**
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- Returns message headers only: `uid`, `from`, `to`, `subject`, `date`, `message_id`,
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`has_attachments`. Newest-first.
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- `--new` filters to messages that are new per the seen-set rule (`uid > floor_uid` and
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not in `acked`). It does **not** advance any state.
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- `--before <uid>` / `--since <uid>` page through history by UID cursor (e.g. page older by
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passing the lowest UID from the previous page as `--before`).
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- `--limit` caps results (default applied if omitted; see 7.3).
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- Whitelist-in and subject-regex filtering are applied before results are returned
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(Section 9); filtered messages are invisible in every mode.
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**`emcli get --account <name> --folder <folder> --uid <uid>`**
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- Returns full message: headers, decoded plain-text body, and attachments as
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`{name, size, mime, content_b64}`.
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- Does **not** ack the message — fetching to inspect is distinct from consuming.
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- If the message is filtered by whitelist-in or subject-regex, returns an error envelope
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(not-found) — the agent cannot retrieve filtered mail.
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**`emcli search --account <name> --folder <folder> [--from <addr>] [--subject-contains <s>] [--text <s>] [--since <date>] [--before <date>] [--limit N]`**
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- Server-side IMAP SEARCH across the whole folder, regardless of floor/ack state. Returns
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the same headers-only shape as `list`. Useful for finding specific historical mail.
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- Subject to the same inbound filtering as `list`/`get`: filtered messages never appear.
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- Stateless.
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**`emcli ack --account <name> --folder <folder> --uid <uid>…`**
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- Marks one or more UIDs as processed (adds them to the `acked` set; triggers compaction).
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- Idempotent, batchable, and order-independent — safe to call from concurrent subagents.
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- After ack, those UIDs no longer appear under `list --new`.
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- A filtered/invisible UID cannot be acked (returns not-found), preventing the agent from
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manipulating state for mail it isn't allowed to see.
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**`emcli send --account <name> --to <addr>… [--cc <addr>…] [--bcc <addr>…] --subject <s> --body <text> [--attach <path>]… [--reply-to <uid>]`**
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- Sends a plain-text message via the account's SMTP endpoint.
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- `--reply-to <uid>` fetches the source message's `Message-ID` and `References` and sets
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`In-Reply-To`/`References` headers so the reply threads correctly. The referenced UID is
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read from the same account (subject to inbound filtering — a filtered source UID cannot
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be replied to).
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- Enforcement: RO accounts are rejected; whitelist-out (if enabled) must pass for every
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recipient across to/cc/bcc or the entire send is blocked (Section 9).
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### 7.2 Admin commands (human-readable / TUI)
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- **`emcli init`** — TUI flow: creates the DB (generating schema), adds the first account,
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and runs OAuth consent if the account is OAuth2.
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- **`emcli account add | edit | remove | list`** — interactive add/edit; `list` prints a
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table (never secrets). `account add` accepts `--process-backlog` (default off) which sets
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the account's baseline policy: off ⇒ newly-seen folders floor at their current max UID
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(existing mail treated as handled); on ⇒ floor at 0 (existing mail is processed).
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- **`emcli whitelist in|out add|remove|list --account <name>`** — manage whitelist entries.
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- **`emcli config set|get`** — global settings (e.g. `audit_retention_days`).
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- **`emcli audit list [--account <name>] [--limit N]`** — view recent audit entries.
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- **`emcli doctor`** — verifies `EMCLI_KEY` is present and valid, the DB opens, and each
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account's IMAP/SMTP connectivity and auth succeed. Human-readable diagnostics.
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### 7.3 Defaults & limits
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- `list --limit` default: 50; maximum: 500.
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- Attachment handling in `get`: full base64 contents are returned. (No size cap in v1; the
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caller is responsible for limits. Revisit if payloads prove unwieldy.)
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## 8. JSON output envelope
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Every agent command prints exactly one object:
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```json
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{
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"error": false,
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"error_detail": {},
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"data": {}
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}
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```
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- `error` — boolean.
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- `error_detail` — object; empty `{}` on success, otherwise `{ "code": "...", "message": "..." }`.
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Never contains secret values.
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- `data` — command-specific payload; `{}` or `[]` when not applicable.
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- Process exit code mirrors `error` (0 on success, non-zero on error) for scripting, but
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the JSON is authoritative.
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## 9. Enforcement semantics
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Enforcement lives entirely in the `policy` package and is exercised on every agent action.
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### Inbound (read: `list`, `get`, `search`, `ack`)
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- If `whitelist_in_enabled`, the message sender must match a `whitelist_in` entry.
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- If `subject_regex` is set (non-empty), the subject must match the regex.
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- A message that fails either check is **invisible**: excluded from `list` and `search`
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results, not retrievable via `get`, and not ackable via `ack` (all return not-found). The
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agent has no way to learn that the message exists or to alter read state for it.
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### Outbound (send)
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- If account `mode` is `RO`, `send` is rejected.
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- If `whitelist_out_enabled`, every recipient (to + cc + bcc) must match a `whitelist_out`
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entry. If any recipient fails, the **entire** send is blocked — no partial send.
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### Address matching (both directions)
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- Case-insensitive.
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- An entry of the form `@domain.com` matches any address at that domain.
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- Any other entry matches a full address exactly.
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### Audit
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- Every action (`list`, `get`, `search`, `ack`, `send`), allowed or blocked, writes one
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`audit_log` row.
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- Blocked actions record a `reason` (e.g. `ro_mode`, `whitelist_out`, `filtered`).
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- On each run that opens the DB, audit rows older than `audit_retention_days` are purged.
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## 10. OAuth2 (Gmail and compatible)
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- The user supplies their own OAuth client ID/secret (registered in their Google Cloud
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project) during account configuration.
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- Consent uses the **loopback redirect** flow: `emcli` starts a temporary listener on
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`127.0.0.1:<ephemeral-port>`, opens the consent URL, captures the authorization code on
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redirect, exchanges it for tokens, and stores the **refresh token** (encrypted).
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- Access tokens are obtained/refreshed automatically before IMAP/SMTP use and held only in
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memory.
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- IMAP and SMTP authenticate via SASL XOAUTH2 using the current access token.
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## 11. Error handling
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- All agent-command failures return the JSON error envelope; they never crash with an
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uncaught panic or emit partial non-JSON output on stdout.
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- Categories: configuration/key errors, DB errors, network/connection errors, auth
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errors, policy blocks, and not-found. Each maps to a stable `error_detail.code`.
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- Secrets never appear in output, error details, or the audit log.
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## 12. Testing
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- **`policy`** — table-driven unit tests covering the matrix of mode × whitelist-in ×
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whitelist-out × subject-regex, including domain-match and case-insensitivity, and the
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"any recipient fails ⇒ whole send blocked" rule.
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- **`store`** — encryption round-trip; decryption with the wrong key fails closed; schema
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migration; floor baseline per `process_backlog`; seen-set membership (`uid > floor` and
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not acked); out-of-order ack correctness; compaction collapses contiguous runs into the
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floor; `folder_state`/`acked` reset on `UIDVALIDITY` change.
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- **`mail`** — integration tests against a containerized IMAP/SMTP server (e.g. GreenMail
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or Dovecot) for list/get/send and threading headers.
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- **`oauth`** — token exchange/refresh against a mocked authorization server; loopback
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capture logic unit-tested.
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- **CLI** — golden-file tests of the JSON envelope for representative success and error
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cases; assert no secret ever appears in output.
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## 13. Open items / future work
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- Optional attachment size cap on `get` if payloads prove unwieldy.
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- Additional auth mechanisms (e.g. OAuth for non-Google providers) follow the same model.
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- Whitelist semantics are currently per-account only; global defaults with overrides are
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explicitly out of scope for v1.
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- No `unack` / re-process command in v1; the agent acks deliberately and acks are final
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(short of an admin reset). Add if a re-processing workflow proves necessary.
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